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JANUARY, 1923

GENUINE AND COUNTERFEIT CHRISTIANITY

Among the extra-canonical sayings ascribed to Jesus, best entitled to be regarded as genuine, is the saying, "Show yourselves approved money-changers." Many of the Church fathers made use of this saying to explain the words, "Prove all things: hold fast that which is good," believing that underlying both exhortations is the figure of a money-changer testing the coins submitted to him to ascertain whether they are genuine or counterfeit. Whether or not this saying was an actual utterance of Jesus, and was present to Paul's mind when he penned his well-known exhortation, it directs attention to a qualification much needed by Christians today.

It may seem strange, passing strange, that nearly two thousand years after the death of Christ men should be discussing the question, What is Christianity? None the less the question is being everywhere debated; and the most divergent answers given and passionately defended, even among those calling themselves Christians. So-called liberal Christians, as a rule, define Christianity as "the religion of Jesus," meaning the religion that Jesus taught and practised, and so value Him exclusively as teacher and example. So-called conservative Christians, however, define Christianity as the religion that has Jesus as its object, and while yielding to none in their esteem of Him as teacher and example yet value Him most of all as Lord and Redeemer. Who is right? Among individuals having more or less of a following, we find that Royce identified Christianity with the sentiment of loyalty, that Sabatier held it to be only a high form of altruism, that Macintosh of the Yale Divinity School says it is nothing but morality of a Christ-like

sort, that Cross of Rochester Theological Seminary identifies it with the highest manifestations of man's religious and ethical life to such an extent that he says the only true Christianity lies in the future. It is difficult to exaggerate the differences between the things called Christianity today. Some preach a non-miraculous Christianity; others tell us that Christianity bereft of its miracles is Christianity extinct. Some hold a non-doctrinal Christianity; others are convinced that since Christianity is an historical religion a non-doctrinal Christianity is an absurdity. Some commend a Christless Christianity, or at least a Christianity in which Christ is not indispensable; others assure us that such a Christianity is nothing short of a contradiction in terms. And as though nothing were too extreme to lack advocates, there are even those who offer us an atheistic Christianity. This is not so surprising when we remind ourselves that a Christianity without God is not precluded by those who identify it with loyalty or morality or altruism. For can not even an atheist be loyal or moral or altruistic, after a fashion at least?

We have made no effort to list the things called Christianity today. In that case we would have to make mention of Christian Science, and Theosophy, and Russellism, and Mormonism, and Spiritualism, and New Thought, and what not? In fact we live in an age in which nearly every system of thought and life designates itself essential Christianity. Surely, enough has been said, however, to justify the statement that there has never been a generation of Christians who more needed to give heed to the exhortation, "Show yourselves approved money-changers." than the one of which we are a part. At the same time it is questionable whether there has ever been a generation less qualified for the task. If proof be needed, it may be found in two significant books published shortly after the conclusion of the Great War, dealing with the religious situation among the British¹ and

¹ *The Army and Religion*, edited by D. S. Cairns.

American² soldiers during that conflict. Both of these books report the results of first hand investigations, and perhaps the most appalling discovery of all was the almost unbelievable ignorance of Christ and Christianity on the part of these soldiers, most of whom had been reared under the influence of Christian churches and called themselves Christians. These soldiers were a cross-section of these nations, possibly the two most Christian nations in the world, young men probably somewhat above the average intellectually as well as physically, so that what was true of them was at least equally true of those of similar age who remained at home. Do we need to look further to explain the fact that so many members of Christian churches fall easy victims to every popular expounder of a new Ism, provided he or she labels it with the Christian name? The pity of it is that multitudes are embracing systems of thought and life that lack every essential of historical Christianity, nay more, that are positively hostile to all that is most distinctive of historical Christianity, who yet cherish the notion that they are Christianity's purest confessors and exemplars, and as such its beneficiaries and heirs.

We are not indeed to suppose that our age is the only age that has debated the question, What is Christianity? In the nature of the case this question takes precedence of all others. Such questions as, Is Christianity true? What is the value of Christianity? What claims has Christianity on our belief and acceptance? are blind and unmeaning unless we know what Christianity is. Wherever Christianity has been discussed, therefore, this question has been central. It was the storm center between Paul and the Judaizers in the first century, between Augustine and Pelagius in the fifth century, between the Reformers and the Romanists in the sixteenth century, between the Evangelicals and the Deists in the eighteenth century. There is this difference, however, between the situation in former periods and the situation

² *Religion among American Men*, edited by the Committee on the War and Religious Outlook.

today. In former periods the issue was, for the most part, between more or less perfect and more or less imperfect answers to our question. Today, to a degree unparalleled in former periods, the issue is between answers that involve the very right of Christianity, as Christianity has all but universally been understood, to exist. This is true to such a degree, for instance, that the heirs of the Reformers, while as unflinchingly opposed to Rome as were their fathers, see in Roman Catholics their allies as over against a common enemy—an enemy that retains nothing distinctive of Christianity but the name.

We do not want to paint the situation in too somber colors. Many as are those who retain nothing of Christianity but the name, they are a small people, we believe, as compared with those who retain the thing itself. It is not always safe to judge the size of a crowd by the noise it makes. It seems evident, however, not only that the question, What is Christianity? is the primary question before Christendom today, but that it is not altogether easy to discover the right answer. It might be supposed that in the pulpits of professedly Christian churches, and in the halls of professedly Christian schools of learning, the right answer would readily be found. Such is not the case. If we seek the answer in the churches, we find the most diverse sorts of answers being given. The situation is somewhat different in Roman Catholic churches, but one who goes about the Protestant churches seeking an answer will certainly obtain a very confused notion of what Christianity is. Even within the same denomination, absolutely contradictory representations of Christianity are being preached. What is true of the pulpits is equally true of the theological class rooms. Learned professors differ, as never before, in the answers they give to this question. Only imagine an inquirer interviewing our theological instructors, and out of the interviews obtained endeavoring to construct a consistent notion of what Christianity is. When the doctors disagree, what is the plain man to do? No wonder Mr. W. R. Matthews in view

of that "impression of incoherent diversity" created by the existing situation should be led to say, "I can imagine a man exclaiming, in no flippant spirit, that it is more difficult to discover what Christianity is than to believe it when it be discovered!"³ This does not mean that Mr. Matthews despairs of discovering what Christianity is. Neither do we mean to imply that, in our judgment, it is beyond the power of the plain man to discover what Christianity is. Notwithstanding the different things called Christianity today we do not think it requires any great scholarship or any extraordinary ability to discover what real Christianity is. The situation is indeed confusing, because so many sorts of coins, bearing the image and superscription of Christianity, are in circulation, and yet we think it possible for even the plain man by the use of such ordinary care and discretion, as characterizes him in the ordinary walks of life, to distinguish between the genuine and the counterfeit.

It is of primary importance as we seek an answer to the question, What is Christianity? that we realize that we are dealing with a historical question. We are seeking to ascertain the nature, not of a "spontaneous" but of a "historical," or "founded," or "positive" religion, a religion that had a definite beginning in the life, teaching, and work of a particular person. The question, What is Christianity? does not differ in kind from the question, What is Darwinism? or What is Mormonism? How do we go about it to learn what Darwinism is? Is it not by reading the writings of Darwin and by considering the views of his representative disciples? How do we find out what Mormonism is? Is it not by reading the Book of Mormon and by considering the views of representative Mormons? And how otherwise can we discover what Christianity is? It cannot be too much emphasized, or too often reiterated, that the question, What is Christianity? is first, last and always an historical question. Such questions as, Is Christianity true? Is Christianity of value? Is Christianity acceptable to the

³ *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, p. 36.

modern man? should be held strictly in abeyance until we learn what Christianity is. Christianity may be false as Haeckel supposed, as harmful as Nietzsche supposed, as unacceptable to the modern man as George Burman Foster supposed; but what has that to do with the question what manner of thing is it?

Many, perhaps most, of the wrong answers given to this question are due to an initial failure to realize its historical nature. As a result the historical question, What is Christianity? is confused with the rational question, What is true? or the ethical question, What is right? or the practical question, What is valuable? or the philosophical question, What is the highest ideal? Christianity may or may not be true—how can we judge that until we know what it is? Its contents may be moral or immoral—are we in a position to say until we know what they are? It may be worthless or beyond price—how can we appraise it until we know what it is? It may be a manifestation of the ideal or of a comparatively inferior religion—how can we say until we at least know what sort of religion it is? An illustration may be found in an article entitled, "What is the Christian Religion?" by Professor D. C. Macintosh.⁴ In the early part of this article it is said that redemption in the blood of Christ as a sacrifice for sin is "not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover essentially unchristian, because opposed to the principles of sound morality" (p. 18). Later it is contended that the Christian religion "must be in essence whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular" (p. 27). It is somewhat difficult to understand, however, just why any conception is unchristian merely because it does not agree with our notion of what is rational or moral or the true ideal. It is no doubt interesting to know what Professor Macintosh regards as rational and moral, as well as his conception of the ideal religion, but it is not so

⁴ *Harvard Theological Review*, January, 1914.

clear that this addition to our knowledge furthers our understanding of what Christianity is. Of course, if we find in Christianity irrational or immoral or unideal elements we shall, to that extent at least, reject it—no one advocates the acceptance of Christianity whether or not it is irrational or immoral. But surely we are not warranted on such grounds to say that these, to us, irrational or immoral or unideal elements are no part of Christianity. The result can only be, as in Professor Macintosh's case, that what is presented as Christianity is not so much Christianity as our individual conception of what is rational and moral and the true ideal. As a matter of fact we have no more right to approach the question, What is Christianity? with the assumption that it is rational and moral and the ideal religion than we have to approach the question, What is Mormonism? with the same assumption. Such questions as, Is Christianity true? Is it moral? Is it of value? Does it possess the element of finality? Is it acceptable to the modern mind? are supremely important but they should be disregarded when we are considering the question, What is Christianity? It is conceivable that the time is ripe to abandon the religion founded by Jesus and practiced ever since by His disciples, and to substitute some other religion for it, but at any rate we can discover what is truly Christian, what is legitimately called Christianity, only by historical study.

It has been much debated whether we are to get our conception of Christianity exclusively from its early presentation in the New Testament or from its whole historical manifestation. It is obvious that Christianity, or at least what is called Christianity, not only existed in the first century but exists today; and that if this were not the case few of us would have any interest in the question, What is Christianity? It is clear also that unless Christianity in some of its historical manifestations has adhered to its original type, so that there is such a thing as a fundamental type of Christianity which has remained essentially the same in the midst of its ever-changing environment and

through all the forms it has assumed, there is not only no Christianity in the world at present essentially the same as New Testament Christianity, but all conceptions of Christianity derived from its historical manifestation as a whole are essentially wrong conceptions. In that case we can obtain even a relatively right estimate of Christianity only as we confine our attention to its New Testament presentation. But on the assumption that Christianity has adhered to type closely enough to warrant Warfield in saying that "impure as the development of Christianity has been, imperfect as has always been its manifestation, corrupt as has often been its expression, it has always presented itself to the world, as a whole, substantially under one unvarying form,"⁵ it is evident that we can obtain a more or less adequate conception of the Christian religion by considering its historical manifestation as a world phenomenon.

If we had to choose between getting our conception of Christianity from its New Testament manifestation and its historical manifestation as a whole, unquestionably we should get it from the former. As a "founded" religion Christianity derives its specific content from its founders, Christ and His apostles. As such nothing can be regarded as belonging to its essential content that does not appear in New Testament Christianity or cannot be legitimately deduced from it. Not only may nothing be insisted on as essential to Christianity that lacks New Testament support, but all its later manifestations are to be classified as pure or corrupt, as adequate or inadequate, by reference to this original content. Moreover as judged by this standard all later manifestations are imperfect and some of them largely apostate. And yet, while we ought to attach primary significance to the New Testament presentation in formulating our conception of Christianity, we ought not to neglect its later historical manifestations. It is conceivable, no doubt that at an early date Christianity departed so radically from type that historical Christianity as a whole is a totally different religion from the religion of the

⁵ *Harvard Theological Review*, October, 1912, p. 462.

New Testament, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that such is the case and at the same time believe that the religion of the New Testament is a God-given religion and its founder the Son of God. It is scarcely supposable that nineteen centuries elapsed before Christ's promise of His Spirit to guide His disciples into truth began to be fulfilled. And unless practically the whole historical development of Christianity has been a departure from type, it is altogether probable that this historical development has some help to offer to those desirous of ascertaining its essential content.

Granted that there has been corruption, is it not also reasonable to expect explication? In fact apart from the explication afforded by its whole historical manifestation no one of us today would have any adequate conception of what Christianity is. The deposit of divine truth in the teachings of Christ and His apostles has not supplied merely the starting-point in the development of doctrine in the church; it has rather supplied the goal towards which we are still slowly and painfully striving. It is an illusion to suppose that any of us have gotten our conception of Christianity direct from the New Testament uninfluenced by the later historical developments. We no more draw our conception of Christianity at first hand from the New Testament than we draw our scientific knowledge direct from nature, unaided by text-books, or the laborious researches of others. Athanasius and Augustine and Anselm, and Luther and Calvin, not to mention others, have not labored in vain. And it is because we have entered into their labors that we have a more adequate conception of Christianity than did the Christians of the second century. This is not to deny, rather it is to affirm, that everything presented as an essential element of Christianity must be able to present New Testament credentials; but it is to maintain that actually our conception of Christianity is derived both from its New Testament presentation and its whole historical manifestation. Granted that the New Testament is our original and only authoritative source of knowledge, and that we must be constantly on our guard when

considering the later developments lest we look upon perversions or even falsifications of Christianity as being in the line of true development, it is none the less true that we, for the most part at least, have been so largely influenced in our interpretation of the New Testament by the teaching of the existing churches as expressed in their creeds and especially as expressed by their accredited teachers that unless Christianity has adhered somewhat closely to type there is little reason to suppose that there is much real Christiaunity in the world today.

The assumption that Christianity has, broadly speaking, conformed to type does not pass unchallenged. It is denied by two influential schools of thought. For want of better names, yet with substantial accuracy, they may be called the liberal and the modernist schools. According to the "Liberals," composed of such men as Harnack, Bousset, Wrede, and their host of followers, almost the entire historical manifestation of Christianity has been a radical departure from type. Almost immediately after the death of Christ, they tell us, the "religion of Jesus" was transformed, refashioned, made over, radically altered, under the influence of the pre-Christian beliefs of His earliest followers. The religion of the "primitive community" was in turn overlaid and transformed by the theological constructions of Paul, with the result that it is Paulinism rather than Christianity with which Church history for the most part concerns itself. These scholars all but unanimously admit that the Christianity that has dominated the ages is essentially one with Paulinism; hence that since Paul Christianity has conformed rather closely to type. They maintain, however, that there are two high mountains through which we must tunnel, if we are to pass from Paulinism to the Christianity of Jesus. The first mountain lies between Paulinism and the religion of the "primitive community"; the second between the religion of the "primitive community" and the "religion of Jesus." Henry C. Vedder is only repeating the view that has become traditional in "Liberal" circles when he writes: "The

publication of the words of Jesus in the Gospels found men's minds preoccupied with other ideas, and his teachings made little impression. The Christians of A.D. 80, and afterward, supposed they were following closely in the footsteps of the Master, when they had really cast aside the most important of his instructions and adopted an ideal of life altogether foreign to his. It required nineteen centuries after that for men to catch sight once more of what Jesus intended and hoped to accomplish.”⁶

Did Christianity thus early depart from type? Did the “primitive community” more or less unconsciously transform the teachings of Jesus into something quite different? Was Paul rather than Jesus the founder of historical Christianity? It is becoming increasingly clear that insuperable obstacles lie in the way of this thesis. Paul certainly did not regard himself as the founder of a new religion; he explicitly denies that he preached any other Gospel than that which had been preached. Harnack himself admits that Paul was not the originator of the Gospel he preached. To the great surprise of many “Liberals,” to whom it had become traditional that Paul was “the second founder” of Christianity, he said in the address which he delivered before the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress:

The declaration that “Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures” Paul indicates to be a traditional, therefore a generally, accepted article of faith of the first rank; and he says the same concerning the resurrection of Christ. According to this it is certain that the first apostles also, as well as the congregation at Jerusalem, shared this conviction and doctrine. This is also proved by the first chapters of the Book of Acts, the credibility of which is indisputable in this respect. Therefore the problem must be moved back chronologically from Paul to the first disciples of Christ, who had already preached the dying of Christ for sin and His resurrection. If they preached it, however, they recognized it at once as the main factor, therefore as “the Gospel” within the Gospel, and this indeed is clearly shown in the oldest written Gospel that we have, namely that of Mark. The whole work of Mark is so disposed and composed

⁶ *The Fundamentals of Christianity*, p. 97.

that death and resurrection appear as the aim of the entire presentation. Even if Mark was admittedly influenced by the preaching of Paul, yet the Gospel specially written for the Jews, that according to Matthew, has the same form. It could not then have been new to the Christians of Palestine.⁷

It is to be regretted that Harnack does not see that what Paul received from the "primitive community," the "primitive community" received from Jesus himself; but that is no reason why we should not. We have abundant reason for so doing. It has proved impossible to discover a more primitive Gospel than that of the "primitive community." Not only is it clearer than ever that the same Christ meets us in all the books of the New Testament, so that the Christ of Paul and John does not differ essentially from the Christ of the Synoptists, but literary and historical criticism has failed to discover any Christ more primitive than the Christ of the New Testament. The choice at the end of the day is seen to be between the Christ of the New Testament and no Christ at all. On the basis of a detailed examination of the relevant evidence James Denney affirmed, and all sound scholarship supports the affirmation, that "Christianity never existed in the world as a religion in which men shared the faith of Jesus, but was from the very beginning, and amid all undeniable diversities, a religion in which Jesus was the object of faith."⁸ The only sound conclusion, therefore, is that not only in the mind of Paul but in the mind of the "primitive community," and not only in the mind of the "primitive community" but in the mind of Jesus himself, the religion He founded is in fundamental accord with historical Christianity.⁹

⁷ *Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress*, p. 101.

⁸ *Jesus and the Gospel*, p. 12.

⁹ For detailed support of this judgment the following references among others may be consulted. *The Lord of Glory* by B. B. Warfield, especially pages 146-173; *Jesus and the Gospel* by James Denney, especially pages 1-90; *The Origin of Paul's Religion* by J. Gresham Machen. Prof. Machen's book is specially important in this connection as it contains, it seems to us, a triumphant refutation of the leading

That Christianity has not held at all closely to type is also maintained by the "Modernists" in both Catholic and Protestant circles. According to the "Modernists" the Christianity of Jesus was but the germ out of which later Christianity has grown. Their attitude toward the New Testament literature is often more radical even than that of the "Liberals," but when they have discovered the "Christianity of Christ" they do not identify this with true Christianity and use it as a norm to discriminate between its pure and its corrupt manifestations; they treat it merely as the seed out of which the tree of Christianity has grown. While the "Liberals" show a tendency to treat the historical developments of Christianity as though they had no bearing on the question, What is Christianity? the "Modernists" show a tendency to treat its earliest manifestations as seen in Jesus and his immediate disciples as a more or less negligible quantity in answering this question. With them Christianity is a living and growing thing; and the important matter is not what it was nearly two thousand years ago but what it is today. Lyman Abbott was writing under the influence of this point of view—the pioneer and perhaps the best representative of which is Loisy¹⁰—when he wrote: "The Christianity of the Twentieth Century is not the same as the Christianity of Jesus Christ; and it ought not to be. For Christianity is a life, and after nineteen centuries of growth it can no more be the same it was in the First Century than an oak is the same as an acorn!"¹¹ Harry Emerson Fosdick under the same influence writes: "The progressiveness of Christianity is not simply its response to a progressive age; the progressiveness of Christianity springs from its own inherent vitality. So far is this from being regrettable, that a modern Christian rejoices in it and gladly recognizes not only that he is thinking thoughts and undertaking

explanations of Paulinism that regard it as other than the religion Jesus founded.

¹⁰ *The Gospel and the Church.*

¹¹ *What Christianity means to me*, Prologue, p. vii.

enterprises which his fathers would not have understood, but also that his children after him will differ quite as much in teaching and practice from the modernity of to-day.”¹² George Cross gives expression to the same point of view when he makes such statements as these: “It must not be assumed that there are available for our use any *fixed* standard tests for the final determination of what is truly Christian as distinct from that which claims to be Christian”; “It is even possible—and we say it with the very deepest reverence for him in our hearts—that if all the teachings of Jesus were brought together in the exact form in which he gave them there might be found among them some that would not commend themselves as fixed and final to the most intelligent and devout Christians of the present day”; “We know of nothing that has remained or can remain unchanged from the inception of the Christian faith down to the present”; “The Christianity of yesterday was creative of the Christianity of today at the same time the Christianity of today is more and somewhat other than the Christianity of yesterday. For it recreates that which came from the past and makes it new.”¹³

In order that we may believe, in the face of the “Modernists,” that there is such a thing as a fundamental type of Christianity that has persisted throughout the ages, it is not necessary that we consider the tenability of their evolutionism—the dominating concept under which they operate. If we were discussing the finality of Christianity that might be necessary; but not when we are merely asking, What is Christianity? For our present purpose, it is enough if we can show that since its origin some nineteen hundred years ago it has held so closely to type that much of the Christianity of today is essentially the same as the Christianity of Christ and His apostles. We readily admit that if some of the things called Christianity today can substantiate their claim to the name, Christianity has radically departed from type.

¹² *Christianity and Progress*, p. 164.

¹³ *Creative Christianity*, pp. 26, 34, 47 and 52.

What however if these things are rightly spoken of as Christianity falsely so-called? No doubt the "Modernists" can make a more or less plausible defense of their thesis; but we are confident that they do this only by ignoring the distinction between fluctuations and mutations in the history of Christianity. Ignoring this distinction they treat the currents and eddies along the edge as though they were the main stream of Christian history. Thus they create the impression of a departure from type where none exists.

The real issue raised by the "Modernists" is whether Christianity as a world-phenomenon has held fundamentally to type, and whatever the fluctuations that have marked its history has shown an unmistakable tendency to revert to its fundamental type as seen in its founders, Christ and His apostles. We have already indicated our reasons for supposing that Paulinism is one with original Christianity; hence all that we need to do to show that Christianity, broadly speaking, has not departed fundamentally from type is to show that historical or traditional Christianity is essentially one with Paulinism. This is not difficult to do. It is not even necessary in dealing with the "Liberals." They are all but unanimous in admitting it. So outstanding a representative as Bousset charges "the orthodox" with "basing the truth of their whole system and the form of their faith on a fantastic mythical-dogmatic interpretation of the life of Jesus by Paul."¹⁴ And Wrede says it was Paul who "introduced into Christianity the ideas whose influence on its history up to the present time has been deepest and most far-reaching."¹⁵ Neither is it necessary in the case of the ordinary Christian. The rank and file of those calling themselves Christians are not conscious of any fundamental discrepancy between their own religion and Paulinism. They may like Peter find "some things hard to be understood" in Paul's writings but

¹⁴ The Significance of the Personality of Jesus Christ for Belief in *Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress*, p. 209.

¹⁵ *Paul*, p. 179.

as far as they understand them his teachings find a ready response in their souls. Even a non-Christian can scarcely read a volume like Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom* without realizing that while these creeds express Paulinism with various degrees of purity yet they are expressions of Paulinism.

The sharp contrasts, so frequently made by "Modernists," between the later and the earliest forms of Christianity should not be taken very seriously. To estimate them at their true value we need only remember that what they are contrasting is not later Christianity and Paulinism, or even pre-Pauline Christianity, but later Christianity and the Christianity they find in the early Christian literature after that literature has been reconstructed on the basis of their naturalistic postulates. While they professedly contrast later Christianity and the "religion of Jesus"; yet what they call the "religion of Jesus," is about as different from the religion that Jesus actually founded as any religion could possibly be. It is not maintained, of course, that there is no contrast between the religion that Jesus founded and later Christianity—imperfect and degenerate types meet us always and everywhere in later Christianity; nowhere do we find absolutely pure Christianity—but it is maintained without fear of successful contradiction that on the whole Christianity has held closely enough to type to enable the plain man to see and feel the gulf between Christianity and all other forms of religion.

It is sometimes assumed that we can obtain a sufficiently exact answer to the question, What is Christianity? merely by ascertaining what is common to those professing and calling themselves Christians, what is common being regarded as essential and what is not common as unessential. Accordingly some tell us that Christianity is what has been held by those professing and calling themselves Christians during the past nineteen hundred years, while others, more under the influence of evolution, tell us that the Christianity of any age, including our own age, is what is held by those

of that age who profess and call themselves Christians. Whether we take the problem chronologically or geographically, the method is fatally inadequate. Suppose that any considerable number of those that have called, or do call, themselves Christians were, or are, not really Christians at all. Then what has been, or is, held in common contains nothing specifically Christian; also the non-Christian forms of thought would be left out. But even if we suppose that all those who have called, or do call, themselves Christians were, or are, really Christians, such a mode of procedure would only give us the minimum of Christianity, the very least a man can hold and still call himself a Christian. Otherwise the most attenuated forms of Christianity of which we have knowledge would be excluded. Suppose we ask the question, What is a man? Do we merely want to know what all men have, or have had, in common? If so we are trying to discover the poorest, meanest, least developed specimen, physically, intellectually and morally, that has existed, or does exist, entitled to be called a man. Do we not rather want to know what a normal or representative man is? Surely it is not otherwise when we ask, What is Christianity? We are inquiring what normal, representative Christianity is, not the most attenuated, contentless form of thought that can possibly call itself Christianity. At its very best this method can only give us the minimum of Christianity. But unless we are wholly wrong in supposing that there has been—and especially that there is—much counterfeit Christianity in the world, it will not even give us this. It will merely give us what Christianity has in common with natural religion. Unquestionably Christianity and natural religion have much in common. They may both teach faith in God and duty and immortality but what they teach in common will not include anything distinctly Christian.

If now we approach the question, What is Christianity? with these two assumptions (1) that it is a “founded” religion that has a specific content of its own derived ultimately from Jesus Christ and (2) that since its founding it has, broadly

speaking, not "run wild" but adhered to type—and apart from these assumptions Christianity is a word without definite meaning—what do we discover?

If we approach the question in that purely objective manner which alone befits our approach to an historical question, we will discover, first of all, whether we consider the Christianity of the New Testament or the whole of its historical manifestation, that it is a religion that ascribes its beginning and its continuance to the person of Jesus Christ. Christianity is not the only religion that ascribes its origin to the life, teaching and work of a person—Buddhism and Mohammedanism do the same, to mention no others—but in no other religion does its founder occupy such a position as Jesus occupies in Christianity. For Christianity Jesus is much more than founder: He is also a present object of worship. He is conceived not only as one who was but as one who is, not only as one who lived and worked in the past but as one who lives and works still, so that Christianity has been as dependent on Him through the ages—is as dependent on Him today—as when He trod the earth. Buddha and Mohammed might be forgotten and the religions they founded remain essentially what they are, because the bond that binds their followers together is not so much loyalty to their persons, much as they have been honored as more or less deified persons, as loyalty to the principles and precepts they taught and exemplified. Could they behold the things done on earth, they would be satisfied if they saw the principles they taught ruling in the hearts of men. It is far otherwise in the case of Christ. He promised to be with His disciples to the end of the world, and desires the love, trust, obedience and worship of mankind. He is not satisfied to see men observing the things He commanded, even if they observe them in a spirit of love, unless they act out of a consideration for Himself. Paul expressed the mind and hope of Christ for all mankind when he wrote to the Colossians: "And whatsoever ye do, in word or in deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to

God the Father through Him." Where He is forgotten or ignored, even if His spirit lives on in individuals or even communities and much of what He taught is known and done, Christianity does not exist. For Christ is Christianity itself. He does not merely point out the way to God and salvation: He is the Way itself.

We discover in the next place, as a no less outstanding characteristic of Christianity, that it is a redemptive religion—a redemptive religion not in the vague sense characteristic of other religions but in the particular sense that it offers salvation from sin, conceived as guilt and power and pollution, through the expiatory death of Jesus Christ. The object of Christian faith has never been Christ *simpler* but always Christ *as crucified*. It may even be said that the thought of Christianity as a redemptive religion in this specific sense is more prominent than the thought of it as a religion that ascribes its origin and continuance to Christ—Christ being valued most of all because of His redeeming work. It has ever been recognized that all that Christ experienced on earth, all He said and did during that period, contributed toward giving Him as the living one the significance He possesses; but unquestionably it has always been recognized that what contributed most was His death on the Cross. It has always been confessed, and not only confessed but placed in the very center of the Christian confession, that apart from that death He would not be qualified to be our redeemer, to grant unto us the forgiveness of our sins and an inheritance among those who are sanctified through faith in Him. With Paul the Church Universal has proclaimed as the most important fact of all that Christ died for our sins. Every great branch of the Christian Church has assigned to His death, regarded as an expiatory sacrifice, the place of primary importance. This appears whether we regard the writings of their representative theologians, the statements of their official creeds, or their hymns and spiritual songs. Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics and Protestants have at least been united

in accepting the Cross as the symbol of Christianity and in singing the praises of the "Lamb that was slain."

In view of the anti-supernaturalism of the age there is need of stressing a third characteristic, viz., the supernaturalism of Christianity. In the nature of the case a religion that looks upon a historical person not only as having lived in the past but as living in the present, and living as an object of faith, is supernaturalistic to the core. It is equally evident that a religion that offers salvation from sin, felt as guilt and power and pollution, on the basis of the death of this object of worship is through and through a supernatural religion—both as regards what happened two thousand years ago and what takes place in human hearts today. It should be added perhaps that we must consider the future as well as the past and present, if we would adequately appreciate the supernaturalism of Christianity. It is not enough that we recognize the supernatural in the sense of creative acts of God in human history that have brought about, and are bringing about, in human history phenomena impossible through the unaided operation of natural causes, however divinely guided: there must also be a frank recognition of the fact that the immortality that Christianity posits both for the individual and the race cannot be realized apart from similar manifestations of the supernatural. The eschatological interest is not an appendage to Christian experience; it is essential to its very being. The salvation the Christian embraces is a salvation for the life to come even more than for the life that now is. As a result the center of gravity for Christian thought and life is in the world to come. A religion whose circumference does not extend beyond the present life and the present world, and which does not have a supernaturalistic eschatological outlook, lacks one of the outstanding characteristics of historic and especially New Testament Christianity. In describing Christianity as a world-phenomenon it will not do to say, therefore, that although the supernatural element has never been absent from its proclamation, yet it has always been an element near the periphery of its message. Such a representation is so inadequate as to

be palpably misleading. It is only because men insist on applying the name "Christianity" to things that lack all that is distinctive of historical Christianity that such a representation is possible. Whatever our personal attitude toward the supernatural, there is no occasion for concealing from ourselves, or of seeking to conceal from others, the fact that the supernatural so enters into the very substance of Christianity as a world-phenomenon that Christianity de-supernaturalized is Christianity extinct.

So pronounced, so wide-spread is that naturalism of thought and sentiment characteristic of the present age that we are apt to forget that it is of comparatively recent origin. Previous to the so-called "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century all life and world views, both within and without Christian circles, were supernaturalistic. Then appeared for the first time the so-called empirico-scientific conception which professes to explain the entire world, including man and religion and morality, without the aid of any supernatural factor, purely from resident forces and according to unvarying laws. It is only within the last fifty years, however, that it has grown to such proportions as to have the courage to contest the right of historical Christianity to dominate the thought and life of the future. It was only to be expected that an increasing effort to naturalize Christianity would go hand in hand with the increasing acceptance of this anti-supernaturalistic life and world view. A galaxy of brilliant scholars have devoted themselves to the task. If they have failed, as we believe they have, it has only been because they were attempting the impossible. It admits of no denial that historical Christianity, including the Christianity of New Testament times, claims to be supernatural. Men used to argue in an amusingly learned way that, whatever might be true of Paul and John, the Synoptists present us with an essentially human Jesus. That day is past. Even Bousset says: "For the belief of the community, which is shared already by the oldest evangelist, Jesus is the miraculous Son of God, on whom men believe,

whom men put wholly on the side of God."¹⁶ The Jesus of the first three Gospels is a supernatural Jesus. At this point, then, radical and conservative scholarship agree. The movement of thought in the attempt to naturalize Christianity, therefore, seems to be something like this. The Jesus even of Mark, assumed to be the oldest Gospel, is a supernatural Jesus. But the supernatural as a factor in human life is a figment of the imagination. Hence there must be a Jesus more primitive than the Jesus of the evangelists, and this Jesus must be a purely natural Jesus. The natural and the supernatural elements in the narratives, however, are so inextricably interwoven as to be inseparable. The supernatural elements are as well attested as the natural elements. It is not surprising, therefore, that the more radical—should we not say the more consistent?—of the naturalistic critics are denying that Jesus ever existed. At any rate there seems to be as good reason for saying that there was no Jesus at all behind the Jesus of the evangelists as that back of the Jesus of the evangelists there was a purely human Jesus. All the historical evidence we have at least points to a supernatural Jesus.

But even supposing it were possible to get back of the Jesus of the evangelists to a more primitive Jesus, Christianity would still remain unexplained. The Jesus that even the more conservative of the naturalistic critics rescue for us—the fanatic or paranoic Jesus of some is worse than no Jesus at all—is useless as an explanation of the origin and continuance of historic Christianity. If the Jesus of the evangelists is essentially a fictitious character, how has it come about that He has exerted as great an influence in history as if He were historical? As the late Professor A. M. Fairbairn put it: "We have not solved, we have not even stated and defined, the problem as to the person of Jesus when we have written the life of Jesus, for that problem is raised less by the Gospels than by Christ's place and function in the collective history of man." "Christ has to be fitted

¹⁶ *Was Wissen wir von Jesus*, p. 57.

into our scheme of things, and we have to explain (1) how His historical action has corresponded to His fictitious rather than His real character; and (2) what sort of blind accident or ironical indifference to right can reign in a universe which has allowed to fiction greater powers than have been granted to truth."¹⁷ In arguing that it requires the supernatural Jesus of the New Testament to account for the Christianity of history we are not appealing to the argument from effects because we are sceptical of the ability of historical criticism to give us not only an actual but a supernatural Jesus. We are merely pointing out an additional reason for believing in a supernatural Jesus. As a matter of fact either the Jesus of the New Testament is the primitive, the only historical Jesus, or all knowledge of such a Jesus is lost beyond recovery. We have been hearing a good deal of the mythical Jesus; we need not hesitate to affirm however that it is "the desupernaturalized Jesus which is the mythical Jesus, who never had any existence, the postulation of the existence of whom explains nothing and leaves the whole historical development hanging in the air."

Since the only Christianity discoverable in the first century is a supernatural Christianity, and since this is the only Christianity that has been dominant in later ages, it seems clear that when we are asked, What is Christianity? we must reply that it is through and through a supernatural religion. We may or may not like supernaturalism, but it is scarcely open to us to deny that it is essential to Christianity.

If then we investigate Christianity, whether as it appears in its founders or as it appears during its whole historical manifestation, intent merely on learning *what* it is, we discover that, whatever else it may be, Christianity is that specific religion that had its origin and finds its continuance in the life, work and teachings of Jesus Christ, He being conceived of so highly, after so supernatural a fashion, that He is placed side by side with God as a proper object of worship. More particularly it is that redemptive religion that

¹⁷ *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 13-14.

provides for mankind a salvation from sin, felt as guilt and power and pollution, through the expiatory death of this God-man—both for this life and the life to come.

Men may like or they may dislike such a religion. They may think it rational or irrational, moral or immoral. They may esteem it their chief treasure, that without which they would be utterly undone; or they may appraise it as a thing of no value, or even as a thing to be destroyed because positively harmful. Be their judgment of it what it may, true or false, moral or immoral, valuable or worthless, it is vain and futile for them—in the presence of those who have the earliest Christian writings in one hand and a reliable history of Christian thought in the other—to deny that as a matter of fact this is the sort of religion which Christianity is.

We do not claim that the definition of Christianity just given specifies all that makes Christianity what it is. We do not even allege that Christianity is to be found wherever any, or even all, of the things mentioned in this definition are believed. No doubt Christianity is to be found wherever these things are confessed in their New Testament meaning and with their New Testament accompaniments. They have been so frequently confessed, however, in connection with beliefs that practically nullify their significance as to preclude our finding either in logic or history warrant for saying that Christianity is to be found wherever these things are believed. But while we cannot always say of those who confess these things that they have an adequate Christianity, or even any real Christianity at all, we can and do say that where these things are not believed there is no Christianity. That is to say, though the presence of these things does not necessarily spell Christianity, their absence does spell something other than Christianity. In the light of the whole historical manifestation of Christianity it cannot be denied that it has been all but unanimously recognized that without these things there is no Christianity. It has been reserved for the "Liberals" and the "Modernists" of the present age

to commend as Christianity a somewhat that lacks these characteristics. Previous to their appearance on the stage no considerable group of those calling themselves Christians commended a non-miraculous Christianity or a Christianity without a Christ who ranked with God or a Christianity without a place for the Cross as an atoning sacrifice. So firmly did the founders of Christianity stamp these things on the religion they established, or rather to such a degree do these things constitute its substance, that, until recently, it was all but universally true that even the most debased and corrupted forms of Christianity have recognized them as essential elements of Christianity. Even the "Liberals" and "Modernists" do not deny that the Christianity of the ages is derived in this respect directly from the New Testament. In order to find in history any real warrant for their conceptions of Christianity they are compelled, as we have pointed out, to maintain that the New Testament represents a falsification of true Christianity. They have failed, however, to find a more primitive Christianity than that of the New Testament; in fact, their efforts have served to make increasingly clear that New Testament Christianity is primitive Christianity. We are more fully warranted than ever therefore in affirming—if such language can be used without exaggeration—that the things specified in our definition of Christianity are things without which there is no Christianity.

Before making use of our definition as a means of discovering whether any of the things widely called Christianity are falsely so called, it may be well to anticipate a serious and far reaching objection that is sure to be made to our method. It will be objected that the test we apply is a doctrinal one and that doctrines are not essential to Christianity. This objection has two forms. Sometimes it is said that Christianity consists in its facts not its doctrines; more frequently that Christianity is life not doctrines. If the objection in either of its forms is valid the test we commend

is valueless. For unquestionably the test we propose is a doctrinal one in the sense meant by these objectors.

We are told that Christianity consists in its facts not its doctrines. But what are Christian doctrines if not interpretations of its facts? Will the facts alone give us Christianity? Certainly the facts are of primary importance. Doctrines which are not interpretations of facts are at the best myths and at the worst lies. And yet the facts alone are dumb and unmeaning. Give the facts no interpretation and they will not give us Christianity; give them an interpretation other than that of the New Testament and they will yield us something other than Christianity. Where a fact and its proper interpretation are under discussion men may differ as to which is the proper interpretation; but it is idle to suppose that they can agree as to the fact and its value while differing as to its interpretation, or that they can agree to be content with no interpretation at all. It seems to us that James Denney did not go too far when he wrote: "A fact of which there is absolutely no theory is a fact which stands out of relation to everything in the universe, a fact which has no connection with any part of our experience; it is a blank unintelligibility, a rock in the sky, a mere irrelevance in the mind of man. There is no such thing conceivable as a fact of which there is no theory, or even a fact of which *we* have no theory; such a thing could not enter *our* world at all; if there could be such a thing, it would be so far from having the virtue to redeem us from sin, that it would have no interest for us and no effect upon us at all."¹⁸ But whether he did or not, it is evident that the distinction between facts and their interpretations has no application when we are concerned with that concrete phenomenon we call Christianity. This at any rate is a somewhat constituted not merely by its facts, but by its facts as understood in a particular way, that is to say by its doctrines as well as its facts. Neither alone give us Christianity as it meets us in history; hence as long as

¹⁸ *Studies in Theology*, p. 106.

our primary aim is to discover not the truth or the value of Christianity but merely what it is, any and all discussion of the validity of the distinction between facts and doctrines is wholly irrelevant. Be the validity of the distinction what it may, Christianity as it appears in its founders and as a world-phenomenon goes to pieces when either its facts or its doctrines are eliminated, for in it the two are inextricably intertwined.

We have yet to consider the objection in its other form, the form in which it makes its widest appeal. Christianity, we are told, is life not doctrines. Christian doctrines are products rather than producers of the Christian life. They are the changing intellectual expression of the life that precedes them, logically and chronologically. As such they come and go, but new ones constantly take their place as the product of that life that is found in living Christian men and women. As such they possess no absolute significance, and provided they express the life one set of doctrines is as good as the other. The life is the principal thing, the one thing of vital importance; as long as it flourishes the doctrines may be left to take care of themselves. The doctrines have a certain value as the intellectual expression of the life and as a means of cultivating the life; but their place is always secondary never primary. Expressed in this form the objection has a pious ring. It is true that Christianity is a life—no one ever denied it—but is it so clear that this life is the mother of its doctrines? What if the life is the product of the doctrines rather than the doctrines the product of the life? In that case to say that the doctrines are of secondary importance is like saying that apple trees are of secondary importance as compared with the apples they bear.

Is it true that Christianity is life not doctrines? Such a statement belongs manifestly in the sphere of history and must, therefore, be subject to historical investigation. It is a declaration the same in kind as if we were to say that Voltaire was a Christian philosopher. We may believe that he ought to have been a Christian philosopher, that it would

have been better if he had been a Christian philosopher, but when we consider the matter historically we are merely concerned to find out whether such was actually the case. And if we investigate Christianity as an historical phenomenon, whether in its earlier or later manifestations, we find that as a matter of fact it is not a life in the sense meant. The first Christian missionaries as little as later ones, looked upon Christianity as merely a way of life. They were not primarily exhorters but heralds of a message—a message that had to do first of all not with the wonderful “life” of Jesus or themselves but with the significance of something that had happened, particularly the death and resurrection of Jesus. We may think it regrettable that Christianity has ascribed the primacy to doctrines, that from the very beginning it has looked upon itself not merely as a life but as a life based on a message about its founder, and so has always placed this message in the forefront; but we should not permit our dissatisfaction with this course to lead us to misrepresent the real nature of this religion. We may believe that the time has come to substitute another religion for Christianity; but history affords us no warrant for saying that Christianity is a life in the modern meaning of the expression. Whether it is psychologically sound to say that life precedes doctrines, or the contrary, it may not be questioned that according to Christianity doctrines do logically precede life. We do not allege, of course, that the religion Jesus founded consists only of doctrines—who does not know that such a representation is a baseless caricature? What we allege is that Christians doctrines are indispensable to the production and maintenance of the Christian life, that the life is the expression of the doctrine, that while Christianity is both a life and a doctrine yet logically the life follows the doctrine and can no more rise above it than a stream above its source. If by the assertion that Christianity is life not doctrine it were merely meant that doctrines are not an end in themselves, or that doctrines have no power to produce life apart from the creative operations of

the Holy Spirit, we would readily concur. What is meant by the assertion as currently made, however, is that the Christian life is first not only in importance but logically and psychologically and as such more or less independent of Christian doctrines. In this sense the assertion lacks historical support—unless we look upon modern religious liberalism as a manifestation of genuine Christianity.

We, therefore, see no reason why we should turn aside from our purpose of making use of our definition of Christianity to ascertain whether certain of the things called Christianity today are really Christianity, because, forsooth, it involves the application of a doctrinal test. Since Christianity is a historical religion a non-doctrinal Christianity is an absurdity. No sound objection can be made against a doctrinal test. It is inevitable that a religion that bases itself on facts that have occurred will be a doctrinal religion, seeing that these facts are meaningless unless interpreted. Everything calling itself Christianity should be willing to submit to the particular test we have proposed. Does it confess not only the historicity but the supernaturalness of Jesus? Does it confess Jesus as a present object of worship and as such indispensable to its very being? Does it find in this divine Jesus a supernatural redemption, grounded in the fact that "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures"? A satisfactory answer to these questions will not prove that it is 100 per cent Christian—additional tests will be needed to ascertain the purity and adequacy of its Christianity—but an unsatisfactory answer to all, or even any, of them makes clear that it falls short of being genuine Christianity.

Those who recognize the validity of our test, but who have been assuming that all or nearly all of the things called Christianity are what they are labeled, will certainly be amazed—no matter how charitably disposed they may be—if without fear or favor they apply it to the things spoken of as Christianity in these days.

They will not be long in discovering that some of the

so-called Christianity of today does not even posit the historicity of any Jesus, that more of it does not posit the historicity of a supernatural Jesus, that still more of it does not posit Jesus as a present object of worship and as such the source of its present vitality. It is not enough, as we have said, to trace the origin of Christianity to Jesus unless we also see in Him a person who not only lived and worked in the past but who lives and works in the present, to such an extent that Christianity is as dependent on Him today as when He tabernacled in the flesh. It makes no great difference, therefore, whether we say with Arthur Drews and W. B. Smith that Jesus never existed; or whether we say with Harnack and Bousset and Eucken and their multitudinous followers that Jesus existed as a subject but not as an object of religion; or whether we say with the rationalists and mystics as a class that religion cannot be dependent on historical facts, and so on Jesus as an historical fact as little as any other historical fact; in either case we are proclaiming a Christianity that, if need be, can get along without Jesus. But surely a Christianity that even entertains the thought that Jesus Christ is not indispensable is just no Christianity at all. Those who define Christianity as morality of a Christlike sort, or as loyalty, or as altruism, or as spirituality, or as the "religion of Jesus" meaning the religion that Jesus practiced, may honor Jesus as the founder of Christianity, as the one who set it going, as still the classic teacher and exemplar of these things, as one from whose memory they draw inspiration, but it is evident that Jesus occupies no absolutely essential place in their Christianity, for such a Christianity could continue to exist and flourish if He should be forgotten or even if historical research could prove that He never existed. Those who so define Christianity may say with Eucken, "We may revere him as a leader, a hero, a martyr," but it is inevitable that they will also add as does Eucken, "but we cannot forthwith bind and pledge ourselves to him and yield him unconditional submission; still less can we make him the center

of a cult, for that would now be nothing else than an intolerable idolatry."¹⁹ It is clear that such Christianity is only indirectly dependent on Jesus Christ, that it does not ascribe both its origin and continuance to Him, that it assigns to Him a place in Christianity essentially the same as Martin Luther occupies in Lutheranism and John Wesley in Methodism. Surely all such Christianity is Christianity falsely so-called.

They will discover no less quickly that much of the so-called Christianity of today has definitely broken with the idea of the Cross as an expiatory sacrifice for sin. No idea is less acceptable to the "modern mind." As we put the question to this and that professed Christian teacher, we can scarcely escape the impression that the majority of our would-be Christian guides, whether academic or popular, have not only broken with it but assumed an attitude of open hostility to it. No language seems too strong with which to pillory it. It is said to be immoral, contradictory to every sense of justice, blasphemous even to suggest that there was need of an expiation of sin through the death of Jesus Christ before God could or would forgive sin. God is love, we are constantly told, and as such freely forgives on condition of repentance alone. Everywhere we are being told that the parable of the Prodigal Son contains the very core of the Gospel, even the whole Gospel, and this finds its explanation most of all in the fact that it makes no mention of an atonement—though one might have supposed that some at least of those who find the whole Gospel in the parable of the Prodigal Son would have stayed to notice that it also makes no mention of Christ or the Holy Spirit. Certainly if we judge only from current religious literature, and from the utterances of those religious teachers who seem to have been most successful in gaining the attention of the public, it would not be strange if we concluded that the idea of the Cross as an expiatory sacrifice for sin is obsolescent if not obsolete. Fortunately such a judgment is not warranted;

¹⁹ *Can We Still be Christians?*, p. 34.

the doctrine still has able defenders in academic circles, is still the common possession of the great majority of those who call themselves Christians. If it were warranted we should be forced to the conclusion that genuine Christianity has practically vanished from the earth, because, whatever we may think of the truth or value of the doctrine, it is altogether certain that it is a fundamental element—we may even say the most fundamental element—in Christianity as Christianity has been all but universally understood by its professors, until recently at least. The object of the Christian's faith is and ever has been Jesus *as crucified*. A Christianity that knows nothing of Jesus as crucified for sin has no more right to call itself Christianity than has a Christianity that knows nothing of a divine Jesus. To speak of a Christianity without Christ is no more a contradiction in terms than to speak of a Christianity without an atoning Christ. The testimony not only of the founders of Christianity but of that vast multitude who throughout the Christian centuries have witnessed the good confession can be cited in support of Warfield when he wrote:²⁰

Unquestionably, Christianity is a redemptive religion, having as its fundamental presupposition the fact of sin, felt both as guilt and as pollution, and offering as its central good, from which all other goods proceed, salvation from sin through the historical expiation wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ. The essence of Christianity has always been to its adherents the sinner's experience of reconciliation with God through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ. According to the Synoptic tradition Jesus himself represented himself as having come to seek and save that which is lost, and described his salvation as a ransoming of many by the gift of his life, embodying the conception, moreover, in the ritual which he commanded his disciples to perform in remembrance of him. Certainly his first followers with single-hearted unanimity proclaimed the great fact of redemption in the blood of Christ as the heart of their gospel: to them Jesus is the propitiation for sin, a sacrificial lamb without blemish, and all their message is summed up in the simple formula of Jesus Christ and him crucified." Nor has the church he founded ever drifted away from this fundamental point of view, as witness the central place of the mass in the worship of its elder branches, and the formative place of justification by faith

in Protestant life. No doubt parties have from time to time arisen who have wished to construe Christianity otherwise. But they have always occupied a place on the periphery of the Christian movement, and have never constituted its main stream.

We can well understand that one swirling aside in an eddy and yet wishing to think of himself as travelling with the current—or even perhaps as breaking for it a new and better channel—should attempt to define Christianity so widely or so vaguely as to make it embrace him also. The attempt has never been and can never be successful. He is a Christian, in the sense of the founders of the Christian religion, and in the sense of its whole historical manifestation as a world-phenomenon, who, conscious of his sin, and smitten by a sense of the wrath of God impending over him, turns in faith to Jesus Christ as the propitiation for his sins, through whose blood and righteousness he may be made acceptable to God and be received into the number of those admitted to communion with him. If we demand the right to call ourselves Christians because it is by the teaching of Jesus that we have learned to know God as he really is, or because it is by his example that we have been led into a life of faithful trust in God, or because it is by the inspiration of his "inner life," dimly discerned through the obscuring legends that have grown up about him, that we are quickened to a like religious hope and aspiration,—we are entering claims that have never been recognized and can never be recognized as valid by the main current of Christianity. Christianity as a world-movement is the body of those who have been redeemed from their sins by the blood of Jesus Christ, dying for them on the cross. The cross is its symbol; and at its heart sounds the great jubilation of the Apocalypse: "Unto Him that loveth us and loosed us from our sins by his blood; and he made us to be a kingdom, to be priest unto his God and Father; to Him be the glory and the dominion forever and ever. Amen."²⁰

Whether, therefore, it be Sabatier or Harnack or Bousset or Troeltsch or Eucken or Oliver Lodge or Conan Doyle or Ralph Waldo Trine or Mary Baker Eddy or D. C. Macintosh or G. B. Smith or G. B. Foster or George Cross or Henry C. Vedder or Harry Emerson Fosdick or Lyman Abbott or Walter Rauschenbusch or Charles A. Ellwood—whoever they may be who scorn or make light of or ignore the cross of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice for sin, we say to them all alike that the fullest recognition of the truth

²⁰ "Christless Christianity," *The Harvard Theological Review*, Oct. 1912, p. 462.

and value of much that they commend will not permit us to look upon them as teachers of Genuine Christianity. Practically none of those we have mentioned by name see in Jesus a present object of worship—in fact faith in the real deity of Jesus is rarely if ever found in those who deny the expiatory nature of His death—but even if they did, that of itself would not entitle them to call themselves Christian teachers, because, as we have sought to show, a Christianity that knows nothing of Christ's death as an atoning sacrifice is just no Christianity at all.

It seems superfluous to add that they will also discover that much of what is called Christianity rejects supernaturalism, denies even that there have been creative acts of God in human history. This is a matter that is shouted from the house-tops. We must be deaf as a post and blind as a bat—in the world but not of it in a sense not commended in the Scriptures—if we are not aware that not only in the writings of the learned but in the pages of popular books, magazines and newspapers, not to mention many pulpits and classrooms, we are told and re-told that the supernaturalism of Christianity is the one great obstacle that keeps the modern man from accepting it. We must preach a non-supernatural Christianity, they tell us, if we are to win the modern world. If such is the case things are certainly in a bad way as regards genuine Christianity. For, as we have seen, it is through and through a supernatural religion so that as regards it the choice is not between a supernatural and a non-supernatural Christianity but between a supernatural Christianity and no Christianity at all. Even if it be admitted that genuine though truncated Christianity may exist where there is no adequate recognition of the supernatural, it cannot be allowed that there is anything that can honestly be called Christianity where all recognition of the supernatural is lacking. Men may preach a desupernaturalized "Christianity" and still preach much that is attractive and worthy of attention, but it is impossible to justify their right to call it Christianity. Only those who are interested in names

rather than realities will obtain any comfort from the retention of the word "Christianity" if the thing it has stood for through all the Christian centuries is cast away as rubbish. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, but calling a thing a rose does not cause it to exhale a rose's fragrance.

Our main task in this article has been to indicate what Christianity is, so that we might show that many of the things called Christianity are falsely so called. We have not raised the question of the truth of Christianity, except to guard against the mistake of supposing that it should be taken into consideration when we are seeking to discover what Christianity is. This is due, of course, to the limited task we have assigned ourselves, not to any indifference to the query itself. When once we have discovered what Christianity is, its truthfulness becomes, whether we will or no, the matter of supreme importance. We would have only an historical interest in the question, What is Christianity? if we regarded it as untrue. Further the question, What is the value of Christianity? would seem idle and fictitious. It is impossible to believe with those of a too practical or a too intellectualistic or a too mystical tendency that the value of Christianity is independent of its truth in the sense of conformity to fact. It argues a radical misunderstanding of the nature of Christianity to maintain that its facts have value only as they express some idea or principle or symbolize some religious experience. According to Christianity we are saved not by works or knowledge or religious experience—though not without them—but by a person, and that person Jesus Christ. We can be indifferent to its truthfulness in the sense of conformity to fact only as we are indifferent to the question whether the salvation He offers from sin as guilt and pollution is a real salvation. For a religion that objectively saves from sin "value-judgments" which are not based on "fact-judgments" lack all saving significance. A religion that grounds itself in the conviction that God has wrought wonders in history for the salvation of His people must maintain that we "make lies our refuge

and hide ourselves under falsehood" if we suppose that it is all the same whether its facts occurred or not.

It is not our present purpose to defend the truth of Christianity; the space at our disposal does not permit. We want to say, however, that no discussion of the question, Is Christianity true? will be fruitful of results unless the parties to the discussion are agreed as to what Christianity is. Nothing is doing more to make matters "confused and confusing," in the realm of religious discussion, than the loose and contradictory senses in which the word Christianity is employed. Men equally intelligent and sincere, it may be, come to no agreement because the suppressed premise of the one contradicts the suppressed premise of the other. The suppressed premise is a different, often a radically different, conception of what Christianity is. To a superficial observer it might seem as though Christianity were approaching a complete victory in the forum of the world's thought. Nearly everyone of much importance calls himself a Christian. We need only consider the divergent answers given to the question, What is Christianity? however to perceive how deceptive appearances are at this point. It is no comfort to us to have a man tell us he believes in Christianity if what he calls Christianity lacks all the distinctive marks of what we regard as Christianity. When he affirms that Christianity is true, meaning a Christianity in which Christ occupies no indispensable place, or in which His atoning death has no place at all, he says in substance that Christianity as we understand it is false. It is the truth of a particular religion, not of everything labeled Christianity, that concerns us when we discuss the question, Is Christianity true? And if anyone retorts that he has as good a right to define Christianity in his way as we have in our way, we flatly deny the claim, unless he can show that his definition has as good historical sanction as our own. This he cannot do.

Is Christianity, as we have defined it, true in the sense indicated? It has been so contended by the Church of the ages. In that conviction it was established, in that conviction it has

spread, and only as that conviction is maintained can we hope that it will escape decay and go on from strength to strength. We must at least have a religion we believe to be true. If we are to believe in Christianity we will do so because such faith is rational, not though it be irrational. We are not fearful, however, lest advancing knowledge will disprove the claim of Christianity, as we have defined Christianity, to be true. Those who are fearful, or hopeful, of this result cannot be aware, it seems to us, of the weight of the evidence by which the claim is supported. More especially they overlook or ignore the fact that Christianity has a definite content of its own that rests on its own basis and is buttressed by its own independent evidence. Consequently they are unduly disturbed, or encouraged, by the teachings of modern philosophy and modern science. That abstraction "the modern mind" becomes a bugaboo that frightens them or a mirage that engenders false hopes. Because Christianity is not in harmony with the teachings of many modern philosophers and scientists, they fear or hope that it is no longer tenable. Their fears or hopes, however, would largely disappear if they would distinguish between the voice of Philosophy and Science and the voices of the philosophers and scientists; and if they would keep clearly before them the fact that the voice of Philosophy and Science is heard only through the voices of the philosophers and scientists, and that the voices of the philosophers and scientists speak only quarter-truths or half-truths. What W. R. Matthews says of modern philosophy is applicable also to modern science. "The actual state of the philosophical world," he writes, "is one of unexampled confusion. Idealism, Pluralism, Logical Atomism, New Realism, Vitalism, all these in widely variant versions claim our acceptance. There is no modern philosophy, there are only modern philosophers."²¹ In the better day when philosophers and scientists speak whole-truths, but only then, may their voices be identified with the voice of Philosophy and Science.

For the present there is no warrant for saying that Chris-

²¹ *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 74-76.

tianity is untenable because it is more or less out of harmony with the teaching of much modern philosophy and science. These things have not yet reached their final form, so that nothing is more certain than that if Christianity were in harmony with the philosophy and science of today it would be out of harmony with the philosophy and science of tomorrow. There is a big difference between saying that Christianity is out of harmony with the dominant philosophy or science of the day, and saying that there is a conflict between Christianity and Philosophy or Christianity and Science. We may admit the first while altogether denying the second. Hence in proportion as we realize that Christianity has a definite content of its own, obtained independently of philosophy and science and independently evidenced as true, we may possess our souls in patience, amid the discordant voices of modern thought, in the firm assurance that when the unity of truth has been vindicated it will appear to all that both the fact-content and the truth-content of Christianity are integral arcs in the circle of truth. Facts are stubborn things and if we have adequate evidence—as we believe we have—for the conviction that history presents us not only with an actual but with a supernatural Christ, and in this Christ a supernatural redemption, we must either deny the unity of truth or we must affirm that every theory in which these great facts do not find a natural and logical place is inadequate if not false. There is something manifestly wrong with any theory that is compelled to treat solid facts as though they were wax or putty.

There is no greater evil in the Church of today than the evil of divided conviction and divided testimony. Though the primary task of the Church is to be a witness—"Ye shall be my witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth"—the testimony being given throughout the Church is discordant and contradictory. Everywhere throughout the churches, and especially throughout the Protestant churches, what one man proclaims as saving truth another man denounces as fatal

error. Hence the distraction and confusion. The main line of cleavage throughout Christendom no longer follows denominational lines, does not even follow the line between Catholics and Protestants. It follows the line between those who are Christians and those who merely call themselves Christians, between the heralds of a genuine and the heralds of a counterfeit Christianity. Those to whom Jesus is not a present object of worship, and who have no consciousness of themselves as sinners redeemed by His blood, are of a totally different religion from those to whom He is an object of faith and whose hope for time and eternity is grounded in the conviction that He bore their sins in His own body on the tree. It is the latter, and they alone, who constitute the true Church of Christ; in them, humanly speaking the future of Christianity lies; and only as they by divine grace are faithful stewards of the saving Gospel will Christ see of the travail of His soul and be satisfied. If matters be allowed to go from bad to worse, if the former be allowed to obtain control of the churches as organizations and make them subservient to their purposes, there would be nothing left for the latter to do except to form new organizations in which to enjoy the fellowship of like-minded persons and through which to function as propagandists of genuine Christianity. We do not anticipate that such a situation will arrive. Certainly it will not arrive unless the Lord's people are derelict to duty. Numerous as are "the false brethren" in the churches of today, and influential as are the seats they occupy, the great majority of church members, we believe, are Christians in fact as well as in name.

It is high time for those who love the Lord in all sincerity and heartiness to awake to the fact that within the churches themselves, even within the ministry of the evangelical churches, there are considerable numbers who not only reject the Gospel but are busily engaged—and with no small measure of success—in propagating essentially pagan conceptions of life and destiny. By using orthodox language to express unorthodox conceptions, by representing essential dif-

ferences as only minor differences of interpretation, by crying "Peace, peace; when there is no peace," they have long kept most Christians in ignorance of the fact that the foundations are being undermined by those of their own household. Partly because of the efforts of those who have realized the situation, partly because many of these "false brethren" have grown so bold that they no longer feel the need of speaking cautiously about the Bible as the Word of God and the Cross as an atoning sacrifice, there are increasing indications that the true Church of Christ is becoming aroused to the peril that threatens. Many even of its leaders, however, are still so little suspicious of danger that they esteem those who sound an alarm as little better than mischief-makers. The task of the Church, in its conflict with encroaching modernism or renewed paganism, would be difficult enough if those who name the name of Christ were unitedly gathered about the Cross, singing praises to their King, and witnessing in word and deed to the essential truths of Christianity. As a matter of fact, however, there are many not only in the ranks but among the leaders who can look on Calvary and see only a good man crowned with thorns and with a spear wound in his side, who refuse to bow the knee in the presence of Jesus Christ, and who as mouth-pieces of the Church are commanding pagan thoughts and pagan ideals. "If the trumpet give an uncertain voice, who shall prepare himself for war?" There is no more pressing need, therefore, than the creation of a situation—whether by the conversion or the voluntary withdrawal or the exclusion of these "false witnesses"—wherein the Church of Christ, as far as possible, will bear undivided testimony to the Gospel of the grace of God. All things should be done in love. Love itself, however, should be subservient to the purity of the faith and will never sanction any paltering with truth. Surely it is worse to offend God than it is to offend our neighbor. No Christian will deny that when it is impossible to please both we ought to seek to please Christ rather than men. Moreover, we should not forget in this connection that the Church is a voluntary organization;

no one is required to belong to it; more especially no one is compelled, willingly or unwillingly, to minister in its sanctuary or to teach and defend its message. Hence no specious plea for tolerance should be permitted to persuade us to give even a tacit consent to anything, in worship or teaching, dishonoring to our Lord in the Church He purchased with His own blood.

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S. G. CRAIG.

THE MYSTIC PATHS

It is one of the many curiosities of mystical literature, and one of the problems of mystic psychology too, that for many there is in mysticism both an intellectual repulsion and an emotional attraction. Robert Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics* is an unconscious commentary upon this. A book more at odds with itself, and a man less satisfied with his intellectual conclusions, it would be hard to find; for from the first chapter to the last this curious study in mysticism exhibits a man deeply in love with mystical thought,—fascinated by it rather, as a twittering sparrow before the jaws of some mighty serpent,—yet screaming aloud at the object of his adoration. Repulsion stirs him even to intellectual violence, yet fascination holds him spellbound before the Vision Splendid. Heart and head surely were never less in agreement than here. Perhaps, in quieter fashion, the same fact holds true of other students of mystical thought. It might, therefore, not be altogether futile, to attempt a study of this thesis of repulsion and antithesis of attraction, and reverently to ask whether in the heart's response to mysticism and the head's denial, there may not be a clue to lead one aright,—a glimpse, let us say, of a Mystic Goal, and a warning of dangerous paths that lead not thither.

Think, if you please, of some Dismal Swamp, cypress-hung and aflame with unwholesome bloom, yet not without its green glades and island hillocks rich in flower and fruitage: a swamp seemingly endless yet with some unanalyzable promise of a Goal beyond, and traversed by a labyrinth of paths. Our question is, whether among these innumerable ways, there may not be one way that truly goes, straitened perhaps and narrowly, to the realized Vision.

According to Vaughan¹ mysticism has no genealogy, no growth in tradition. "It is a ready-made commodity, to which certain temperaments are liable in any age, nation, or

¹ *Hours*, Vol. I, Book II, ch. 2.

religion." What Vaughan here says, though with animosity, and without realizing what he has said, seems to me to be this: that mysticism is not a product of human speculation. There is development in all thinking; there is growth in all tradition; there is no changeless speculation; a "ready-made commodity" to which "certain temperaments are liable," smacks of the instinctive; so that in this curiously repellent comment, Vaughan grants the very thing he is so intellectually anxious to discredit. If he has unconsciously voiced a truth here, then mysticism, (not as any speculative system, nor in its intellectual content, but as an emotional bent,—or, let us say mysticism in essence and not in manifestation) is of an instinctive quality, liable as all instincts are to suppression or evolution, and in evolution liable to normal or abnormal, diseased or wholesome development.

Evelyn Underhill has, one would say, nothing in common with Robert Vaughan further than our common mortality. At least their judgments upon individuals and doctrines never coincide. It is the more curious to find that when Miss Underhill sets out, as a protagonist of mysticism, to define it, she reaches approximately the conclusion of Vaughan the antagonist.² She tells us, that is, of mysticism as an "organic process," "the expression of the innate tendency of the human spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order . . . whatever be the theological formula under which that order is understood." That her elaborate series of definitions finally exclude whatever cannot be squared with her own theological and psychological beliefs, and include those beliefs, is of minor importance. Attention is drawn merely to her recognition of mysticism as an "organic process," an "innate tendency," or as perhaps she might be willing to say, and possibly does elsewhere say, "a religious instinct."

This instinctive quality lies either implicitly or explicitly in most definitions of mysticism. Behind all analyses, whether of mystical "saying" or "doing," is found a recog-

² *Mysticism*: Preface.

nition of one dynamic instinct—the desire of the finite towards the Infinite, of the relative towards the Absolute, of the soul towards God. This desire, when it finds its expression emotionally rather than intellectually (yet not necessarily setting up a false antithesis between the two), is essential mysticism. The will may be, and in practical mysticism must be, exercised; the intellect should be, and in developed mysticism is, called upon at least to analyze; but the emotional element of man remains in charge of the mystic instinct, wheresoever it quests. We live, move, have being in God. Essential mysticism is but the instinctive recognition of that divine environment.³

Objective nature is steeped in deity, created, upheld, providentially guided to its divine purposes, moving with infinite majesty towards the goal of God's completed will. The same glorious truth applies to humanity as a whole, and to every individual. The Immortal gives to all mortality his upholding Spirit. There is no barrier to the full knowledge of this immanence of the Creator in the whole of his creation—except the unsurmountable barrier of sin (un-surmoutable by man, not by God). It is just here that natural religion takes on the character of an instinct; however impotently, the immortal spirit of man appeals in a dumb craving that is almost a physical need; and that appeal is in itself the productive instinct from which religion, i.e., natural religion—man, God-seeking, but by no means God, man-seeking—finds its origin. And while this instinctive religious urge finally develops into every intellectual and volitional type of worship, nevertheless its basis remains emotional. Wherever that emotional basis retains its ascendancy you have some form of mysticism, using the word now not merely as descriptive of essence but of manifestation.

Here is a clue towards an understanding of that intellec-

³ Dr. B. B. Warfield, in reviewing Fresenius', *MYSTIK* (this REVIEW, Apr. 1914) says: "at bottom mysticism is just natural religion"; cf. *Bib. Rev.* (Apr. 1917): "Mysticism and Christianity": "God is a part of man's environment."

tual repulsion which mysticism itself develops against itself, especially in such evangelical minds as that of Robert Vaughan. The repulsion, however, is by no means limited to evangelical thinkers. It, too, smacks of the instinctive, for it is a further knowledge possessed by the soul—a spiritual awareness, breaking through to consciousness,—of the spirit's impotence. Steeped in God, man is yet without him. Man can merely *crave*. This fact means that an immense gulf is opened between the religion where God is found to be actively and objectively and verifiably seeking, and the religions where men alone (whatever intellectual interpretations they give to the subjective urge) seek helplessly for God. The Christian, that is, knows nothing of a natural or supernatural guidance of the Spirit, apart from objective revelation. The Within is no rule of faith or guide to life. There is no subjectivizing of religion, nor making God to be merely an inward experience. Authority, for the Christian, inheres in an objective, supernatural revelation, a revelation designed to save men who cannot save themselves. But natural religion, on the other hand, knows nothing of this supernatural grace of God, indissolubly bound up with the historical Jesus and an inspired Bible. It knows merely that universal power whereby the Creator providentially and yet personally upholds and rules every atom of his handiwork.

There is much to be said about this providential care of God: more perhaps than those who have the clearer light generally acknowledge. In broad day we have small praise for the tallow dip. Man, as the trite phrase truly enough goes, is a religious animal; he will have a religion, though it be but the vaguest of superstitions or the most intellectual of sciences; and the religion that he has, in its inception, is going to be a true religion, though not a saving one; for the heart and soul of it will be an instinctive recognition of the Divine. There is a challenge about nature to the rudest savage. The "flower in the crannied wall," the flaming heavens, the majestic procession of the seasons, the cosmic

forces that obey no human laws and yet do veritably obey even in their seeming lawlessness laws that no human mind may grasp—here is enough for a religion. Men, bringing their intellects to bear upon what to begin with is an emotional reaction to the glory of the universe, interpret this glory in terms of stick, stone or totem, nymph and faun, godling and Olympian Zeus, and so slowly beyond them to Chronos, to the Unconditioned, to the Divine Dark and Great Anonymous. Always the intellectual conclusions are going to be at fault, for “who by searching can find out God?” but always the spiritual premise is true, because it is rooted and grounded in this primary fact, that every creation is a revelation of the Creator, in whom “all things hold together.” But natural religion is something more even than this: not merely an emotional and intellectual response to the appeal of nature, but a spiritual response as well.

There is, to one who feels deeply the beauty and mystery and infinite grandeur of physical things, a sense of communion through them with Something not physical, the hint at least of a Presence behind the kaleidoscopic veil. Dream of that, apply your natural speculations to that, develop for yourself this passing Glimpse, and you will sense at least this much: that there is a barrier, but something beyond it, a way for your soul to travel, but with a wall ahead, an immediate contact with God to be achieved, yet unachievable. It is when you decide to scale the barrier and achieve this unachievable by your own inward efforts that you become what is commonly called a mystic. It is then, too, in all probability, that you become an emotional pantheist, saying with P. B. Blood,⁴ and with many other and better known mystics for the matter of that, something like this: “Into this pervading genius we pass, forgetting and forgotten, and thenceforth each is all, in God. . . . ‘The One remains, the many change and pass’; and each and every one of us is the One that remains.”

⁴ William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 389.

God, the River, floweth, and with him we flow,
 God within us sheweth, where we mingling go,
 But what God's heart knoweth, we may never know.

This appeal of pantheism to those who have or who can understand and believe no other than natural religion, is one that is almost irresistible. The majesty of nature, its domination of the human mind, the awe that overcomes one whether in contemplation of pebble or cosmos, fire-fly or far and flaming star—to the sin-darkened mind what adequate explanation of it all, what soul-satisfying solution of the problem of existence, save the dervish's ecstatic repetition of "God! God! God!"

It is not without significance that Professor James⁵ found his collection of mystical moods to be largely a collection too of moods superinduced by nature—occurrences of the great out-of-doors. A host of illustrations come to mind: Charles Kingsley, the thoughtful protestant clergyman, walking in the quiet English fields, and lifted to an ecstatic recognition of deity there. Francis, "the troubadour of God," in his enchanted world of Assisi. Amiel, the timid agnostic, with his "prodigious reveries" under the shadows of the Alps.⁶ Walt Whitman, anarchic and bellowing, loafing in nature in no quiet mood, and inviting his soul with loud adjurations to worship the Divine Within and Without. Blake bemused over his pebble. Maeterlinck, that new Balaam, open mouthed before the horses of Elberfeld, self-applausive in the séance chamber, but truly enraptured before bee-hives and "old-fashioned flowers." "Mab"-mad Shelley, and many another poet, not with the Psalmist's vision, but only of mortal eye, looking up to the stars and noting somewhat of the Open Country of Heaven there and the God of the Far Reaches! Christian and agnostic, theist and pantheist, alike may step over this threshold of God's visible creation. But that entrance way, as Omar the Tent Maker knew well, is like an enchanted door in Færie, wherein enter-

⁵ William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 394.

⁶ *Journal* Apr. 28, 1852, Jan. 7, 1866, etc.

ing, one finds oneself in the same room out of which one has but stepped.

Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about; but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went.⁷

So much for a natural recognition that God is; it is the inner altar that all men build to the Unknown God, with always a sinful tendency to worship themselves there. Out of this instinctive and unescapable feeling of "a Presence that disturbs with the joy of elevated thoughts," man has built his systems of explanatory philosophies and subjective theologies, his wholly human and speculative religions, his guesses "about it and about." From this veiled but true glimpse of the Ineffable in all things, the long generations have built up that school of pantheistic thought and pathological practice, a school as old as history, which we usually think of as mysticism. It contains a belief that God is, and is in his creation; that harmony between the finite and Infinite may be secured by physical means, by exertions either of one's own body and will, or of God dwelling within and yearning upwards towards freedom from the flesh. It embraces either the belief in or the recognition of an abnormal human faculty or sixth and unfleshly sense, productive of what are hallucinations or else the strangest of unphysical phenomena. It finds special divine revelations, powers, and beatitudes in purely psychical states. It strives to meet God by transcending phenomenal being. It denies all outward objective authority in religious matters, making of subjective experiences the one norm and rule of faith. It transcends the intellect and the will, appealing directly and exclusively to the emotional life as to something higher and more fundamental. In short, it is man's natural, instinctive religion, recognizing the immanency of God, but unguided and uninspired by outward authority, unsupplemented by

⁷ Fitzgerald's *Omar*, Rub. xxvii.

outward revelation, interpreted only through natural powers, and seeking to hold direct intercourse with the Absolute. It is a clearly developed philosophical doctrine and a clearly expressed mode of life or practice. The only revealed religion that it acknowledges is that which it experiences.

Without arguing the question as to the existence of variant types of mysticism, true, false, or inbent of falsities and verities; without debate as to the mystical character of Christianity itself; thinking for the moment only of this one historical school, traceable in doctrine and practice by the clearest line of descent from the 20th century A. D. almost to the 20th century B. C., one might define mysticism by saying that it is a blind instinct for the God of nature, which believes that it can attain deity even in this life through no other than its own divine yearnings towards the Oversoul; God, apart from God, struggling upwards to unity with God. In its developed forms it almost invariably teaches an essential union of part with Whole, a mingling of brook and ocean, of the body's breath with the whole atmosphere of earth; or, to speak without metaphor, a union of man's spirit with God's Spirit, made possible by their essential identity, and in which personality disappears and man becomes God, and God man.

"Animism," some one has said, "is the pantheism of savages," of primitive man. A study of animistic mysticism would, I fancy, show us every phenomenal characteristic of the more advanced schools, overlaid by crude and savage superstitions, no doubt, yet still mystical to the core. When in the sacred books of India we watch primitive animism slowly and painfully developing into the wonderfully perfect systems of pantheism and pan-nihilism of completed Brahmanism and Brahmanic Buddhism, we see at the same time perhaps the most perfect examples of empirical mysticism, mysticism in action, developing with the developing philosophy of India into a supreme effort to overcome the phenomenal world. The essentials of doctrinal mysticism are all here in primitive Indian thought and practice, cruder

perhaps, bolder in their frank expressions, yet sternly logical in carrying out the idea of negation to its nihilistic end. In its two fundamental principles of God as all and all as God, and evil as mere nothingness or negative good, Indian thought permeates the greater part of all later mysticism to such an extent that one is sometimes tempted to say that mysticism is just Brahmanism carried over into other lands, and infused into other systems of religious speculation. The thoughts, the doctrines, and the very language of the bulk of western mysticism remain Brahmanic even to this day. The same is true not only of philosophic but of empirical mysticism. The austerities, self-mortifications, passive but terrible inward struggles of the yogi to cast off the illusion of life, to free himself from all phenomenal being, to achieve Nirvana—this is the same life that is developed in all the later machinery of the Negative Way. Suso's chains and nails, scourges, repulsive tortures, his whole life of purgation, would find a fitting environment in some dark and secret forest of early India, where, with the wild fanatic visionaries and "holy men" of old, he would have been a brother indeed, achieving the quiet of absorption into Brahm.

Further westward, less speculative animism with its accompanying mystical life, flowered in those systems of nature worship and sacramental abominations of sexualism of which we have happily but veiled glimpses in the Scriptures. The nature mysticism of the Semitic races, if we had but sufficient materials for study and comparison, would probably give us a clue to much of the orgiastic ritual centering about the worship of the Mother Goddess and her dying and rising son and lover. Though in Old Testament days perhaps the mysteries of Tammûz and Ishtar, "Adonis" and the Mother, Attys and "Cybele," Osiris and Isis, did not rise above a gross sexual paganism, yet there must have been a deep strain of nature mysticism in all the worship of high place and temple: for it seems certain that we shall have to conceive of these early anti-Jehovistic re-

ligions as a second element in the growth of western mysticism, only less important than Brahmanism for its influence on later doctrines and life. The closest possible connection exists between Semitic nature cults⁸ and the earlier Orphic and Dionysiac mysteries of Greece. Aphrodite and Adonis, Kore and Persephone, Dionysos himself and Orpheus, are western versions of the immemorial Asian dream; cruder nature worship transmuted by poetic ritual, sublimated, pantheized, made the vehicle for mystical doctrine and practice. Yet just as early Ba'al worship was anti-Jehovistic, so, we may be certain, its classical progeny in their day were as surely anti-Christian.

Out from these two main sources, then, we may trace the westward flow of pantheistic mysticism, the one type losing nature in God, the other losing God in nature, but both alike teaching in one form or another the possibility of breaking through the barrier of physical life, and becoming one with the Absolute.

Neither the pedigree nor character of Gnosticism may be studied here; yet that "metaphysics of wonderland" has its place in the development of western mystical thought, for, though Neoplatonism was to a large extent a product of passionate opposition to the fancies and fables of the Gnostics, nevertheless the latter left their mark upon Plotinus and his followers. W. K. Fleming⁹ tells us that Gnosticism was, in its "wild guesswork" "quite alien from the mystical instinct after a basic unity." The crude dualism of the Gnostic repulses him, rightly enough; yet he fails to see that the Gnostic's effort, too, was to transcend dualism and so reach the Absolute. The Gnostic theory of emanations, surely, is the Positive Way of later mysticism—the Absolute reaching downwards through ever more attenuated outpourings of Itself, to come at last into a Point,

⁸ Phrygian, Egyptian and Semitic Cults are classified together, in the belief that J. G. Frazer's *The Golden Bough* furnishes sufficient evidence of their common ancestry.

⁹ *Mysticism in Christianity*, Ch. 3.

that immanent spark of the soul, which in turn, going upwards, forms the Negative Way of "Pseudo-Dionysius," aspiring back through negations of the world to the Abyss whence it came.

It is possible to think of Plotinus as at once the apex and foundation of pantheistic mysticism. In him are gathered all the results of long ages of earlier speculation and mystical experimentation; and out from him proceed the pantheistic doctrines and the purgative and psychic machinery of all succeeding ages. Back of the philosophy—or shall we not rather say the religion?—of Plotinus lies the old Brahmanic metaphysic, so that if one were to try to express Plotinus and Neoplatonism in a word, I fancy it would be possible to say that *negation* sums up the whole matter. Dean Inge is of the opinion that all the fundamental tenets of Plotinus are purely Greek in origin;¹⁰ yet he cannot ignore the deep influence of the mysteries on Neoplatonic thought, even though he does ignore their eastern pedigree. The fact of the matter is that "purely Greek thought" is an unreal abstraction; the eastern world fathered Greek mystical thinking; so that the Dean's "Greek" influence amounts to little more than hellenized versions of Brahm and Ba'al.

All pantheism must negate the individual, sweep away distinctions of being, in order to achieve a doctrine of *Pan* at all. Plotinus' Abstract Godhead, then, has no character, no individuality, and must not only be above thought, but must include within itself a negation of thought, and of the phenomenal world and individual being as well. The negation of sin and evil (so clear and uncompromising in Plotinus that it cannot be explained away), follows as a matter of course from these negations, and is not understandable without them. We are, therefore, not surprised when Plotinus tells us in effect that evil is disintegration, and perhaps not even of sufficient reality to be truly a downward force; for evil is not merely unreal, but "unreality as

¹⁰ *Christian Mysticism*, Lecture III; and cp. his notable volumes *The Philosophy of Plotinus*.

such." What more logical than that this metaphysic of negations should issue in a religion of negations? The negative Way of Plotinus' followers, the Way of purgation, illumination and union, this is the fruit of the tree. The flesh must be negated by purgations, the senses must be negated by vision and divine illumination, the very intellect and personality must be negated by trance, ecstasy, and the loss of all conscious existence, in order that the metaphysic of negation may issue in the negative life.

The metaphysics of Neoplatonism became the metaphysics of "Pseudo-Dionysius" without any change in the fundamental doctrines. Entering Christianity from an anti-Christian source, the whole Dionysian movement remains anti-Christian to the end. The stream flows, as through a series of lakelets, through Plotinus, through "Hierotheus," through "Dionysius," to the West. The self tortures of faqir and yogi, the eight-fold path of Buddhism, the negations of Plotinus, and the self-crucifixion of "Hierotheus," all aim at utter absorption of personality even in this life. This is the Dionysian scheme, the Negative Way of heretic and saint, where by stripping off all human passions, all fleshly and sensible ideas, virtues, qualities, abstract thoughts about God, all personality except bare continuance of being, the mystic arrives into ecstatic supernatural contact with the Divine Dark, and becomes one with the Unconditioned. The text of all of "Dionysius" might well be, as Dr. Philip Schaff¹¹ says, "Romans, XI, 36, 'from God and through God and unto God are all things.'" There is, however, no Christian interpretation of that text in the double procession of Godhead as "Dionysius" views it—downwards from the Dark that transcends all being, downwards through ever lessening emanations of Itself, to a divine Point in man; and thence expanding, upwards again to the trnscendent "Nothing it set out from."

All this is just one of earth's innumerable examples of

¹¹ *History of the Christian Church*, vol. 4, p. 597.

the helplessness of the natural man, the inability of man to find God for himself, even though God's common grace in some sort reveals him both Within and Without, and the almost transparent mystery of his creation rouses the longing soul to search. It is a moving commentary on the "sinfulness of sin."

If mysticism is man's natural, instinctive religion, it follows that, though having an affinity with all positive religions, mysticism in action will be as it were more at home, more at ease, more capable of freedom and what, to it, may be thought of as a normal development, in those religions whose basic element is of an emotional nature. Its close affinity to pantheizing modes of thought is thus at least partly explained. Where it manifests itself in Christianity, too, we will *a priori* expect to find it more clearly developed in the emotional element of our religion. Where it exhibits its presence in non-Christian faiths, the same phenomenon will be anticipated. Nor will our anticipations fail of verification. It is, e. g. in the emotional element of Islam, among the dervishes and their spiritual kindred, that mystic belief and practice come most clearly to light, while very remarkable examples of group mysticism are found in the revivals that shook Roman Christendom in the Middle Ages, and Anglo-Saxon Christendom during the days of Wesley and Whitefield. This, of course, is not meant as a depreciation of those two men, nor as a slur upon the true Christian faith of the majority who participated in those great emotional upheavals. It is merely saying that where the emotional element even of the one revealed religion is given full and uncontrolled play (as it often was in those days) there one would expect to find the natural mystical element of religion in a developed form; and there, indeed, empirical mysticism as a matter of fact, becomes at times even the dominant factor. The deep spirituality of the leaders of our revival movement kept its mystical element within bounds. The truly Christian emphasis upon the Bible as the one rule of faith and practice, prevented any such distressing out-

break as that which was witnessed in mediæval days. Nevertheless, critics of revivalism will have no difficulty in finding both the philosophical doctrines and the psychical phenomena of pantheizing mysticism, even in such a truly evangelical movement as that which closed the Eighteenth Century. The same fact will explain why mysticism has always found such a congenial atmosphere in the cloister, where the magnificent pageantry of the Roman ritual, the long and solitary hours of brooding devotion, the persistent inward struggle against the lusts of the world, the flesh, and the devil, together with a depreciation of (and often indeed an ignorance of and indifference to) the revealed Word, combine to place so much emphasis upon the emotional, and to push back and even destroy any truly evangelical faith, where intellect and will would have equal place and power with the feelings. The man of emotional temperament, or perhaps abnormal psychic condition, or of exaggerated sensibilities, will have a religion where his emotion, his psychic experiences (illusory or true) are given the opportunity of free play, and where their exaggerations and even their pathological phenomena, may be incorporated into his scheme of religious life.

Intellectuality becomes a pretty highly developed power before complete dependence upon emotional states fails as the controlling factor in natural religion. It is in consequence of this dependence upon the inward and the emotional that mysticism naturally gravitates towards pantheism. There is a downward or backward pull to every instinct; their capacity for sublimation depends upon an environment which will remake the instinct itself; and that environment does not exist in nature; man must create it for himself. But that is exactly what man cannot do in this one case of the religious instinct; it presupposes something above man, and uninfluenced by man. The religious instinct can be remade only by him who implanted it, of whom it speaks, and for whom it yearns. It follows that man's mystical search for God will never be without at least a pantheizing tendency;

for that is undoubtedly the natural and downward bent. However intellectual some of our modern systems of pantheistic thought may be (and one could hardly find anything more compact of thought than the Hegelian dialectic) nevertheless they are, so to speak, emotions intellectualized. Nature, by itself, can reveal no more to me than I, a part of nature, am. I find myself a mirror of nature, and nature a mirror of me. Either nature becomes God, or God becomes nature; and in either alternative I share in that deification. This religious instinct of mine, this natural religion, this "desire of the moth for the star," can do no more.

Doubtless mysticism will clothe itself in any theological garment that may be conveniently at hand. For all that, its inner character remains the same; the clothes vary, the body persists. Natural man is not vitally concerned about *finding* a religion; he receives whatever outward authority may offer him as an interpretation of the inner urge. But if that outward authority does not smother out the instinct itself (as it well may) the soul's craving for God will reinterpret the symbols of religion, fill them with a new content, read into them its interpretation of nature. The various doctrines, for instance, which are usually considered essential to mysticism, appear not only in developed systems of mystical thought, but spontaneously as well among groups widely separated in space and time. Traditions doubtless are transmitted; speculation grows. Where there is no traceable connection, however, similar doctrines spontaneously appear. Mystics, on the whole, think alike. This very fact, primary argument as it is among mystical writers for the validity of their findings, is at least an indication that the natural religious instinct can never transcend itself: it must find a natural satisfaction for its craving, and deify nature, or naturalize God. Thus, whether we trace the so-called schools of Christian mysticism back, as has been outlined in this paper, through a clearly defined and well connected train of traditions to the earliest mystical speculations, or whether we grant—as perhaps sometimes we must—the spon-

taneous appearance of identical doctrines in the rhapsodies of lonely and untaught hermits, we yet find them to be generated in nature and unable to transcend it

We may reasonably suppose this to be the full cause of the repulsion which well-developed mysticism creates against itself. Doubts and fears take hold upon the mystics. Their very Way must have its Dark Night, its Period of Despair, its loss of faith, its morass where no light is and all paths vanish. A knowledge breaks through to consciousness at times, that natural man is not as happily situated as he sinfully dreams; that God, near as he is, is not achievable. Your mystic seeker will put that knowledge by as a temptation of the devil. Really, it is still the religious instinct speaking—the urge for God—saying in no uncertain voice, that though man may seek him, man may not find him; that though man must have him, man cannot.

Basic mysticism we have attempted to define as in essence man's religious instinct; his initial and emotional response to a God-environment. That is neither Christianity nor an approximation to it, but it is human nature, and therefore of the natural or neuter ground upon which Christianity too is built. Though the Christian (as already said) knows nothing of either a natural or supernatural guidance of the Spirit, *apart* from objective revelation, though he has learnt that the Within cannot be in this world his rule of faith or guide to life, yet for all that his response to the God-environment is and must be at least as complete as any mystical surrender to the Oversoul. Every bit of objective revelation has revealed to him what otherwise he could never have comprehended, that God seeks man: the whole content of an objective supernatural religion is open to him, its historicity verifiable, its unique saving quality to be experimentally known. Through this implanted religious instinct, this inner urge of the soul, this mystic realization of the fact of God, he receives the power of faith, and through that supernaturally given power, objective revelation is received as a further and a saving fact: God has sought and

found him. But objective revelation itself gives the clearest of knowledge concerning a subjective revelation. God Without is not the whole story; God Within is needed to give faith in the Without, to apply to the individual the outward and redemptive act, to create a clean heart, renew a right spirit, interpret the written Word, and so regenerate and sanctify that the redeemed human spirit shall be led into all truth. God has provided an objective and supernatural means whereby men may be saved; and he himself, a personal and Holy Spirit in the inward man, applies that means of salvation both to the regeneration and sanctification of those who receive him. The Christian, therefore, has as a divine fact what natural mysticism can at the best merely long for; he has God—not as a part of the soul, a divine Spark, an uncreated ground of the human spirit, but God working in him savingly, that he may both will and work God's good pleasure.

This is Christianity, and there is something here very like to the doctrines which we commonly call mystical, so like, that mystical writers usually include a chapter or two in their books to link up Paul's doctrine and John's and the teachings of Jesus, with Plotinus and his followers; so like, indeed, that Christ's men may, and have, and yet frequently do, confuse the two. It is just because of this surface resemblance that mystical doctrines and practice attract and even fascinate the reverent soul.

That Christianity does not negate natural religion of any sort, emotional, rational or intellectual, is so obviously true that it needs no emphasis of statement. The God of nature is the God of grace, and even as the revelation of God in the Scriptures does not supersede, supplant or in any way make void the revelation of God in nature, so too the revelation of God to and in the natural man is not done away with, much less contradicted, by the supernatural and authoritative religion of grace and salvation in and through Jesus Christ. But natural religion is thus savingly supplemented.

Yet neither the phenomena nor the doctrines that are the fruitage of natural religion belong to the religion of grace. In the phenomena of mystical practice¹² no law of nature is set aside, no supernatural power is intruded in such a way as to overcome natural law; "second causes" rule, whether for good or evil. Where phenomena are not hallucinations, they are nevertheless capable of wholly natural and scientific explanation, which we may safely leave to the scientist. On the other hand, the phenomena of the Bible (to keep the same word for purposes of parallelism) are not only different in degree but in kind. For there walked upon the earth a Man who was not a Master Mystic, but who was Immanuel, the manifestations of whose power over nature, man, and the spiritual worlds, were the revelation of his own authority over the creation of his hands. John, Paul, Peter, and whoever else possessed miraculous gifts of the Spirit, and exercised them in healings, visions, prophecies and tongues, possessed and used gifts that were wholly supernatural. These men and women were the instruments of Christ's Spirit, and not at all natural mystics exercising natural powers. Either this is true, or Christianity has no more real authority than any historical mystical movement, and we are yet in our sins.

The matter of doctrine is on a somewhat different plane, not so easy of separation, yet quite as sharp a cleavage in reality exists as in the matter of phenomena. Broadly, we might characterize the two Ways by saying that the Christian's is affirmative, the mystic's negative, one the *Via Negativa*, one the *Via Crucis*. There is, so to speak, the same geographic distance between the shore of Lake Galilee and the jungles of India, as there is between the knowledge of the indwelling Christ, and the theory of an inward and brooding divine essence, struggling towards self-realization. The uncreated Spark of the soul, and the true inner guidance, help, power, and light of the Holy Spirit in the lives

¹² Cp. article, *The Psychic Phenomena of Mysticism*, P. T. R. Vol. XX, No. 3, July 1922.

of Christians—these too are just exactly as far apart as pantheism and Christianity.

What natural mysticism can never find equivalents for or any parallels to, are the precedents of subjective Christianity—God's justification, Christ's redemption—in short the whole objective content of our faith. All that is worth while in natural mysticism, then, does not need statement in mystical terms. We find in pure Christianity whatever so-called "Christian mysticism" holds that is of abiding worth to man. And we find in pure Christianity what we will never find even in the closest natural approach to the evangelical faith—the objective and absolute authority of the Scriptures and their triune God.

Now let us go back to our starting point. We have attempted to trace, if only in outline, this emotional religion through all its natural courses. Everywhere it has seemed to be no more than a dynamic instinct functioning through, and influenced for good or evil by, the more positive religions with which it associates itself. We have seen it as a wholly natural movement, without a single supernatural element in it, though often associated with supernatural Christianity. At the same time we have seen it as a religion without authority, standing on the shifting sands of emotional feeling, anarchic, dependent wholly upon the inner state of a man's soul for guidance, and upon individual, unaided conquest of the flesh for the winning of salvation, deification or absorption . . . whatever the goal may be. Its whole history may be thought of as an object lesson in natural religion, showing to men just how impotent they are to save themselves, and how their highest and best efforts to scale the heavens end in negations and darkness. We will do well to heed our instinctive distrust and repulsion of this Mystic Way.

We may, however, think of mysticism in a finer, truer and spiritual sense, inclusive of natural religion, but inclusive also of all the aspects of Christianity which make of the sacrifice of Christ and the revelation of the Bible, facts

of redemption and sanctification for the individual. One would then be a mystic as John, Peter, Paul were, not in their official capacity but in their private lives . . . very near to Christ, rich in God-given faith, spiritually minded, looking beyond the things of this world to the surer and truer things of eternity, filled with the Spirit of God. To this spiritual mysticism the facts of objective revelation would be the facts of supreme importance, and the inspired record of God's whole supernatural process of salvation would be the one guide and the only authority for the life that Christ Jesus died to save. But all this would not be mere dogma, mere intellectual belief, mere orthodoxy; it would be the one great and overmastering reality; for beside it, confirming it, would be a knowledge quite as real, quite as vital, not merely vouched for by the Scriptures but spiritually known to be true—the knowledge that the Christ of the Four Gospels indwells in the lives of his followers through his Holy Spirit; that he is present, and saving, and sanctifying those whom he has saved. Further still, there would be the knowledge that this world, for all of its goods, is no more than a place of pilgrimage, and that all lesser and earthly goods may well be negated for the sake of the one supreme good, God. We will do well to heed our instinctive attraction towards and affirmation of *this* Mystic Way, wheresoever we glimpse the truth of it in any mystic's doctrine or life.

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THE CHARGE AGAINST CAPITALISM

The capitalistic system of industry has both an economic and a moral justification. That justification rests on the primary truth that Capitalism fulfils a beneficent and many-featured function, in the saving and storing, the guardianship and employment of capital, along with the personal oversight of labour, the conduct of industry, and the advancement of commerce. Through this service a personal liberty, a potent moral incentive, the exercise of responsibility, are all attained, and, thereby, there is secured the social well-being, and the moral and intellectual progress of the community, and even of the race.

But this justification has been described, to its prejudice, as the plea of an advocate holding a brief. It has been said that the case against Capitalism has been lightly touched, if ignored. We shall, therefore, set Capitalism at the bar and examine the charge made against it.

The charge is, in general terms, that while Capitalism secures abundant production, that is attained by the economic impoverishment and industrial bondage of the labourer. Production, it is declared, is carried on under unjust and repressive methods, and the distribution of the product violates both equality and equity. As a consequence, employment is often exhausting and degrading, and always irregular and insecure, while Capital sits high in ease of mind, with an abundance which it wastes in selfish indulgence, in shameful contrast with meanly-housed and barely-fed labour. The charge consummates in the statement of the last and bitterest wrong—that the labourer is a wage slave deprived of his due status of manhood.

Three comments on this indictment are in order. The first is that the charge and the statement of the consequences are overdrawn. No man who is intimate with the relationships of labour and capital, or who lives among the manual workers, will accept this highly coloured picture as true to-day, whatever may have been the case a generation

ago. The amount of the weekly wage coming into the homes of the manual workers, the shop windows of every market town, the enjoyment of the pleasures and even delicacies of life by the masses of the people, make some of the statements in the charge ridiculous. The surest proof of that is that the modern socialistic demand is based, not on the poverty, or the distressed condition of the labourer, but on the claim to a fuller and freer and more secure life than he now has. It is the claim for a larger share and "a better time" such as he sees some others enjoy.

The second comment is that this mean condition, so exploited by the opponents of Capitalism, is largely due to causes which are ignored and have nothing to do with Capitalism. They are recorded in the annals of the police courts, and make up the items of the evening newspaper. Sloth, waste, intemperance, disloyalty to chastity and to other ennobling self-disciplines, are evident causes of destitution and misery. Every river-side and factory district will display, in the same common entry, homes of cleanliness, comfort and taste, and homes of squalor, destitution and misery. These miserable homes are not due to the environment. They make the environment. When the authorities of a great city have cleared out a slum, and razed its buildings to the ground, the people who dwelt in it have removed to another district, and soon made it as much a slum, as that in which they dwelt before. Men mistake the effect for the cause in the case of environment, and they forget that many of the best lives are lived under these conditions, in the same way as the best life the world has known, was lived in Nazareth.

The third comment is that in this charge no account is taken of the real antagonism to Capitalism. That is the disparity between the social condition of the different classes. Underneath all these bitter charges can be heard the cry for equality of social condition. The three catch-words of the French Revolution "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" are no longer on men's mouths. The whole strength of the demand focusses on equality. Out of that there comes every other

demand, and from it there rises, like a mist from a marsh, the envy which brings forth greed and hate and suspicion. This question of equality is complex and fuller of difficulty than some realise. But briefly here it may be said that there never has been, never can be, never should be, a complete equality of possessions. Men are not equal, either at their birth or after it. They do not remain equal, and a man's debasement or exaltation are, in most instances, due to his own endeavour. Under any social order there must always be some who are set in authority over others. In so far as that authority and reward are unjust—whether they are equal or unequal,—amendment is an immediate duty. At the same time, if we follow the highest example we shall not be much concerned about the inequality of our possessions. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things he possesseth." But, mark here only this one thing, that the charge against Capitalism, set out in these terms of reproach, is really based on a reaction against social disparity. The other items of the charge are set down to give it heat and colour.

But let us examine the charge with more detail, and look at the arguments by which it is supported.

The first is that capital is motived by profit, not by use, and is therefore, necessarily oppressive to labour. It is declared that a collective industrial system would be under no temptation, and could not find opportunity, to wrong the labourer of his justly larger share. But this statement rests on the fallacy that profit and use are opposed to each other. The truth is that the capitalist's first and immediate motive is production for use. He need not attempt to produce a commodity for which there is no demand. If he produces a superabundance his profit is gone, for he has exceeded the quantity required by the users. If he produces an article that does not satisfy the demand, he finds himself left with his production on his hands. There are iron laws of production, and the producer must supply the actual wants of the community, and must adapt his goods to the purchasing

power, and even to the taste, of the consumer. His first aim must be use, and only as he meets use is there profit at all.

The further truth is that profit and use are complementary. If one manufacturer produces a better wire for fencing than another he is assured of his profit, while the others, who have aimed at a higher profit, only make a loss. If one firm of tool-makers will reduce the cost of their implements they secure a larger sale, with a larger gross profit than the others, who have not kept use in view. Beyond these elementary facts there is the truth that Capitalism, with its constant aim at a large turnover, always supplies the customer more cheaply, more accommodately, more promptly than any public board, or State-controlled factory. Capitalism must aim at use, and at the largest possible area of use, or it suffers impoverishing loss. Every newspaper company is aware that in proportion as it can meet the needs and the desires of the users of newspapers, it will increase the number of buyers. It can, therefore, be content with a mere decimal of profit, because of the large number of copies of the journal which are sold. In every industry under Capitalism, use, the enlistment of the goodwill and support of the customer, is the first aim. So that Capital works first for use, with profit only as a consequent.

The second item in the charge is that capital is theft. This charge is old as Proudhon, who set it in his famous phrase—"Property is robbery." It was silenced for many years by the still unanswered reasoning of Bastiat in his *Harmonies of Political Economy*. Yet it has reappeared in the contention of the collectivists of to-day. It is heard in the Marxian doctrine of "surplus value," and it is the accusation, uttered, with a note of passion, by most of the opponents of Capitalism.

But capital gained as a reward for service, whether it be of hand, or of brain, or of possessions, is not theft. It is a just reward of hours of toil, or a return for skill, resource, and inventive genius, or the honourable increment due to the man who has put his possessions at the disposal of an-

other, for that other's advantage. When capital has been gained dishonourably, whether by an employer who does not give a fair value in what he supplies, or by a workman who slacks and skirks, there is theft indeed. But capital, honestly gained, whether by personal service, or the loan of possessions, is not theft. It follows, therefore, that rent for the use of a house which a man has built, or bought, is both just and honourable,—if the rent be adequate. It further follows that interest for the loan of tools or machineries—into which form the loan of money is really condensed,—is equally honourable. It may be true, and doubtless is true in some regards, that the ownership and possession of land is in a peculiar position. A strong reason can be urged for the proposition that those who work the land should own it, for land is, in its largest use, simply a tool. But in nothing is it more emphatic that land should be held in private ownership, for nothing has been proved more wasteful than State, or community land-holding. The story of every Commune is a glaring picture of the economic and moral wastefulness of Collectivism in land. So that so far from capital being theft, it is a wise and honourable reward—when honestly gained,—and its economic wisdom is written so large, that the most heedless glance can discern it.

The third item in the charge is that Capitalism compels a competition which is economically wasteful and morally depressing to the labourer. Here it is urged that competition tends to overdrive the labourer, and to regard him as only a part of the machinery. It passes on to affirm that the numbers engaged in management and distribution are needlessly large, and that they absorb an undue share of the product, to the detriment of the manual labourer. It is completed by the allegation that capitalistic competition issues in over-production, due to the hustled pace of the competitors, so that a periodic cycle of dull trade sets in, when labour suffers the misery and shame of destitution, with the inevitable result of moral deterioration.

The evidence led in support of this charge is usually taken

from a limited area—almost entirely from public services, not from production. The most notable instances in this charge of waste through competition are taken from transport. Two railways carry goods to the same area; a single line is sufficient. The trucks of one company deliver goods to the stations of another; they return empty. Several shipping firms possess fleets of vessels, maintain office establishments, and waste money in advertisements; a single agency could conduct the service. Three milk deliveries supply one street; only one is required. Similar instances are cited from other departments of service.

In so far as there really is waste no defence can be made, or ought to be made, under any system. But an excess in the number of employees and an over-supply of goods are not to be found among the articles of faith, or among the methods, approved by Capitalism. Waste either in production or management or transport, spells loss, and often bankruptcy, to the capitalist. Indeed so utterly opposed to such waste is Capitalism that the formation of the large Combines—against which some objections can be laid,—has been carried out to prevent such waste. The result has usually been that while the profits have increased, because of the savings in management, the cost to the consumer has been lessened. The charge is valid really against Collectivism, whenever the watchful superintendence of the capitalist is withdrawn. It needs no argument, but only the simple recollection of those who know the history of industry, to be assured that, neither production, nor distribution, nor transport, are carried on so cheaply, so efficiently, so regularly, so courteously, under Collectivism as under Capitalism. The keen oversight of the capitalist, his interest in cheap production, his eager desire to secure the custom of the public, may tempt him to hard dealing with employees, but they certainly engage his whole mind in economic and courteous production and supply. Private management is always more resourceful, more adventurous, more eager to

expedite delivery, more instant in the service of the consumer than any national service can ever be.

But this charge, so obviously unsupported by any proof of economic waste, falls back on the other feature of moral wastefulness. Competition between capitalists, it is urged, surely tends to oppress the labourer. It depresses his wages because of what Lasalle called "The iron law of subsistence." He affirmed a law by which wages tended to fall to a level which would keep the labourer alive, and no more. That rhetorical line has now been scored out of the indictment. But it is still contended that competition will always deny the labourer the free and full life which is his due, and will grind him between the upper mill-stone of the employer's greed, and the nether mill-stone of the consumer's apathy. The final charge is that competition may not waste wealth, but it wastes men.

What is the truth about competition? There may be a competition which is open to a just moral condemnation. For that reason the statute books of all Christian nations are filled with enactments to regulate competition. The various organisations of labour and industry have been organised to check any self-willed actions, and the share in the oversight of conditions of labour, now exercised by workmen, is a powerful check on any act of oppression. But in every passion and energy there is a high and a low plane of action. Competition is as inevitable as the pulse in the blood. The desire for preëminence is a native passion of the heart. It cannot be eliminated from any social or industrial, or moral order. It has a function to fulfil, and the true and wise end is to purify and exalt the exercise of competition, and so secure its blessing, and not turn it into a curse.

One clear-sighted collectivist has discerned and faced this truth with candor. Mr. G. R. Stirling Taylor writes in this decisive way. "There were many brave people amongst us who tried to prove and believe that competition was altogether evil, and that we could do without it. As a theory for latter-day saints there was a great deal of truth in our

brave arguments. As a practice for present-day sinners, we were trying to bury our heads in the sand. The gentle prick of competition develops an energy in man."¹ This is a wise and convincing correction of much wild and heady argument. Mr. Stirling Taylor sees that many of the diatribes against competition draw lurid pictures that are false to the facts, and that to-day competition has only "a gentle prick." He realises that competition is not only inevitable, but necessary. He does not see, apparently, the whole round of its blessing. It develops energy, as he asserts, but it also imparts interest to life, zest to labour, and enriches the mind and quickens the spirit. Even were the world to become the home of "latter-day saints" they would require, and would rejoice in, the whole round of competition, but they would transmute it into a noble emulation. They would not discard the pliant garment of competition for the strait jacket of a limited endeavour.

The pregnant blessing of competition appears in every sphere of human activity. In the games of life it imparts a zest and produces a skill not otherwise attainable. In all the higher achievements of human endeavour—in the strenuous competition in art and music, in learning and in literature, its influence is renewing and strengthening. Competition has a dynamic that the world cannot do without. It promotes patience, endurance, courage, self-discipline, and a noble passion to nobly excel. In the sphere of industry it is as indispensable, and as salutary. The finer adaptation of machines to their purpose, the zeal for the discovery of new worlds and for the opening of new markets, the passion to excel in the perfection and the finish of all the tools of life, even the rivalry between two firms, or two workers, promote the moral well-being, and add to the joy of life. Whatever will quicken interest, develop energy, and add to the moral moment of toil deserves encouragement. All the petty and selfish rules which fence a man about in his daily work, and command him that his hammer shall drive only

¹ *The Guild State*, p. 93.

so many nails an hour, or lay so many bricks in a day, degrade a living, thinking, self-resolved human being into a machine. They rob him of his power of initiative. They dull his mind, and tame his spirit. They check the progress and evolution of the race. There is an upward calling which the human spirit hears, and to which it can respond only in freedom. That response may cost strain and toil, but the development of the personality is attained in no other way. Browning bids men "strive, and never mind the throe." He describes the degradation of those who try to escape from the arena of struggle and contest, and he pictures them as cattle,

Tame, in earth's paddock, as her prize.

The Hebrew poet anticipated Browning when he likened such men to "the beasts that perish." Competition is a moral force.

The fourth item in the charge is that Capitalism imposes "serfdom" on labour. Here we are at the focus of the appeal in this moral argument. Here, as a consequence, the terms of the indictment ring with protest. We all know the declaration against the mean dependence, the supplicant bearing, the servile mind, the lost manhood which the labourer manifests through his subjection to the capitalist. Rousseau's familiar sentence "Man was born free, and yet is everywhere in chains" is the oft-quoted text of the opponents of Capitalism. It was a heated and rhetorical saying in Rousseau's dark days, and it is repeated in our own as though it were a steadfast truth. As a consequence there is the demand for the complete independence of the employee from any conditions, except that of subjection to the State, and the escape thereby from what is called "serfdom" due to the fact and the power of an employer.

The first question to ask in regard to this allegation is this—is it accurate? Is labour, under Capitalism, in serfdom? Are employers of labour tyrants? Have they power to deal with their employees as their selfish greed dictates? Dare they treat their workmen in a way which injures their

independence, or lessens their self-respect? Can they, of their own counsel, adopt and impose the methods or the hours of work within their own gates? No one who knows anything of the modern conditions of work, and the varied and complex regulations imposed upon management, will listen, without a just protest, to the rhetorical talk of "the serfdom of labour." Where the phrase might be used is in regard to the tyranny of Trades Union where a small oligarchy, themselves fearful of losing their position, compel men to action against which, in private, they make sad but ineffectual protest.

The wiser opponents of Capitalism do not insist on this term "serfdom." That word, borrowed from a past feudalism, is too ridiculous to be used by men who claim to be reasonable. The new term, "wagery" i.e., the receiving of a weekly wage from an employer is alleged to be the basis and the mark of the workman's enslavement. From some writers one would gather that if the term "wage" could be disused for the term "pay," or better still "salary," there would be less degradation in receiving it. Others have suggested that if the wage were given at longer intervals, and without exact accounting of the days and hours which are worked, as is the case with a salary, it would become honourable. They seem to be unaware that the grievances felt by most salaried persons are that the intervals of receipt are too long, that too little account is taken of hours and days, and that overtime has a minor place in the scale of reward.

Why should there be any sense of degradation, any loss of self-respect, any conception of enslavement, in receiving a wage? If only a man feels sure that he has given a fair day's work for a fair day's wage, and has earned his salary by diligence and fidelity, why should he feel lessened in his personality? A trader has no feeling of dependence in taking money across the counter. A lawyer and a doctor take a fee for their services, and they are not abashed, and do not pretend that they are degraded. They have been paid what is nothing more nor less—name it as one may—than "a wage,"

and they have obeyed a call to serve. Why should a working man who has produced some article by the skill of his hands feel any loss of respect in receiving a just reward for his labour? On the other hand when men who have received good wages, and spent them at their will, so often, improvidently eat bread provided out of public taxes, burn coal at less than the cost of its production, refuse to pay an economic increase of rent although they have been insistent that their wages should rise in a greatly higher percentage, they ought to have a sense of degradation, and ought to suffer a lost self-respect. Two generations ago they would have been called "paupers," and the pauper, under any name or form, loses his independence.

When will men learn that there is no escape from obedience and subordination on the part of one man to another, under any possible social or industrial order. There must be those in authority, who give orders. There must be those with oversight, who direct the actions of those who obey. There must be those who have responsibility, and, therefore, must make choices and decisions. It is sometimes urged that men will willingly obey any one who has been elected by the workers to his position of responsibility and authority. It is difficult to understand why obedience to an authority so chosen is honourable, but obedience to a master of industry degrades. The experience of those who work for public officials contradicts any such conception. A ruling official in a public department, the manager of any undertaking under a civic corporation, the controlling authority in any co-operative union is always more autocratic and less approachable than the master of a large enterprise, whose interest is bound up with the respect and goodwill of his workmen. The thought that if one gives "social service," as it is called, he will escape this sense of dependance, and keep his self-respect does not face either the facts, or the actual conditions of labour. Service is not only the obligation but the law of life. Only he who serves is noble. The questions he should ask are not whom he serves, but whether he serves in

an honest cause of human need and with fidelity. "I am among you as one that serveth" said the noblest spirit who ever walked in perfect freedom on our earth. He took a towel and girded Himself, and performed the most absolutely personal service, when He stooped to wash His disciples' feet. To-day all the world kneels at His feet.

Now all these statements seem to be justified both by the evidence for them and the reason which is within them. Yet there remain the wrongs so evident in our social order. These wrongs, as we have again and again suggested, have been and are being redressed. But the contention made here is that these wrongs are not evils necessarily bred by Capitalism. They are the growths from these roots of evil, out of which there spring most of the wrongs of life. In all relationships, in every organism, in the state and the city, and even in the household, there are the covetous, the greedy, the envious, the rude, the proud, the aggressive, the vengeful. They infest a Trades Union in the same way as they trouble a Chamber of Commerce, or the Senate of a University. What, then, is the truth in the matter? What shall we say about these wrongs? This is the answer,—they are not the wrongs of Capitalism. They are the wrongs of the capitalist. They are not the wrongs to which he is compelled, for there are capitalists who are not guilty of them. And if some capitalists, who stand out as glaring transgressors, were not only juster but wiser than they are, they would cease from evil, to their own well-being, and to that of all others with whom they have to do.

Let me set down in the briefest way and in general terms what these wrongs are. Out of, we may say, three great sources of evil doing, all the streams of social injury are flowing. The first is that some capitalists, not only seek profit but exact an unjust profit. Shoddy is manufactured and dressed to pass for honest wear. A higher price is demanded than yields a fair profit on the labour employed. Advantage is taken of a rising market to fix a higher price on goods, which have been bought when a lower rate pre-

vailed. No doubt a certain allowance must be made to cover the risk of a fall, but there are large increases which cannot be justified. The profiteer of to-day stands in the pillory with the publican of the time of Christ. He is a capitalist who is a criminal. But he is guilty not only in the production, but in the distribution of wealth. When profits began to rise many employers paid no spontaneous heed to the wages of employees. They refused to share their larger income with those who were fellow-workers with them. They met every appeal by a refusal, or by the offer of the slightest possible increase, until a costly strike enforced the workman's demands. Companies paid large dividends, enlarged their premises, and "watered" their stock, but kept their staffs at the lowest minimum they would accept. Had capitalists been wise, and been moved to justice, they would have shared the increase, and would not have been classed among those who have committed crimes both against the labourer and the well-being of the community.

The second crime of the capitalist is his heedlessness of the social well-being of the labourer. He has not asked, and he has not cared to ask, about the labourer's home. He has not cared to enquire as to whether comfort or cleanliness or decency could be attained within his narrow house. He has not been ashamed that the sun could not shine into the street where his workmen's children played. As a class capitalists have taken little account of the life lived by their employees when they left the gates of their factories. Such friendly interest is not easy, but more might have been done than has been even attempted. A sympathetic subscription does not discharge a capitalist's obligation. It must not be forgotten that the slum dwelling and the mean home are not entirely due to the capitalist's want of care. We must not forget the improvidence, sloth and drunkenness, which do more to impoverish and degrade the labourer, than any neglect on the part of the capitalist. In every congested district there are homes whose shining windows, clean thresholds and bright firesides are the index of a life of high

purpose, and an atmosphere of purity and peace. Yet this does not exonerate the capitalist from that heedlessness to the well-being of the labourer which reaches its saddest and most blameworthy line in his almost apathetic neglect of the out-of-work labourer. There have been firms who have kept their labourers at work at a loss even of their capital. But too many have discharged their workmen without a moment's thought as to where they and their children would get their bread. What an opportunity has been missed! It would have sweetened the atmosphere of society, and strengthened the manhood of humanity, as well as has been of unspeakable blessing to himself, if the capitalist had given some personal attention to the well-being of his unemployed. He would have fulfilled that counsel of Christ, enshrined in the parable of the vineyard, when the master gave the penny not only to those who had justly earned it, but to the unemployed who stood idle in the market-place, because no man had hired them.

The third crime of the capitalist is his spending his possessions in selfish indulgence. If wealth were modestly possessed and wisely used, if it were spent in the furtherance of moral ends, not only would greed and envy be exorcised from men's hearts, but the man of wealth would be ennobled in character. Few object to a man's prosperity in the things of this life if that be gained through his industry, skill and foresight. The average honest working man who spends his strength in the use of his tools, is aware of the toil and strain, the resourcefulness and watchfulness which his employer contributes. He recognises that any man with a difficult and hazardous occupation is entitled to a higher reward than the man who has "a soft job" or one which merely strains his muscles. But if wealth, however gained, is squandered in selfish indulgence, condemnation is swift and keen and often just.

The contrast rouses to passion. The questions asked are—Why should one man lie soft, and suck the sweets of life and another man endure hardness? Why should one man

waste wealth in display and in the gratification of dainty appetites, when another man is given a bare livelihood? To men who believe that a rich and free and full life is dependent on generous spending the sight of the capitalist making his wasteful and vulgar display, adorning his home with costly luxuries, garbing his womenfolk with rich clothing, and pampering his children with a round of delights, are sights which enflame with indignation. This is the embittering sight. Most men count it the supreme crime of the capitalist. Were possessions wisely used much of the bitter feeling would pass away, for the simplest man can see that in this self-indulgent spending, the capitalist not only sins against labour, but against society, and against his own soul.

At the same time it must not be overlooked that these crimes of the capitalist are the crimes of other men. They are the crimes of labour. The slacker who stints his toil, the workman who takes advantage of a scarcity to demand a higher wage, stands in the dock with the man who takes the unjust profit. There are labourers who are as intent on their own wealth, and as heedless of the well-being of their fellow-labourers, and especially of the employer, as any capitalist. When an employee wastes his master's goods, or is disloyal to his interest, he is equally guilty with the master who seems to be unjust to him. And when he spends lavishly, as has been done in the past few years, both in the costly provisions, and dainty luxuries, and extravagant clothing, as well as in the lavish indulgence in pleasure, he is gratifying the same appetites, with an equal condemnation to that visited upon the capitalist. Many of the pleas for labour as against capital, seem to be blind to the facts that the same wrong-doing is evident in the conduct of both.

This brings us to the closing question: How are these social wrongs to be remedied? The present method is that of the policing of the capitalist. This is fairly effectually attained, although labour is policed only by common law. The legislatures of every civilised land have been spending the greater part of their time in framing laws which deal

with the condition of labour, the relief of the distressed, the sharing of the profits, with the endeavour to secure a larger portion of the wealth of the world for the manual worker. Much has been done, and more will be done, for it is a conviction of the modern mind, that the policing of capital is a primary and urgent obligation of government. Yet no policing can ever do more than prevent, or punish, some of the wrongs from which our modern economic and industrial order suffers.

Others who belong to that large and varied section called by the common name of Socialists, demand the abolition of Capitalism. Some would abolish all forms of private ownership. Others wish to sweep away the large capitalist, with his supporter, the receiver of dividends and interest on his capital. Others seem to suggest a certain *datum* line below which the possession of private property would be allowed. Others seem to desire that some industries should be under State control, but that other industries—especially agriculture—might be left to private ownership and management. These are supported on grounds set forth succinctly by one writer. “We consider that the capitalist is as much the victim of his *system* as the unemployed, and that he has to conform to its evil pressure, in the same way as the poverty-stricken have to do. The results are not the same, but they are products of the same social mechanism.”

Here we reach the real dividing line in this controversy. Some place their faith in a new system, but there is no position more condemned by history and by reason than this belief that a mechanism can heal a moral disease. There is no system which can be made, in a world like ours, *accident-proof*. The emergencies which arise in a world, where all the forces of nature, as well as the wills of men are in action cannot be met by the most skilfully and delicately constructed organism. There is no system which is *fool-proof*. Even a machine, which has been finely adapted, can be made to work havoc, and even to ruin the most finely designed fabric, if it is in charge of a heedless, and careless and stupid, although

well-meaning, man. But there is no system that can be made *knave-proof*. It is the knave in all past history who stands out as the wrecker of every well-meant scheme, or system, of government or administration or social order. Every Communism has been wrecked by its Ananias and Sapphira. What we need is not a better system, but better men. One of the most sympathetic, as he was one of the wisest of the workers among the labourers, has written "I am a Socialist in so far as I desire for every one equality of opportunity, and an equal chance of a healthy life, and of enjoying the best gifts to this age." With Canon Barnett every one must agree. And we shall still more heartily agree when he adds "After all it is the spirit which is in the people, and not the law, which is the most important. If, as has been said, every one were Christian there would be no need of Socialism; and until every one is Christian, Socialism will be impossible."² That is the mind of Christ.

Glasgow, Scotland.

W. M. CLOW.

² *Life*, Vol. 2, p. 272.

THE CONFLICT OVER THE OLD TESTAMENT*

In a recent number of the *British Weekly*¹ there appeared an article by Professor George Jackson of Manchester which has been the occasion of considerable discussion, both favorable and otherwise, in subsequent issues of that journal. Professor Jackson calls attention to a remarkable situation in England: "on the one hand, a general acceptance of the results of Old Testament Criticism by the teachers of the Christian Church, and on the other, a widespread ignorance or fear of them by the great multitude of the Church's members." He declares that as far as England is concerned "the battle is over," leading scholars of all evangelical denominations being in the ranks of the critics. He names eight as typical² and asserts that "there are no names to set over against these." Yet he makes the remarkable admission: "We are afraid it is no exaggeration to say that probably five-sixths of the Old Testament teaching given in the Sunday-schools of this country last Sunday [he is speaking of England] was based on the presuppositions of fifty or a hundred years ago." This situation Professor Jackson considers especially deplorable because the old view, according to which a Christian is commonly supposed "to stand committed to the truth of everything in the Old Testament" has cost the Church, he believes, the adherence of many earnest seekers after truth who stumble, as Henry Drummond's correspondence shows that men of a generation ago stumbled, at "its discrepancies, its rigorous laws, its pitiless tempers, its open treatment of sexual questions, the atrocities which are narrated by its histories and sanctioned

* An address delivered by the author in Miller Chapel, October 10, 1922, on the occasion of his Inauguration as Assistant Professor of Semitic Philology, and now published with some revision and the addition of footnotes.

¹ July 13, 1922.

² Viz. Drs. Driver, Ottley, Skinner, G. A. Smith, Bennett, Wheeler Robinson, Peake, and Lofthouse.

by its laws."^{2a} He sees in the "new knowledge" which criticism has given us "one of God's best gifts to this generation"; maintains that "never before has the Old Testament been so intelligible, so readable, so 'preachable' a book as it has become in the hands of Christian scholars"; and regards it as the great task of the leaders of the Church to make this new knowledge accessible to those who, as he sadly confesses, are either "ignorant" or "afraid" of it.

In view of the fact that Professor Jackson quotes so competent a judge as Dr. Hastings, the editor of the numerous dictionaries which bear his name, as saying that "in the United States of America a great upheaval is at hand over the Old Testament," our subject may be regarded as a most timely one. And I shall ask you to consider with me whether it is true that "never before has the Old Testament been so intelligible, so readable, so 'preachable' a book" as the critics claim to have made it, that we may be able to judge whether there is warrant for the claim that the "new knowledge" should be regarded as "one of God's best gifts to this generation,"—a gift which it is our duty to receive with gratitude and share with all mankind.

Never before so preachable! This is a startling assertion. A few moments ago there was read in your hearing an account of the first and in some respects at least the most successful sermon ever preached by a follower of Christ.³ The account which is given to us is brief. Luke devotes only about twenty-two verses to Peter's sermon at Pentecost, adding two verses to tell us how Peter gave the "invitation to come forward," as the modern evangelist might say, and telling us that "with many other words did he testify and exhort, saying save yourselves from this untoward generation." Now what is the most striking thing about this sermon of twenty-two verses as reported by Luke?

^{2a} Prof. Jackson's authority for this statement is Drummond's biographer, Prof. G. A. Smith (*Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the O. T.*, p. 28).

³ Acts ii. 1-36 was the Scripture Lesson read as a part of the opening exercises.

It is this, the prominence it gives to the Old Testament. Indeed, the "report" consists very largely of citations from it and comments thereon. We have first a five verse quotation from Joel, with a verse of introduction. This passage is briefly (in three verses) applied to the death and resurrection of Christ. Then follows a four verse citation from the 16th Psalm, which is expounded by Peter as fulfilled in Christ's death and resurrection; and Peter adds a second quotation from the Psalms, in this instance from the 110th, to clinch his argument. This would seem to indicate that Peter on the day of Pentecost found the Old Testament Scriptures quite a 'preachable' book. Professor Jackson tells us that with the new light which Criticism has shed upon it, the Old Testament is more preachable than ever. We are fortunately in a position to test this statement as applied to Peter's speech. For we have now two accounts of this sermon. We have the "old" account given us by Luke; and we have the "new" version of the Higher Critics as contained in the *Shorter New Testament*, the chief editor of which was Professor Kent of Yale, an Old Testament critic of recognized ability and one who has been engaged for years in what Professor Jackson considers to be the great task of today, popularizing the results of Criticism. It should be especially instructive, therefore, to know how Professor Kent, an authority on the new knowledge which makes the Old Testament so much more preachable than hitherto, "reports" Peter's speech for us.⁴

We notice in the first place that the quotation from Joel is reduced, in the *Shorter New Testament*, from five verses to two. Evidently Peter made a mistake in using such a long citation! The relevant part of Joel's prediction is contained, it would seem, in the first two verses; and the last three in which the language is apparently regarded as too "apoca-

* It should be especially instructive, because the aim of the editors is stated to be "to single out and set in logical and as far as possible in chronological order those parts of the Bible which are of vital interest and practical value to the present age" (Preface of *Shorter Bible—New Testament*).

lyptic," to appeal to the sober judgment of thoughtful men is omitted. Then we discover that both of the quotations from the Psalms are eliminated, and all of the comment which refers directly to them. Why is this? The reason is obvious. Luke represents Peter as having made these quotations from the Psalms on the assumption that David was their author, and that the language which he used is so manifestly inapplicable to himself that it may properly be regarded as referring to Christ in whom it has a remarkable fulfilment. But, it is one of the surest results of that "new knowledge" which is so highly valued by Professor Jackson that, "there are no Psalms certainly or even probably Davidic," but that "The Psalter as a whole presumably belongs to the Second Temple and even to the later history of that Temple."⁵ Consequently Professor Kent deems it advisable to delete these references to, and arguments based upon the Psalms. As a result the Old Testament citations are reduced from about eleven verses to two, while the entire speech is 'shortened' to less than half its New Testament compass. It follows, then, that whether or not the Old Testament is more preachable than ever, Peter at any rate did not know how to preach it, and most of what he says about it would better be omitted. And if an Apostle cannot be relied on to preach it properly, is it surprising that many a Christian minister, who has accepted the new knowledge should show very great caution and hesitancy in using his Old Testament and be careful to avoid giving the "unscholarly" impression that he is appealing to it as authoritative?

This example of the application of the "new knowledge" is noteworthy for several reasons. It not merely has an important bearing upon the question of the preachableness of the Old Testament. It shows with equal clearness how close and vital is the relation between the Old Testament and the New, and how different is the modern critic's

⁵ Peake's *Commentary*, p. 368. The section on the "Psalms" is by the late Prof. W. E. Addis.

estimate of the Old Testament from that of the founders of the Christian Church.

Let us now examine a little further into the character of this new knowledge. Principal Joyce writing in "Dr. Peake's great Commentary on the Bible,"⁶ as Professor Jackson styles it (a book from which frequent quotations will be made, because it is largely representative of the present conclusions of the critics⁷ and because it is one of the most ambitious attempts thus far made to popularize the results of critical study of the Bible), makes this rather startling statement: "Externally and to a superficial observer it may well have seemed that, even in the times of the Monarchy, the religion of Israel was distinguishable only in certain minor points from the religion of the neighboring tribes."⁸ This statement is a little general. Professor Henry Preserved Smith tells us regarding the religion of Israel in the days of Moses, "Except that he [Yahweh] was more powerful, he did not differ essentially from Chemosh of Moab . . ."⁹ Chemosh, you will recall, is spoken of in the Old Testament as "the abomination of Moab." And you will also recall that one of the religious practices in the worship of "the neighboring tribes," which was responsible for his being called the abomination of Moab, was human sacrifice, "causing their sons to pass through the fire." Dr. Whitehouse tells us that among "the darker aspects of sacrifice belonging to the primitive period of Canaanite and Hebrew life was *infant sacrifice*"¹⁰ to which we have an allusion in one of the

⁶ *A Commentary on the Bible*, edited by Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D., Rylands Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester; Professor in Hartley College, Manchester. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1920 [cited simply as PEAKE].

⁷ Five of the eight leading scholars named by Prof. Jackson were contributors to this Commentary: Bennett, Lofthouse, Peake, Wheeler Robinson, and Skinner.

⁸ PEAKE, p. 428. Principal Joyce is discussing "Old Testament Prophecy," and his reference is to the pre-prophetic religion of Israel as "reconstructed" by the critics.

⁹ *Religion of Israel*, p. 61.

¹⁰ Prof. Whitehouse here refers to Prof. Jordan's sketch of "The

earliest codes (Ex. xxii. 29f.), where it is enacted that the human first born as well as of oxen and flocks are to be offered to Yahweh.”¹¹ The passage referred to reads as follows: “Thou shalt not delay to offer the first of thy ripe fruits, and of thy liquors: the first born of thy sons shalt thou give unto me. Likewise shalt thou do with thine oxen and with thy sheep.” Canon Harford in discussing this law remarks: “It is not said here (vs. 29b) how the offering of first born boys was to be made,¹² but the obvious analogy of the firstlings (vs. 30, “give me,” as vs. 29b) suggests that the form at least of the law goes back to the time when children were actually sacrificed (cf. Gen. 22).”¹³ Do you

Religion of Israel” (PEAKE, p. 81ff.), where the question is asked, Was human sacrifice ever a part of Hebrew religion? and answered in part as follows: “It certainly does not belong to the religion of Yahweh, and never receives the sanction of any prophet. Hebrew religion first modified and then banished this ancient widespread and barbarous custom.” This statement seems at first sight to conflict with that of Prof. Whitehouse. The explanation is that Prof. Jordan does not regard this law of Exod. xxii. as normative of Yahweh’s religion, or at least of the higher Yahwism of the Prophets (see below).

¹¹ PEAKE, p. 99.

¹² Here Canon Harford refers to Exod. xiii. 12f. which the critics assign to the document J (the Book of the Covenant being “unanimously” assigned to E) and which expressly states: “and all the firstborn of man among thy children shalt thou redeem”—a statement which anyone not committed to the theory of separate documents in the Pentateuch would naturally regard as proving conclusively that the meaning assigned by the critics to xxii. 29 is unwarranted, for the reason that this verse is to be interpreted in terms of xiii. 12.

¹³ PEAKE, p. 187. This statement takes the middle ground between the two opposing views advanced by critical scholars. On the one hand we have Stade, Loisy and Arch. Duff, who find here a definite requirement that the first-born son be sacrificed to Jehovah. Stade tells us that the Book of the Covenant (in which this law is found) demands this “quite bluntly” (“ganz unverblümt,” *Geschichte*, p. 634), and refers to this verse as proof. Loisy in contrasting this verse with xiii. 12 gives it as his opinion that “the text in itself does not provide for this substitution, and one may add excludes it” (*Religion of Israel*, p. 166); he even finds a reference to this law in Ezek. xx. 25f. (*Le Sacrifice*, p. 232). Duff does not hesitate to connect it directly with Moses: “This rule to sacrifice every first-born is, therefore, a very old one, and pictures doubtless exactly the old Mosaic worship” (*Hints on O. T. Theology*, p. 161f.). J. Estlin Carpenter apparently favors

recall who is said to be responsible for both the form and the contents of this law? The Bible tells us that this law formed a part of the Judgments which Jehovah gave to Moses at Mt. Sinai to set before the people!

It is the view of Wellhausen on the other hand that, according to the clear teaching of the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries, sacrifice had no Mosaic authorization.¹⁴ Consequently the critic has this advantage that he need not attribute his law¹⁵ of infant sacrifice to Moses, but may regard it as representing very largely what Professor Burney calls "the consuetudinary legislation of Canaan in the pre-Mosaic period."¹⁶ The critics have found it com-
this interpretation (*Composition of the Pentateuch*, p. 223). He cites Baudissin as regarding Exod. xxxiv. 20 as a "modification" of xxii. 29b. Baudissin's words are, "This is clearly an explanation, perhaps a modification of the Book of the Covenant" (*Einleitung*, p. 131). The view that "redemption" is a "modification" of the original rigor of the law is also strongly urged by J. G. Frazer, who claims the support of Nöldeke for it (*The Dying God*, p. 179). On the other hand, Wellhausen regards the claim on the human first-born not as "primitive" but as "a later generalization," and points out that there are "no traces of so enormous a blood tax, but, on the contrary, many of a great preference for eldest sons" (*Proleg.* p. 88). Smend denies that the wording of Exod. xxii. 29 favors the interpretation of Stade, which he declares would be "in most violent conflict with the spirit of the Book of the Covenant" (*Lehrb. d. A. T. Religionsgesch.*, p. 276). Addis calls it a "misinterpretation" (*Hebrew Religion*, p. 42f.). Still there seems to be quite a tendency, even on the part of those who agree with Wellhausen that the sacrifice of the first-born could never have been customary in Israel, to admit that the law in question is probably connected in some way with the ancient Semitic custom of human sacrifice (cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 464) and that this view is favored by the phraseology, or as Canon Harford calls it the "form," of the law (cf. Baentsch, *Exodus* pp. 89f. 203; Driver, *Exodus*, pp. 235, 410f.; S. A. Cook, *Encyc. Bib.*, col. 1526).

¹⁴ In commenting on Micah vi. 6, Wellhausen says: "It is no new matter, but, a thing well known, that sacrifices are not what the Torah of the Lord contains" (*Proleg.* p. 58).

¹⁵ It is only proper to speak of it as "his" law, for he seems to have discovered it. It has remained apparently for modern critical scholarship to make a discovery of which previous generations of Bible students were blissfully ignorant.

¹⁶ *The Book of Judges*, p. 329f. This contention of Prof. Burney's illustrates how radically the critics differ among themselves even on

paratively easy to interpret the fiery denunciations pronounced by the prophets upon a purely external or mechanical conception of sacrifice as a minimizing of the value of sacrifice as such, and even as an absolute rejection of it as altogether meaningless and wrong. Thus Professor Peake tells us: "The prophets do not attack sacrifice in itself so much as sacrifice divorced from morality: yet their tone suggests that they attach very little intrinsic value to the ritual of sacrifice."¹⁷ Professor Kennett goes much further. Notice what he says: "Thus, whereas, the great prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries repudiated all sacrifice, the compromising school of reformers represented by Josiah and his advisers found it necessary to insist on attendance at the great religious feasts . . ." The bearing of these

questions of vital importance to their hypothesis. He regards the Book of the Covenant as representing very largely "the consuetudinary legislation of Canaan" as observed by such Israelitish tribes as were never in Egypt and did not come under the influence of Moses (cf. PEAKE, p. 169: "It is unlikely on several grounds that all the tribes were in Egypt"). Yet the Book of the Covenant is "unanimously" assigned by the critics, including Prof. Burney, to the document E, which the "overwhelming majority of scholars since Wellhausen" attribute to a man of the Northern Kingdom, and hence regard as an "Ephraimitic narrative." Unless "Ephraimitic" is a tragic misnomer it should imply that E is par excellence the document of the Joseph tribes, which according to Prof. Burney are the very ones which were in Egypt and did come under the influence and leadership of Moses. Dr. Driver flatly contradicts Prof. Burney by saying: "It is reasonable to suppose that the teaching of Moses on these subjects [“civil ordinances” and “ceremonial observances”] is preserved in its least modified form in the Decalogue and the Book of the Covenant" (*Introd.* p. 152f.).—Loisy thinks the Hebrews did not practice human sacrifice in the desert, but learned it from the Canaanites. On the other hand Bertholet sees in "the abomination of the Egyptians" referred to in Exod. viii. 26 an allusion to this practice and remarks: "Because the Egyptians want to prevent Israel from offering their human first-born, they must pay the penalty with their own" (*Kulturgesch.*, p. 100)—a statement which recalls Wellhausen's remark, "Because Pharaoh refuses to allow the Hebrews to offer to their God the firstlings of cattle that are His due, Jehovah seizes from him the first-born of men" (*Proleg.*, p. 88), but is far more offensive.

¹⁷ PEAKE, p. 437; cf. p. 95.

words is made still clearer by the following, ". . . Haggai's zeal for sacrifice seems retrograde in comparison with the teaching of the pre-exilic prophets . . ."¹⁸ It is plain that Professor Kennett regards sacrifice as "primitive," and Haggai's insistence upon it as "retrograde."¹⁹

Now let us consider the New Testament inference from this critical conclusion regarding the Old Testament. Dr. Barton has drawn it for us very clearly: "So far as western Asia is concerned it was left for early Christianity to inaugurate a religion entirely without such sacrifice, and then the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was compelled to interpret the death of Christ in sacrificial terms (Heb. 7-10) in order to explain why the new religion could discard this world-old custom."²⁰ This shows something of the reach and sweep of the "new knowledge." It can read infant sacrifice into what the Old Testament declares to be the Law of Moses and read the vicarious atonement out of New

¹⁸ PEAKE, p. 573. Bousset states this view clearly as follows: "The prophets have always been powerful opponents of ceremonial worship, not merely degraded forms of it, but any forms . . . Jehovah, they announced, took no pleasure in bloody sacrifice and burnt sacrifice, in feasts, and new moons, and Sabbath solemnities. He had commanded none of these things from the fathers in the desert" (*What is Religion?* p. 132f.).

¹⁹ The 53rd of Isaiah, especially vss. 10-12, constitutes a serious difficulty in the way of the acceptance of this view. Prof. Wardle tells us that "The text of these verses [vss. 10-12] is so corrupt that any translation is hazardous" (PEAKE, p. 467f.). Prof. Kennett makes the assertion: "It is indeed improbable that there is in this whole section concerning the Servant of the Lord (Isaiah lii. 13, liii.) any *sacrificial imagery*" (*The Lord's Supper*, p. 41f.). This statement would be absurd, did not Prof. Kennett, like Prof. Wardle, have recourse to the familiar device of the critic, questioning the correctness of the text, a procedure which shows that the prophet succeeded in what Dr. Addison Alexander calls his "obvious design," viz., to make it "impossible for any ingenuity of learning to eliminate the doctrine of vicarious atonement" from the passage (*The Later Prophecies of Isaiah*, p. 278).

²⁰ *The Religion of Israel*, p. 210. Similarly in commenting on the 51st Psalm Dr. Barton remarks, "The Father needs no propitiation except the penitence of the son for whom he has waited so long" (p. 215)—a statement which clearly indicated that Dr. Barton discards the closing verses of this psalm as spurious.

Testament Christianity.²¹ How does the critic succeed in bringing about these startling results?

The "critical" study of the Old Testament is very far from being a simple matter. On the contrary it is so full of technical difficulties and involves problems of such varied nature, that it has remained, as Professor Jackson regretfully points out, very largely a *terra incognita* not merely to the majority of laymen, but to very many ministers as well. And it is not seldom the case that those who adopt it do not clearly understand it. Indeed the critics themselves are not backward in asserting that its problems are problems for scholars and must be left to them. It is the results, the "assured results," arrived at by these scholars that they are so eager to pass on to the rank and file. But while criticism is a highly technical and intricate subject, and one in the mazes of which the unlearned and even the learned may easily lose his way, it is not difficult to single out the two great guiding principles or rules of criticism as it is understood to-day which are responsible for such radical and

²¹ It is important to observe that the "New Testament inference" has been drawn clearly by several of the O. T. contributors to PEAKE. Wade in his *New Testament History* (p. 620), Kennett in *The Last Supper* (cf. especially his "paraphrase," p. 35ff.), Lofthouse, in *Ethics and Mediation* (p. 133ff.) all deny that the death of Christ was a substitutionary atonement; while Carpenter, in *Jesus or Christ* (p. 234f.) tells us: "Jesus remains for us a man of his country, race and time," which of course carries with it a denial of the atonement. Of other writers who have drawn the inference it will suffice to mention Bousset and Loisy. The latter sees in the Cross, (as an ex-Catholic he naturally has the Mass especially in mind), "the quintessence (*sublimation*) of the most abominable of sacrifices, human sacrifices" (*Le Sacrifice*, p. 528).—It is worthy of note that Ritschl, whose aversion to the doctrine of penal substitution is well known, accepted the critical theory of a distinction between the prophetic and the priestly teaching and regarded the former as the true one (*Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung*³, II, 53f.). It may also be noted that like Wardle, Kennett and others he questioned the correctness of the text of Isaiah liii. This is natural in view of "the great influence of Isa. liii. upon the early conception of the death of Christ" (cf. G. F. Moore, *Encyc. Bib.*, col. 4233). The Ritschlian and the Higher Critic of the O. T. consequently have in this matter a common interest.

destructive conclusions as these, to which your attention has just been called. The first of these rules is *negative*. It may be stated as follows:—

THE DOCUMENTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, ESPECIALLY THOSE DEALING WITH THE EARLY PERIOD, ARE ALL MORE OR LESS UNRELIABLE, AND FREQUENTLY CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AT THEIR FACE VALUE OR IN THEIR OBVIOUS SENSE.

This conclusion may be arrived at in various ways. One passage may be unreliable because its text is thought to be corrupt, another because it is late, another because its author is prejudiced, another because it contains discrepancies, another because it is too "ideal" or too "advanced,"—the general result is the same, the Old Testament as a whole is unreliable.

This may seem to be an extreme statement, but it is not hard to prove. Professor Kennett tells us: "Of the religion of the tribes of Israel proper at the time of the conquest of Palestine we have no direct information; all the stories relating to this period are written for the edification of later ages and are coloured by their circumstances."²² Let us hear a second witness, Professor Henry Preserved Smith. Writing of Moses, he says: "All that we can with probability conclude from this stream of tradition [the Pentateuchal documents] is that a man named Moses had a marked influence on the religious development of early Israel. That he was not a legislator in the later sense of the word seems obvious."²³ You will admit I think that it is correct to call this first rule of the critics a negative one. For a principle which in the face of all the evidence regarding the Mosaic period furnished us by the books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, makes it possible

²² Hastings, *Encycl. of Religion and Ethics*, article "Israel," p. 400.

²³ *Religion of Israel*, p. 46. A like remarkable statement is the following which is cited from Day's *Social Life of the Hebrews*. In the chapter entitled "The Influence of Individuals," which deals with the period of the Judges, he remarks: "We begin with Samson, for of Joshua little of a reliable nature is known" (p. 49). Think of regarding Samson as more historical than Joshua!

for the critic to say with assurance that we have "no direct information" regarding it, is certainly a negative principle.

But does this mean that the period of Moses, for example, is really an utter blank as far as any reliable information is concerned? By no means! For the second rule is the positive one. It may be stated thus:

THE MATERIALS CONTAINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT MUST BE TESTED, SORTED, INTERPRETED, SUPPLEMENTED, AND THE REAL HISTORY RECONSTRUCTED, IN SO FAR AS THIS IS POSSIBLE, BY MEANS OF A COMPARATIVE STUDY, GUIDED AND CONTROLLED (WHERE NECESSARY) BY THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

This is the *positive* principle. By means of it the real value of the Old Testament documents is to be determined. Where secular history has furnished us definite facts, the statements of the Old Testament will of course be compared directly with them. Where the extra-biblical data are of a more general nature, the comparison will be by analogy and the theory of evolution will be more strictly applicable.

Here is what Dr. S. A. Cook of Cambridge, himself a higher critic, has to say about the comparative method: "Among the most conspicuous features of modern research has been the application, in their widest extent, of anthropological and comparative methods of inquiry. The effect has been to break down racial, intellectual, and psychical boundaries, and to bring into relation all classes and races of men, all types of organic life, all forms of 'matter.'"²⁴ Notice this further statement: "The comparative method is commonly bound up with certain persistent and prevalent notions of the 'evolution' of thought and the 'survival' of rude, superstitious or otherwise irrational beliefs and practices from an earlier and more backward stage in the history of culture." Now Dr. Cook while believing in this method ventures to point out that problems may be more complex

²⁴ Article, "Religion" (p. 664) in Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion and Ethics*.

than we suppose and care should be used in applying it. But what it is especially important to our purpose to notice is that Dr. Cook states that the *tendency* of the comparative method is to "break down" all differences and "relate" all phenomena;²⁵ and that the theory of evolution is commonly bound up with it.

Let us now pass on to consider concretely the application in the hands of the critics of these two principles to the Old Testament.

The Story of Hannah is one of the most touchingly beautiful in the whole Bible. It stands out with singular attractiveness against the dark background of what has been aptly called "Israel's iron age," the rough period when the Judges ruled. And the story itself has its dark shadows as well as its shining vistas. The darkest shadow of all, perhaps, is when Eli seeing Hannah's lips moving in earnest prayer, accuses her of drunkenness—Eli, whose rebuke of his worthless sons was so mild and unavailing! Regarding this story, Principal Bennett has this to say: "The priest of the sanctuary, Eli, a local magnate, also spoken of as 'judge,' (iv. 18) occupied an official seat close by: he knew that the religious character of the occasion did not always prevent feasting from degenerating into excess (Is. xxviii. 7, Am. ii. 8), so that when he saw Hannah moving her lips without making any audible sound, he thought she was drunk and rebuked her."²⁶ With this part of the narrative the critic has no fault to find. It fits into his theory that the feasts of the Lord originally partook much of the nature of similar feasts in neighboring peoples and were not free from unworthy and even immoral (orgiastic) features. But, how about Hannah's Song? This is what Dr. Bennett tells us: "This poem is quite unsuited to Hannah's circumstances; its the-

²⁵ Bousset (*What is Religion?*, p. 7) sets this view in its religious aspect squarely over against the belief (he calls it, "this wide-spread opinion") in the uniqueness and finality of the Christian religion, asserting that it is this new conception which has made the modern scientific study of religion possible.

²⁶ PEAKE, p. 274f.

ology is too advanced for primitive times (vss. 2, 6, 8), and the reference to the 'king' (vs. 10) implies an actual king and indicates the period of the Monarchy, or is Messianic, i.e., connected with the hope of an ideal king, and implies a post-exilic date."²⁷ Poor Hannah! that part of the narrative which contains Eli's base suggestion that she was drunk can be accepted without demur, and may even be welcomed by the critic because of the light which it casts upon the religious practices of that benighted age. But, the "theology" of her song is too advanced to be allowed to her; and she, the mother of Samuel the King-maker, may not be permitted to speak of the king!

But, we may ask, what was the nature of the religion of this primitive period for which the Song of Hannah was too advanced? We have already seen that according to Principal Joyce the religion of Israel in the days of the Monarchy did not obviously differ materially from that of the neighboring tribes. And if that be the case Hannah's Song might well be regarded as too advanced. But what is the proof of this remarkable statement, by what critical legerdemain does this simple psalm of praise become too advanced for the *post Mosaic* period? A few examples will serve to illustrate the way it is done.

Professor Addis has this to say about the covenant name Jehovah: "The correct pronunciation of the name is Yahwe, and in Exod. iii. 14 it is said to mean, 'I will be what I am wont to be'; in other words, through all change and in each manifestation of Himself Jehovah remains the same ever-faithful God. No one will deny that this is a beautiful and sublime interpretation—but we must remember that we meet it first in a writer who lived centuries after Moses. It is, moreover, most unlikely, considering the social conditions of the tribes in Mosaic times, that they would have understood or accepted a divine name so abstract and refined. . . . Other modern explanations are much more in accordance with the analogy of early religions which

²⁷ PEAKE, p. 275.

begin with material conceptions, and they are consistent with sound philology. Three of these may be mentioned here: viz. 'he who casts down,' rain, hail, lightning, etc.; 'he who casts down' his foes; 'he who blows,' on which last supposition Jehovah was at first a wind god like the Assyrian Ramman, or the Teutonic Wodan."²⁸ You observe the method? It is very simple! It is also very effective! The document is affirmed to be *late*; it is assumed to be *unreliable*; its explanation of the name Jehovah, is declared to be too *advanced* for a primitive people; one more in harmony with the *analogy* of other religions is substituted, and the name Yahwe can now be "plausibly" cited as supporting the view that the God of Israel was originally a storm god like Ramman or Wodan. Real proof there is none. The Old Testament does tell us of course that the Lord thunders from heaven and that He rides upon the wings of the wind. But that does not make Him a weather god. And no valid objection can be brought against the interpretation of the name given us in the biblical record. But this other explanation suits the theory of the critics that Yahwe was originally little different from the gods of the neighboring peoples. And this is all that is needed.

As a second example of the method of the critics, Dr. Skinner's statement regarding the naming of Gad the son of Leah may be cited: "Gad is the name of an Aramaean and Phoenician god of luck (*Tύχη*), mentioned in Is. lxx. 11. . . . There is no difficulty in supposing that a hybrid tribe like Gad traced its ancestry to this deity and was named after him,"²⁹ though, of course, no such idea is expressed in the text. In Leah's exclamation the word is used appellatively: With Luck. It is probable, however, that at an earlier

²⁸ *Hebrew Religion*, p. 65f. Prof. Addis seems to favor the explanation, "he who casts down" (lightning, etc.). It was pointed out above that Prof. Addis prepared the section on the "Psalms" in PEAKE.

²⁹ There is a difficulty and a serious one in supposing this: the narrative tells us plainly that Gad was a son of the patriarch Jacob by Leah (i.e. Zilpah.).

time it was current in the sense ‘With Gad’s help.’ ”³⁰ Why is it “probable” that a polytheistic meaning lies back of the appellative one adopted by Dr. Skinner? It is “probable” because the *analogy* of the “neighboring tribes”—their mythology and folk-lore—is regarded as favoring the view that this simple and straightforward account of the birth and naming of Gad must be regarded as fictitious and interpreted in terms of a legend which would trace the ancestry of this tribe to an eponymous hero or god.³¹ But what is especially significant is that Dr. Skinner while regarding this view as “probable” says of it (and his words will bear repeating, since it is not often that a higher critic speaks so plainly), “though of course no such idea is expressed in the text.” We can see that with half an eye. But, the legendary view is “probable” just the same!

In Lev. xix. 9-10 we have the Law of Reaping. “And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest.” The reason is plainly stated in vs. 10: “thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger.” Professor Lofthouse tells us: “It may well be that the corners of the field were originally left so as to avoid driving out the vegetable spirit.” And he adds, “That motive is now forgotten; the practice remains, and a new motive characteristic of the codifier and the period [the post-exilic] is found.”³²

³⁰ *Genesis*, p. 387 (Internat. Crit. Ser.). C. J. Ball and Gunkel are referred to as favoring this view. The rendering of the AV “a troop cometh” which is supported by the Targum and Peshitto is due perhaps to a too literal interpretation of Gen. xlxi. 19, which may simply involve a play upon the words *gadh* and *gedhudh*, without implying that they have a similar meaning. Both the LXX and the Vulgate favor the rendering “With luck.”

³¹ The weakness of this claim is well shown by Orr, *Problem of the O.T.* p. 88ff. And we have seen that Professor Skinner himself while advocating the mythological view of the name admits that it is here used appellatively.

³² PEAKE, p. 207f. This passage has been more fully discussed in *The Presbyterian* of Dec. 29, 1921, in an article entitled, “The Quest of the Primitive.”

The fact that the one motive is clearly stated and the other is a "forgotten" one, does not prevent the critic from regarding the forgotten one as original and setting the other aside in its favor.

Let us look at still another instance. Among the events recorded in the Old Testament, which stand out in bold relief, there are few if any which are given such unenviable prominence as the apostasy of Jeroboam. "He departed not from the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat which made Israel to sin," is the dirge-like refrain which occurs again and again in the Book of Kings. In Peake's *Commentary* the charges brought against Jeroboam are analyzed by Professor Foakes Jackson into six specifications, and Jeroboam is acquitted on every count. Regarding the calf-worship it is stated that he "may here not have introduced a new worship, but one which was already common in Israel."³³ Professor Barton tells us emphatically that Jeroboam "was not a religious innovator, but a religious conservative."³⁴ How does the critic succeed in thus reversing the verdict of the Book of Kings? Professor Foakes Jackson tells us: "The whole account of him in Kings is coloured by the prejudices of a much later age, and in view of all the evil which followed from the partition of the two kingdoms"³⁵ —a very simple way of getting rid of difficulties. Of course, if the account in Kings is prejudiced Jeroboam may be greatly misrepresented. But notice how far the application of his negative principle has carried the critic. Kings is supposed to be generally reliable, and its statements are appealed to by the critics to discredit Chronicles. And if it

³³ PEAKE, p. 301.

³⁴ *The Religion of Israel*, p. 86. Not content with this he asserts that Solomon was a religious innovator and tries to make his "innovations" in building the Temple responsible in part for the schism which followed so soon after his death, regardless of the fact that the Book of Kings clearly states that the Temple was built at the behest of David, was blessed by the visible presence of Almighty God, and was rejoiced in by all the people.

³⁵ PEAKE, p. 300.

cannot be trusted, where are we to go for reliable information regarding so important an event as the alleged apostasy of Jeroboam? And how does the critic know enough about Jeroboam to be able to affirm positively that the statements in the Book of Kings are wrong? It is at this point that the positive rule of the critic comes in. We have seen that according to Principal Joyce, "Superficially considered it may well have seemed that, even in the time of the Monarchy the religion of Israel was distinguishable only in certain minor points from the religion of the neighboring tribes," and that according to Canon Harford one of the earliest codes, dating from the time of the early monarchy, was so phrased that an ardent worshipper of Yahweh might consider it his duty to sacrifice his first born to him, as the men of the neighboring tribes did to their gods. And if by "religious conservative" we are to understand a man holding such views, the designation may not after all be so inapplicable to Jeroboam as would be at first supposed. But, to enter a little into the details of the question, it is clear that in Kings the principal charge is, the idolatrous worship of other gods. Could a man be guilty of this and still be, not an innovator, an apostate, but merely a religious conservative?

First the idolatrous feature, the worship of the calves, was this unlawful in the days of Jeroboam? Certainly, you will say, the Law of Moses strictly prohibits it: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image." Listen to what Professor M'Neile, has to say about this commandment. He sums it up briefly in the words, "No visible representation of Yahweh may be made." And then he adds, "This is one of the surest signs that the Decalogue as we have it was much later than Moses. Images were widely used in Yahweh's worship till the time of the prophets."³⁶ With regard to this last point, it can only be remarked in passing that this "use" is repeatedly stated in the Old Testament to be contrary to the Law of Moses. But what I ask you to observe

³⁶ *Exodus*, p. 115. The article in PEAKE on "The History of Israel" was prepared by Prof. McNeile.

especially is the sentence which precedes it—as an illustration of the critical method it is very significant. It shows that the express prohibition of idolatry³⁷ contained in the Second Commandment and definitely declared to have been uttered by Jehovah himself at Mt. Sinai, is regarded by the critic as proving, not that idolatry was contrary to the fundamental law of Israel from the days of Moses, but rather that the Decalogue cannot be regarded as being what it purports to be, Mosaic. This of course helps us to get a clearer idea of Jeroboam's action as the critic sees it. Idolatry in his day was a lawful or at least a tolerated element in Jehovah's worship; it may have been a bit old fashioned, but could not be regarded as actually wrong.³⁸ Jeroboam was simply retaining or reviving the old custom of worshipping Yahweh under the symbol of a calf or bull, a practice which had perhaps suggested itself to him during his enforced sojourn in Egypt.

But what was the nature of this idolatrous worship? It is important to observe that in the Book of Kings, Jeroboam is reported to have said, "Behold your gods, O Israel," which brought thee up out of Egypt. The plural of the verb³⁹ indicates clearly that it was not merely an idolatrous worship of Jehovah, as Dr. Barton and other critics suppose,⁴⁰ but the

³⁷ The critics are inclined to take the word "graven image" with absolute literalness and argue that only certain kinds of images are forbidden. But this is a subtlety for which there is no real warrant. The Second Commandment condemns not the use of certain kinds of idols but idolatry as such.

³⁸ Bousset expresses himself quite strongly on this point: "The right view of images has been obstructed largely owing to the aversion with which the Old and the New Testaments regard the worship of images. People forget that the men of the Old and New Testaments—Jeremiah, the second Isaiah, Paul—were engaged in actual warfare with lower forms of religion and were, therefore, not capable of an impartial historic judgment" (*What is Religion?*, p. 78).

³⁹ When *elohim* is used as a plural of majesty it is almost invariably construed as a singular.

⁴⁰ The statement of Dr. Barton quoted above reads in full as follows: "Jeroboam when he said: Behold thy God, O Israel, who brought thee up out of the land of Egypt (1 Kings xii. 28), was not a religious innovator, but a religious conservative" (p. 86).

service of "other gods" which this religious conservative introduced at Bethel and Dan. Might we accept this statement,—that Jeroboam became a polytheist,—unreliable as the critics consider the narrative to be, and still regard him as a religious conservative, not as an innovator and apostate? Yes, we might even expect that this would be the case, for "the worship of more than one divine being at the same time was the rule" among the neighboring tribes;⁴¹ and while the "fierce jealousy" of Yahweh might oppose it, a worship which as Principal Joyce tells us differed only in minor points from them, might tolerate at least in a religious conservative like Jeroboam the practice of polytheism. But,—and here I touch on a very unpleasant subject,—what kind of gods were these gods of the neighboring tribes? Orelli tells us: "They are divided into male and female groups of two";⁴² and then he adds, with a view to pointing out the difference between these religions and that of Israel, "while in Hebrew there is not even a word extant for goddess, and the idea of a female companion-being to Jehovah is an impossibility." As to the fact that there is in the Hebrew language no word for "goddess," there can be no question. And certainly to us the idea of "a female companion-being to Jehovah" seems impossible; and the very suggestion is repulsive and blasphemous in the extreme. But, is it impossible to the Old Testament critic?

The view that there was a connection between the religion of Moses and that of the Kenites has been much discussed. Professor Barton has been one of its strongest advocates. And that there may have been such a connection is admitted in Peake's *Commentary*.⁴³ Dr. Barton, whose views are very extreme, thinks that "the ritual of the Day of Atonement

⁴¹ Orelli, article "Israel, Religion of" in *Internat. Stand. Bible Encyc.* p. 1535. Orelli refers specifically to the Phoenician, Aramean, Babylonian, and Egyptian gods.

⁴² *Ibid.* Cf. Bousset, *What is Religion?* p. 62.

⁴³ McNeile (PEAKE, p. 64) seems to regard it as correct, Jordan (*ibid.*, p. 84) is non-committal, Harford (*ibid.*, p. 170) considers it possible.

is probably a survival under a new interpretation of the worship of Tammuz, or equivalent god, in connection with the worship of Yahweh." He suggests that with this was connected the worship of the "primitive goddess Ashtart [Ashtoreth]"; and draws the following inference: "Analogy thus leads us to believe that probably the Yahwe worship of the Kenites contained an Ashtart. If such was the case, some will be ready to urge that that is no evidence that such worship was adopted by Moses. It must be admitted, however, that if the Kenites associated an Ashtart with Yahwe, Moses and the Hebrews would inevitably worship her too. Converts to a new religion are not its reformers, but its blindest devotees."⁴⁴ Do you wonder, my hearer, that a man who holds such views regarding the origin of Israel's religion, can characterize Jeroboam with his calf-worship, as a "religious conservative"?

This suggestion of Professor Barton's is so repugnant, so utterly contrary to all that we believe that the Bible plainly teaches regarding the religion of the Old Testament, that I hesitated to refer to it in this place. I have cited it because it shows in all its naked hideousness the result of insisting upon the application of the 'comparative-development' theory to the religion of Israel. For the logic of the situation is plainly on the side of Dr. Barton.⁴⁵ If you set out deliberately to 'connect up' the religion of Israel with that of the neighboring nations by means of the comparative method, you cannot ignore, you cannot close your eyes to, one of their most obvious characteristics, the sensuality which enters not only into their religious practices but into their religious beliefs. And it is when we compare such teachings as these with the fact writ so large on the pages of the Old Testament that these ideas and practices were utterly foreign⁴⁶ to the

⁴⁴ *Sketch of Semitic Origins*, p. 289f.

⁴⁵ Cf. note on "Primitive Jahwism," pp. 113-115 *infra*.

⁴⁶ The unique purity of the theology and cultus of the O. T. religion is, especially in view of its environment, one of its most striking features, one which sets it apart most markedly from the cults of the neigh-

religion of the "Holy One of Israel" that we realize to what disastrous conclusions the theories of the critics lead us.

We are now prepared I think to decide the question whether, as Professor Jackson maintains, the Old Testament is more intelligible, more readable, more 'preachable' than ever, and whether the "new knowledge" which the critic claims to have furnished us is one of God's best gifts to this generation. Let me ask you as ministers and candidates for the ministry, a few very practical questions. When your people bring their little ones to present them to the Lord in baptism, will it be a pleasant duty for you to tell them that had they lived in the days of David, Jehovah like Chemosh or Molech would have accepted, perhaps even required the sacrifice of their first-born upon his altar? "Five-sixths" of those to whom it will be your privilege to minister, the "ignorant" and "timid" ones to whom Professor Jackson refers as holding the old view of the Bible, are accustomed to think of Him as the tender, loving Shepherd. To them the 23rd Psalm, as a Psalm of David, is very precious. They love to say, The Lord is my shepherd, and to think of Him as,—to use those words of Isaiah, which Handel made the theme of one of the most beautiful arias of *The Messiah*,—'feeding His flock like a shepherd, and gathering the lambs in His arms and carrying them in His bosom.' It is a comfort to them to believe that their God is the God of their fathers, the God of Isaiah and David, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. They may find it hard to commit themselves, still harder to give their little ones to a God who in the days of David,⁴⁷

boring tribes. Passages like Deut. iv. 14f., Exod. xix. 15, xx. 26 show how utterly different was the religion of Israel from those ethnic religions in which immorality was practised and even fostered under the sanctions of religion.

⁴⁷ David, being of the tribe of Judah (one of the tribes which according to Prof. Burney was probably never in Egypt and so did not come under the influence of Moses) might be expected to cling to the "consuetudinary legislation of Canaan" and therefore to a belief in the validity and necessity of human sacrifice. Yet, on the other hand as we have seen, it is the "Judean" document J which provides a substitute for the human first-born.

demanded them in sacrifice. Do you wonder they are afraid of the new knowledge? Do you crave the privilege of enlightening their darkness? For it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the critics are solely responsible for this enormity of making the law in Exodus xxii. refer to infant sacrifice. They point with pride to the difficulties which their critical analysis of the Pentateuch has solved. But it is their analysis alone which stands in the way of the interpretation of this law of Exodus xxii. in terms of the preliminary statement of Exodus xiii. where it says definitely, "and all the first born of man among thy children shalt thou redeem."

On the other hand, if at prayer-meeting they call for the old hymn "Just as I am without one plea, But that Thy blood was shed for me," how will you dare to tell them that Jeremiah protested centuries ago against the 'blood theology' and that it was only as a concession to a world old custom—a primitive belief—that the New Testament writers interpreted the death of Christ in sacrificial terms, and thus teach them, by inference if not explicitly, to account the blood wherewith they have been sanctified an unholy thing?

Again, it is generally recognized that it is hard to interest people in the study of the Bible. Even those who profess to believe it to be from cover to cover the Word of God, are sometimes sadly ignorant of its contents. Will it make the teaching of the Bible easier for you, if you are obliged to caution your people constantly against accepting its statements at their face value and in their obvious sense? They read in Exodus iii. a statement which implies that Jehovah means "I am that I am," or to quote again Professor Addis' words, "I will be what I am wont to be." And then you must tell them that this interpretation is late and incorrect; that it is too advanced for a primitive age, and opposed by the analogy of other religions; that the original meaning was perhaps "he who casts down." They read the account of the naming of Gad, and you must tell them that the meaning of Leah's glad exclamation was probably originally, "With

Gad's help." And if you are as frank as Professor Skinner, you will add, as he does, "though of course no such idea is expressed in the text." They will read the law of gleaning in Leviticus, and will be inclined to accept the explanation that it was intended to provide for the poor. You must tell them that this is the view of a post-exilic writer, but that the "original" motive, which is now "forgotten" was to provide sustenance for the corn spirits, that the next harvest may be plentiful. And if they draw the inference that this original motive was the accepted one in the time of Moses to whom the law is attributed by this late compiler, and conclude that Moses had some very primitive and superstitious notions, you will of course not be surprised. If they are inclined to accept the harsh estimate passed upon Jeroboam for introducing idolatry and the worship of "other gods" in the Northern Kingdom, you must point out to them that Jeroboam was not an innovator or an apostate, but merely a religious conservative, and that the account in Kings is 'prejudiced.' And if they call your attention to the fact that Kings is often appealed to by the critics as reliable, your reply will be that the "Deuteronomic" redactor has "edited" this narrative and sacrificed "historical accuracy" to "moral purpose." And if, finally, after a steady diet of this kind they show a disposition to confess that they have reached the point that they do not know what to believe and are disposed to give up as hopeless the study of the Old Testament,⁴⁸—do you think that this will be altogether surprising? Is it remarkable that "five-sixths" of the church people prefer to remain in happy ignorance of this "new knowledge," or say frankly that they are afraid of it?

⁴⁸ Prof. Badè in *The Old Testament in the Light of To-Day* (1915) gives his first chapter the striking title "The Old Testament under Sentence of Life." He calls attention to the "numerous proposals" made during the past generation "to eliminate the Old Testament from the religious education of the young." He argues that criticism has made these proposals unnecessary. Being himself a radical critic, he would of course be loath to admit what seems so obvious to us that the "proposals" referred to are the result in large measure of the destructive conclusions of Criticism.

What then do the critics mean when they tell us that the new knowledge has removed the difficulties which were a stumbling block in the past, and made the Bible more intelligible, more readable, more preachable, than ever before? They surely cannot mean that the Old Testament as they interpret it, is free from discrepancies, and contradictions, from imperfections and moral blemishes. No one could affirm that their conception of Israel's religion in the time of Moses, for example, is an ideal one. The fact that the Yahweh of the critics can be compared to Chemosh is sufficient proof of that. What they do mean is this, that by their ruthless exposure of the imperfections of the Old Testament, as they see them, they have effectually and finally disposed of the old doctrine of its inerrancy and divine authority, or as Professor Jackson expresses it, of the idea that to be a Christian means among other things "to stand committed to the truth of everything recording in the Old Testament,"⁴⁹ and that by studying it in the light of comparative religion and applying to it the law of evolution they have made it with all its imperfections a more intelligible book than ever. "For," as Professor Badè expresses it, "the harm lies not in dealing with imperfect moral standards, but in failure to recognize them as imperfect."⁵⁰ And if we but recognize that there are in the Old Testament religion the same imperfections as in the ethnic faiths, if we study it in the light of a "scientific" theory which teaches that there is nothing high and noble and ideal, which has not been evolved out of something which is low and ignoble and vile, then the Old Testament becomes an intelligible book because we are reading it as we would any other book; and have no more reason to be shocked at the imperfections and crudities of the Old Testament than at the abominations of

⁴⁹ This statement is ambiguous. The truth and authority of the O. T. as the word of God does not involve or imply that everything in it is true except historically. Gen. iii. for example records a "lie" of Satan. The record is true; but the lie is a lie.

⁵⁰ *The Old Testament in the Light of To-Day*, p. 5.

primitive Semitic religion or the moral lapses related in classical mythology.

I am afraid that I have already taxed your patience too much; but I hope that you will bear with me for a few moments longer while I point out to you briefly the most serious objections to the acceptance of the "new knowledge," the reasons why it must be regarded, not as "one of God's best gifts to this generation," but rather as "a strong delusion," to be opposed as such by every true follower of Christ.

I have called your attention to the two great guiding principles of criticism: the *negative* which questions the reliability of any and every statement of the Old Testament, until it has received the imprimatur of the critics; the *positive* which makes its correspondence with the analogy of other religions the test of its truth. They stand opposed to the two great fundamental doctrines of historic Christianity. The negative principle is the direct antithesis of the belief of the Church in the authority and inerrancy of the Bible. To the simple, "It is written" of Christian faith, it opposes the "I know better" of the modern critic. No statement can be accepted until the critic has approved it. He feels at liberty to carve up a document into as many pieces as he pleases, and to assign them to any date which he sees fit, regardless of the historic faith of the Church or the claims of the document itself. He claims the right to reject any statement contained in any document if it does not suit him; or to read into it any meaning however far-fetched, which suits his purpose, and to read out of it any meaning, however clear and unmistakable, which does not suit it. He does not hesitate to question the veracity of the author of a document at pleasure, and to set his statements aside and reject his arguments as prejudiced or incorrect, if they do not agree with what he regards as the true facts of the case. He is even known to use a statement to prove exactly the reverse of what the one who made it specifically intended. To appeal to any passage or text as proving that the Bible teaches this

or that is futile. For there is no statement which can withstand the assault of the critic. Abraham becomes a myth, Moses ceases to be a legislator, Jeroboam becomes a religious conservative. The one thing certain about the Decalogue is that Moses had nothing or next to nothing to do with it. The Bible instead of being a book which speaks with the simplicity and directness of a credible witness, nay more, with the authority of God Himself, as men have for centuries believed, becomes a mass of contradictions and misstatements. This is sufficient in itself to discredit the theories and methods of the critics. A theory regarding the religion of Israel which treats so ruthlessly its best and in most respects its only witness has a serious charge to answer at the outset, the charge of tampering with the evidence! But the seriousness of the charge becomes doubly apparent when we ask ourselves the question, Why are these radical and ruthless measures necessary? why is the critic obliged to doctor the text, to discredit the witness, to seek hidden meanings, to make a diligent search for discrepancies? It is necessary because the positive rule of the critic is the antithesis of the biblical doctrine of the uniqueness of the Old Testament religion.

The critics proceed as we have seen on the assumption that the religion of Israel in the time of Moses, for example, was very similar to the religions of the neighboring tribes and was perhaps derived directly from one of them. Yet in order to assert this with any degree of plausibility they are forced to discredit the patent claim of four books of the Pentateuch, to give a very different account of it, and to assert that regarding the religion of this period we have, as Professor Kennett says, "no direct information." They must rule out the direct information because the Old Testament asserts again and again that there is an utter difference between the religion of Israel and that of the neighboring tribes. We find this contrast set forth with especial clearness by the great writing prophets. Listen to Jeremiah: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even

they shall perish from the earth and from under these heavens. He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion." They *have* perished and their idols have been thrown to the moles and bats. Why has He not shared their fate? Jeremiah tells us: because He is "the true God and the living God, and an everlasting king." Or, think of that wonderful picture which Isaiah gives us of the impotence of the gods of Babylon and the might of Israel's God. "Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, their idols were upon the beasts, and upon the cattle: your carriages were heavy loaden; they are a burden to the weary beast." What a picture of utter helplessness! The idols must be carried because they cannot go. Listen now to the words which follow: "Hearken unto me, O house of Jacob, and all the remnant of the house of Israel, which are borne by me from the belly, which are carried from the womb: And even unto your old age I am he; and even to hoar hairs will *I* carry you, *I* have made, and *I* will bear, even *I* will carry and will deliver you." The idols are things of vanity. Is it to them that we shall liken the God of Israel? And this unique claim is not found first in Isaiah and Jeremiah. Moses in the book of Deuteronomy repeatedly speaks of the uniqueness of Jehovah.⁵¹ At Sinai Israel learned from God himself that He who brought them out of the land of Egypt out of the house of bondage was the "Creator of the heavens and the earth." And of Abraham we read

⁵¹ Being convinced that Deuteronomy dates from the 7th cty., the critics are not concerned as formerly to deny that its doctrine of God is monotheistic. Since they regard the prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries as the discoverers of monotheism, as distinct from henotheism, it is natural for them to seek confirmation of this view in a book which they insist on dating from this period. Barton argues that Jeremiah was the first "theoretical monotheist" because he speaks of the gods of the heathen as *vanities*, "mere figments of the imagination" (*Religion of Israel*, p. 123). The same characterization meets us in Deut. xxxii. 21, in a passage which is called the "*Song of Moses*," a circumstance which accounts in part for the consistent faith of the Church that Moses was also a theoretical monotheist.

that he caused his servant to swear by "Jehovah the God of heaven and the God of the earth." Yet the critics try to make the religion of Israel follow the analogy of these ethnic faiths. If they are right in this, why has it not perished from the earth long ago as they have? If on the contrary it is essentially different from them, why must we suppose that it once so closely resembled them, why seek to derive it from them?⁵²

There is a striking question in the book of Job to which the critics might well give heed. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" The answer given is, "Not one!" The critics have long been endeavoring to change this answer. They have sought to bring the pure and lofty ethical monotheism of the prophet Jeremiah out of the foul and noisome swamp of primitive Semitic religion. But they have failed and they must fail. An Ethiopian cannot change his skin; a leopard cannot change his spots. And a Chemosh-like god of the Kenites cannot change or develop or evolve into the "Holy One of Israel."⁵³

⁵² Prof. Burney speaks as follows: "A special Providence, a chosen people, a unique Revelation made in an early period in the history of the race to a leader and teacher endowed with exceptional qualifications for his office—these are factors which tradition pictures as guiding and determining the evolution; and however much modern scientific study may modify our conceptions of the process, it will be found that, apart from the recognition of such factors, the history of Israel's religious development remains an insoluble enigma" (*The Book of Judges*, p. cxx.f.). It is strange that one who can make such a confession as this is willing to go to the lengths that Dr. Burney does in the attempt to relate the religion of Israel to the ethnic religions and to derive it from them.

⁵³ The Conservative who holds to the historic belief of the Church that Deuteronomy is Mosaic will find in the late dating advocated by the critics a striking proof that there has been in the religion of Israel no such development as has been so confidently asserted by the advocates of the development hypothesis. That this Mosaic law-book is found by the critics so "admirably" suited to the golden age of prophetism is a sufficient refutation of the claim that prophetism constituted a great advance upon Mosaism. On the contrary it is clear that the prophets regarded it as their duty to impress upon the people the prime necessity of keeping the law of Moses. And the final injunction of the

It would be different of course if the Old Testament professed to be nothing more than the record of man's searchings after God. We could then trace or try to trace, as the critic seeks to do, the gradual refinement of religious speculation, and point with pride to the progress which man has made in the interpretation of his world. But that would result in pure scepticism. For how could we be sure that there is any reality corresponding to that mental concept which men call "god," and which the Moabite individualized as Chemosh and the Hebrew calls Jehovah, and the Moslem calls Allah? Professor Leuba in his *A Psychological Study of Religion* has a chapter entitled "The Making of Gods and the Essential Characteristics of a Divinity." Yet Leuba is an atheist who holds that "The great mass of enlightened men can get along without the personal God and immortality."⁵⁴ But the Bible does not profess to be a record of the religious speculations of Hebrew thinkers, though it does tell us plainly that sinful men have thought that God was 'altogether like unto themselves' (perhaps the best characterization and condemnation of the ethnic faiths ever penned); and that they have "changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things"; and that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator." We get a very good picture of 'primitive Semitic religion' in the first of Romans! But the Bible does claim to be a record of the self-revelation which the one living and true God made to a peculiar people. As such it stands on a different plane from the ethnic faiths and philosophies. And one of the clearest proofs that this is the case is found in the tremendous difficulty, the sheer impossibility, which the critics have encountered in their effort to bring it into relation with them. The extreme methods

last of the prophets is this: "Remember ye the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel, with the statutes and judgments."

⁵⁴ Pp. 111ff., 328.

which they employ and of which examples have been cited prove this conclusively. They dare not allow the Old Testament to witness freely in its own behalf lest it denounce their theories to their face.

The idea of "comparing" the religion of Israel with the ethnic faiths is not new. On the contrary it is very old. The prophets of Israel made particularly effective use of it; and believing scholars of every age have found it a most convincing apologetic. But this is because they accepted the definite statements of the Old Testament as true, as giving an accurate and adequate account of the religion of Israel, with the result that they were impressed, as every one who does this must be, with its uniqueness and incomparability. The new method on the other hand makes the ethnic religions, of many of which—the beliefs of the Kenites and the Moabites for example—we know astonishingly little, the standard of comparison, nay more, the arbiter and judge⁵⁵ to determine the actual nature, the real genesis and development of Israel's religion, as a phenomenon regarding which the Old Testament gives us no reliable information. The one method exhibits clearly the peculiar excellence of Israel's God and the folly of idolatry. The other method sets the "Holy One of Israel" before us as a Chemosh-like god of the Kenites who only gradually loses his repellent characteristics as man himself becomes more refined and advanced in his religious ideas. But this god of the critics is not the God of the Hebrew prophets nor of the Christian Church. As Hosea thinks of the golden calf at Bethel, the god of Samaria, he cries out: "The workman made it; therefore it is not god." And the more thoroughly and consistently

⁵⁵ Oesterley warns the Conservatives that "the study of comparative religion must in the future become one of the greatest dangers to the Christian religion or else its handmaiden" (*The Evolution of the Messianic Idea*, p. 276). The fact is that comparative religion is proving itself a menace just because the critics have not been content to treat it as the handmaiden of Christianity but have made it the mistress of the house and assigned to it the seat of unquestioned authority in religion.

the critic carries out his attempt to remake the God of Israel in the likeness of the gods of the heathen, the more strongly will the conviction be forced upon the believing Christian of today that: The critic has made it; therefore it is not God!

Now, if this were the first time that the Bible had ever been under fire, we might well tremble as we think of the furious battle which is raging about it. But the words which Beza used of the Church are equally applicable to the Bible which is her sacred charge. "It is an anvil that has worn out many hammers." It has had its Jehoiakims and its Porphyrys, its Voltaires and its Ingersolls. It has been disbelieved and denied and defamed, and the holy men who uttered its precious words have been treated as those of whom the world was not worthy. Yet the critics often speak as if this were the first time that the breath of criticism had been permitted to blow upon it, as if they were the first to dare to scrutinize it closely. This claim would be amusing, because it is so naïve, were it not so false and misleading. What *is* new is that men who treat it as they do, and use the arguments and make the claims of the open enemies of the past should profess to be devout students of it, that this fiercest of all attacks upon the Word of God should be made from within the pale of His Church and by men who profess themselves His followers. And the only explanation which they can give of this singular phenomenon, the only justification of their anomalous position is that they are endeavoring to save the Old Testament, to save Christianity itself by making it intelligible to the modern man. Now I do not wish to question this motive. I believe there are many who are perfectly sincere in advancing it and that Professor Jackson for example feels it very keenly. But what I do want to point out to you is this, that the claim of the critics that they are saving the Bible by reconstructing it, that they are striving to prevent it from being a stumbling-block in the way of those who are offended by "its discrepancies, its rigorous laws, its pitiless

tempers, its open treatment of sexual questions, the atrocities which are narrated by its histories and sanctioned by its laws," is one of the most terrible indictments which could be brought against the morals and intelligence of the Christian Church and its Founder.

What is this book which the critic is so eager to save for the men of this generation? We find it in our Mother's Bible, the book she loved and cherished above all others. We read it, the Old Testament and the New, at her knee. She taught us to love it. Many of us are in the ministry or soon will be because of our mother's teaching and her prayers. Some of us have in our homes copies of the great Family Bibles which our forefathers used. In his "Cotter's Saturday Night," Robert Burns gives us a beautiful picture of the Bible in the family life of Scotland. Some of you can look back upon such scenes, scenes from which "old Scotia's grandeur springs." It has been frequently pointed out that the King James Version is wrought into our very literature. Think of what the Bible did at the Reformation. Modern civilization is its hopeless debtor. Remember how the Westminster Confession, *our* Confession of Faith, speaks of the heavenliness of its matter, the majesty of its style, its many incomparable excellencies, and its entire perfection. The great Bible Societies are printing it by the hundreds of thousands, it is today the world's "best seller," the Book of books. What an impertinence, not to use a stronger word, for the critic to imagine that unless he revises it, and modernizes it, unless he removes its "imperfections," it must fail to appeal to the men of this and future generations. Is this generation so much nobler, so much finer fibred that it is entitled to stumble at "difficulties" which Christians of the past have altogether failed to find,⁵⁶ or have succeeded in explaining in a manner consistent with the high claims of the Bible,⁵⁷

⁵⁶ For instance, the requirement of infant sacrifice as taught in the Book of the Covenant (Exod. xxii. 29).

⁵⁷ Loisy in his terrible picture of what he calls the "Old Jahvism" brings forward this as one of many indictments of the character of

or else have been willing to allow to wait for clearer light, assured that "God is his own interpreter, and He will make it plain." And have the critics who are constantly raking over the muck and mire of what they are pleased to call primitive Semitic religion that they may find there among the ethnic religions the matchless flower of Israel's faith, and in so doing have made the study of religion, even the religion of Israel, an unpleasant and even a painful subject, have they the right to tell us that they have saved it, when as we have seen they have made it for those who accept their teaching, a mass of contradictions and imperfections?

But the ultimate fact is this. The Old Testament as we have it is not merely a part of our Mother's Bible. It has not merely nourished the faith of our Puritan ancestors and of the Reformers and of the Christians of the Early Church. It is *the* Bible of Christ and His apostles. This is conceded by the critics. Even so radical a scholar as Cornill admits that in the time of Christ "almost the same books were counted as Holy Scripture as are found in our Old Testament." And another critic, Professor Rogers, tells us that Jesus "fed and feasted his own soul upon the Old Testament, whose books were to him the Scriptures." Yet He did not stumble at its imperfections. He quoted from it frequently. He said of it as a whole: "The scripture cannot be broken." He said of the Law: "Not a jot or tittle shall pass from the Law till all be fulfilled." And of Moses He said expressly, "If ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" What more serious arraignment can

Jehovah: "He blinds or befools those on whose ruin he is set. He provokes the crime which he punishes" (*The Religion of Israel*, p. 105). Loisy is not the first to find difficulty in reconciling human freedom with divine sovereignty. But we will do well to remind ourselves that while he finds in the Lord's dealings with Pharaoh proof that the Jahveh of Mosaism was positively immoral, Paul after discussing the same question and referring to the same incident closes with the great doxology, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God," etc. The problem is not a new one. The question is, Which is better: Paul's attitude and his solution or that of Loisy and others of the critics?

there be of the ethics and aesthetics, of the moral elevation and spiritual discernment of men who call themselves Christians, than the fact that they cannot accept His Bible, as He did, as the very Word of God?

Professor Jackson asserts that in England all scholars have accepted the conclusions of the critics, and Professor Peake challenges the Conservatives to stand up and fight for the old faith, the faith of their fathers which they profess to believe. The challenge of the Liberals has not been unanswered, and it is not true that there are no scholars who hold to the old views. The errors and inconsistencies of the "new knowledge" have been exposed again and again; but, the Church of God does sadly need men today to stand in the breach and defend the faith once for all committed to the saints. Are there not some here in this gathering, some among these candidates for the Christian ministry, who will hear the call and come up to the help of the Lord against the mighty? that the men of this and coming generations of Christians may believe and know as have the Christians of former generations that, as Old Testament prophet and New Testament apostle alike assure us, THE WORD OF OUR GOD SHALL STAND FOREVER!

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NOTE ON "PRIMITIVE YAHWISM" (cf. p. 99, *supra*).

From the standpoint of the evolutionist who feels obliged to trace the development of the religion of Israel through henotheism and polytheism back to a primitive animism, analogy furnishes a strong argument for the view that the God of Israel must at one time have had, like the gods of the nations, a consort. But when we come to examine the evidence which has been presented in support of this contention, we find that it is both meagre and unconvincing.—The "Kenite theory" is based solely on the O. T. record. We have no other evidence to connect Israel with the Kenites. Yet this record speaks expressly of Jehovah as the God of the Patriarchs, not of the Kenites, and is absolutely silent about a 'companion-being.' To seek one in Ashtart or Ashirta solely on the analogy of other religions as Dr. Barton does involves, therefore, a glaring *petitio principii*. And Dr. Barton does not make his theory any the more acceptable by arguing that the Yahweh of the Kenites "like most other Semitic deities" was probably himself developed out of the primitive mother goddess.—The same sex ele-

ment which is so particularly offensive because so contrary to the plain teaching of the Bible and so derogatory to the Holy One of Israel, has likewise been introduced into the theory of the Babylonian origin of the name Yahweh. The view is held by many scholars that in the proper name *Yaum-ilu*, and similar names a shorter (?) form (*Yahu*) of the Tetragram is to be recognized. Some scholars hold further that in names like *Ardi-ya*, of which a much less frequent form is *Ardi-yaum*, and in similar names, the same divine name is also to be identified; and they take *ardi-ya(um)* to mean "servant of *Yaum*" (i.e., *Yahu*). As warrant for this rendering they cite such names as *Ardi-Bel*, *Ardi-Shamash*, in which the names of well known Babylonian deities are clearly to be recognized. But the difficulty with the acceptance of this conclusion lies in the very argument which is advanced in its support. *Bel* and *Shamash* are well-known deities. But no convincing proof has been produced that a god *Yaum* is to be found in the Babylonian Pantheon. His existence must be inferred from such personal names as we have just mentioned. Is it likely that in names like *Ardi-ya* which are very frequent in Assyr.-Bab., we have the name of a practically unknown god? Clearly it is not. Most scholars, consequently, regard this ending as a diminutive or hypocoristic ending (like -y in Willy for William, Robby for Robert, etc.). Now it is to be noted that beside such names as *Ardi-ya* (*Ardi-yaum*) there are also found, though quite rarely, names like *Beli-yatum*, in which *tum* seems to be the feminine ending (*Yautum* also occurs alone a couple of times as a proper name). It has consequently been argued that *Yautum* is the feminine of *Yaum*. And since as we have seen *Yaum* is thought to represent *Yahu*, it has been inferred that *Yautum* is the original of *Yahweh* (e.g. by Sayce who disregarding Exod. iii. 14 explains *Yahweh* as the feminine of *Yahu*). The startling inference drawn from such extremely meagre evidence is, that *Yahweh* was originally a goddess, which later, like some other Semitic goddesses, was transformed into a god, because of the preference of some Semitic tribes for male deities. One hardly knows whether to be more astonished at the drastic nature of this inference or at the inadequacy of the foundation upon which it rests. If as most scholars agree -ya is a hypocoristic ending, it is not very difficult to account for the far less frequently occurring forms -yaum, and -yatum as due to the natural tendency to supply these abbreviated names with the same case endings etc. as are found with common nouns and also with many proper names. And that the abhorrent idea that Jehovah was originally a female and later became a male deity (Dr. Burney speaks of it as an "attractive explanation"!) should be seriously advanced on the basis of such exceedingly slight evidence illustrates very forcibly the spell which has been cast by the theory of naturalistic evolution over so much of our modern thinking. Whether the name Jehovah (*Yahweh*) has been found in Babylonian, except in late inscriptions in the names of Hebrews, is naturally a question of no little interest: but it does not directly concern us at present. Since the Old

Testament makes it plain that the name was not first revealed to Moses, but was known to the fathers its appearance on early Babylonian documents would not be strange, might indeed be expected, for we know that Abram came from Ur of the Chaldees. But it is far from certain that it has been found. Clay lists the name-element *Yau* as found in *Yau-bani* and several other names as "Hittite-Mitanni" (*Personal Names of the Cassite Period*, p. 30). But Hehn who also calls attention to its frequent occurrence in names of this origin, yet considers *Yau(m)* as probably representing the indefinite pronoun in Babylonian. After a careful consideration of the question from various angles he reaches the conclusion that "the Babylonian *Yau* owes his existence to the effort to find in Babylonian the Yahweh of the O. T." (*Gottesidee*, p. 243). Finally in view of the intricacy of the problem and the important issues involved it will be well to remind ourselves that it is necessary to be very cautious about identifying homonyms. In an inscription of Tiglath-Pileser, for example, Ahaz [i.e. (Jeho)ahaz] king of Judah is referred to as *Ya-u-ha-zi* king of *Ya-u-da-a*. Both names begin with *Yau*—but while the first clearly contains the divine name Jehovah the other probably does not.

NOTES AND NOTICES

A NOTE ON THE LATIN TRANSLATIONS OF THE SCOTS CONFESSIONS OF 1560 AND 1580-1

It is well known that there are two quite distinct Latin translations of our old Scots Confessions. Dunlop gives the Confession of 1560 in Scots and Latin, side by side, the latter "according to Leckprevick's Impression 1572. It was done by Mr. Patrick Adamson at the desire of the Kirk, and is a much better Version than that which is in the *Syntagma Confessionum.*" His closing document, Vol. II, p. 811, "is a Translation of the National Covenant as it was subscribed 1581, published at that time; but it came not to the Publishers' Hands, till after the English was printed: It is therefore put here at the end of this Volume, that it may be preserved. It is said to be done by Mr. John Craig, who wrote the English, which was first subscribed by the King, the whole Council and the Court. It is a much better version than that which is in the *Syntagma Confessionum.*" This verdict is endorsed in both cases, though probably without any independent examination, by Dr. Schaff, who prints from Dunlop.

But in spite of their intrinsic merits, and their greater authority the versions of Adamson and Craig do not seem to have been in general use, even among Scottish theologians, writing in Latin. I find, e.g., that Dr. John Forbes, in his *Irenicum* quotes both Confessions according to the *Syntagma*, although a defense of the Five Articles of Perth must have been intended primarily for Scottish readers. Scholars outside of Scotland wishing to know something of our Confessions, would of course consult the *Syntagma*. Few such would have access to them in any other form. There was no representative general collection of Confessions before the *Syntagma* in 1612, nor was there any between the second edition of it in 1654 and the Oxford *Sylloge* of 1804.

The *Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum Fidei* etc., though by no means a common book, is too well known for anything like a detailed description. A fairly complete account of it may be found in Schaff's *Creeds*, Vol. I, p. 354, or in Niemeyer's *Collectio Confessionum*, pp. vii ff. My copy, like Dr. Schaff's, is

of the second edition. Internal evidence shows that the original editor was Gaspard Laurent, Rector of the Academy of Geneva in 1600, and author among other things of a funeral oration on the death of Beza. See *La France Protestante*, 1st Edition, Vol. VI, p. 432.) But there is one point which I think worth mentioning, because of the light it sheds upon book-making in the seventeenth century, even though it is aside from our direct interest. The second Helvetic Confession is not reprinted from a Zurich edition of 1651, as Dr. Schaff says. The Zurich sheets are simply taken as they are, and bound in with the others. The same is done with a 1647 reprint of the Confession of Basel, which is really a University programme, dividing the twelve articles of the Confession into thirty-six propositions or 'theses' to be maintained by the three regular theological professors in turn in weekly disputations. This explains, in part at least, the somewhat erratic pagination of the whole work.

The two Scots Confessions occupy pp. 109-128, inclusive, of the first division of the *Syntagma*. There is a confused and inaccurate paragraph concerning them, in the unpage general introduction. This I translate in full, both for its intrinsic interest, and because it is our sole primary source of information as to the origin and authorship of the Latin translation, in which our Confessions were commonly read.

"The Scottish Confession of Faith was written in the year 1568, in the Scottish language only. It was subscribed by the King's Most Serene Majesty, and the Nobles and Estates of the Realm in Parliament in the year 1580. It was translated into Latin by a nobleman, eminent for his piety (*Nobilissimus vir ac pietate insignis*) with this weighty, pious and serviceable admonition, or observation.

" 'Since, just as there is but one God and one Lord and Mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ, so there is but one truth and revealed will of God, which is the basis of the True Faith, hence it follows necessarily that there is but one Faith, and all the Confessions of this True Faith, though they differ in expression, are yet in substance in glorious accord with each other. When therefore we believe with the heart unto righteousness, and confess with the mouth unto salvation, certainly there can not be in this life anything sweeter, or more beautiful than the consensus of the Confessions in this one Truth, Faith, Right-

eousness and Salvation. For however many such consentient Confessions, of the Churches there are, there are just as many most weighty consentient testimonies for the Truth against error and falsehood. As many as by a public Confession bear testimony to their mutual consensus, mutually confirm each other and exhort to constancy in that Confession, and invite and encourage others to embrace the same Truth: and such consensus in the truth of the saints here on earth, exhibits a sort of type, and supplies a proof not to be lightly esteemed, of the consensus and harmony which the saints in heaven will celebrate eternally before the throne of God, the Author of all Truth. The collection therefore and arrangement in a Harmony of the Confessions of the Orthodox Churches is a laudable design to be approved of as entered upon by a sort of divine instinct. For in this way it is shown that distance and diversity of locality is no obstacle among the faithful to their conjunction and unity in the Holy Spirit who is always everywhere like Himself. Then again those placed in the light of so great a consensus, surrounded by so great a cloud as it were of witnesses, have reason to blush when they dare to recall from the dead and offer for the reception of others errors condemned and exploded by the consensus of the Churches of this our time, as well as by the orthodox Fathers of former ages.

"When therefore by a sort of divine Providence the Confession of the Church of Scotland, (first published in the year of Christ 1568, which has been communicated in no language other than Scots, and to no Churches so far as I am aware), fell into my hands; and I heard the complaint that the Confession of the Church of Scotland was lacking in *The Harmony of the Confessions*, it seemed worth while to translate that Confession into the Latin language, to satisfy the wishes of the pious, who desired it to be inserted in the *Harmony* along with the others, or otherwise appended to it. For that Church by comparison with many has the rare privilege which has made its name celebrated even abroad that, for about fifty-four years more or less, without schism not to speak of heresy it has preserved and retained unity along with purity of doctrine. Of this unity, by the mercy of God, the main support has been that step by step in conjunction with the doctrine of Christ, there has been received also the Discipline of the Apostles, as pre-

scribed in the Word of God; and as nearly as possible the whole ecclesiastical government has been administered in harmony therewith. In this manner all the seeds of schisms and errors were nipped and extirpated, as it were in the bud and germ, as soon as ever they were seen to sprout or germinate. May the Lord God in His Infinite Goodness grant the Most Serene Royal Majesty and all rulers of Churches, Powers which are the nursing mothers of the Church, that they may perpetually conserve that unity and purity of doctrine in accordance with the Word of God! Amen.' Thus far the most excellent translator."

It is evident that the Editor of the *Syntagma* knew nothing of the origin and historical circumstances of the Scottish documents, except what he learned from the translator. Both wrongly ascribe the Confession proper to 1568, instead of 1560. Neither shows any clear understanding that the document subscribed in 1580-1 is quite independent of the Confession proper. Both seem to regard it as a sort of appendix, added presumably when the 'Confessio Scoticana' was subscribed in that year "by the King and the Nobles and Estates of the Realm in Parliament." *The National Covenant* reaffirms "the trew Christian Faith and Religion pleasing God and bringing salvation to man . . . as mair particularie is expressed in the Confession of our Faith, stablished and publicly confirmed by sundrie Acts of Parliament . . . To the quhilk Confession and Form of Religion we willingly agree in our consciences in all pointis, as unto Godis undouted trewth and veritie, groundit only upon his written word." But there was no public subscription or further reaffirmation of the Confession of 1560 in that year, nor have the Scots Confession of 1560 and the *National Covenant* or 'Negative Confession' of 1581 ever been regarded by Church or State in Scotland as constituting in any sense one unified testimony to "the trew christian Faith and Religion." We are thus driven to the conclusion that the translator drew his knowledge of the Scottish Confession from some non-Scottish source, where the Confession of 1560 and the *National Covenant* of 1581 were printed side by side, without any further information as to their origin and history than what he gives us in his Latin headings; except something which suggested 1568 instead of 1560 as the date of the Confession proper. It is not at all difficult to conjecture how the latter error is likely to have arisen. When the Confession of

1560 was ratified for the second time on Dec. 15, 1567, after the imprisonment of Queen Mary, it was incorporated *in extenso* in the ratifying act. The copy of the Confession, thus incorporated, would naturally be the standard copy, to which others would conform. In all probability the translator's source would claim to give the Confession, according to the copy newly adopted by the Scottish Parliament. Quite likely either it, or more probably, as we shall see, its source, bore the date 1568. I do not suppose that at that time, the Scottish Parliament printed its Acts, as they were passed, though a standard collection of them was published by Sir John Skene, as early as 1597, and Dunlop prints the Scots Confession "according to the copy which is in Sir John Skene's Edition of the Acts of Parliament compared with many other editions." I have no bibliography of early editions of the Scots Confession, and I am writing some fourteen thousand miles from the great libraries of Scotland. But there is every probability that the Confession would be printed in 1568, 'according to the copy newly ratified by the three estates of the Realm in Parliament.' For one who came across some such copy or statement, without knowing the real history of the Confession, it would be the most natural thing in the world to conclude that the Confession itself belonged to the year 1568.

We can go further than this, however, and determine with almost absolute certainty the precise form in which the Scottish Confession "fell into the hands" of the translator. He tells us that it was lacking in the "Harmony of the Confessions." The reference is to the once famous work, described by Dr. Schaff in his *History of the Creeds of Christendom*, p. 354, published at Geneva in 1581. But both the Scottish documents are found in the English translation of the *Harmony*, published at Cambridge in 1586. Now the Latin translation of the *Syntagma* and the English of the Cambridge *Harmony* agree in a very remarkable variant reading in the *National Covenant*, a variant found in no other ancient copy so far noted. They speak of the Pope's 'dispersed and uncertain repentance' (*dispersam atque incertam poenitentiam*), whereas all old Scottish authorities read 'despered' and the renewed National Covenant as subscribed in 1638 and 1639 reads 'desperate.' The Scots Latin translation, contemporary with the original and believed to be by the same author, reads without any ambiguity 'uncertain and

full of despair' (*incertam ac desperationis plenam*). There is not very much difference in meaning between the two. The Pope's 'repentance,' *i.e.* doctrine of penance, is 'uncertain and desperate,' because it brings no assurance of pardon or peace to the troubled soul, but rather leads to hopelessness and despair of ever being able to satisfy God. It may be called 'dispersed,' because it seeks to win forgiveness by a multiplicity of scattered acts, instead of accepting God's free grace in Christ, and finding our peace in Him. But there can be no doubt that "despered" is the genuine reading, and that the English editor of the *Cambridge Harmony* changed it to 'dispersed' either by a mere blunder or more probably because the Scottish word or spelling conveyed no meaning to him, and he thought he was restoring what must be the true meaning.

We find, then, that the Latin translation of the Scottish documents in the *Syntagma* is the work of a man '*nobilissimus ac pietate insignis*,' who communicated it direct to the editor, so that wherever we meet with this version we may assume that we are dealing with the *Syntagma*. As for the date of the translation, we must bring it as near 1612 as possible, because the Church of Scotland had already been Reformed, 'about fifty-four years, more or less.' The translator is a convinced adherent of the doctrine and discipline accepted in Scotland, but his knowledge of the History of the Church of Scotland for the first half century after the Reformation is of the vaguest. He knew the Scottish Confessions from the English translation of the *Harmony*, and he is certainly not a Scotsman. If his Latin is less classical than that of Adamson and Craig, he uses contemporary theological Latin with freedom and precision. He had no knowledge of any other Latin translation. This much I regard as certain, concerning him.

What follows I merely suggest tentatively. Is he an English Puritan? I scarcely think so. An English Puritan as much interested in the Scottish Church would be likely to know more of the dangers and fluctuations of fortune it had encountered, during the "fifty-four years, more or less" since its Reformation. If in the mercy of God it had escaped heresy and schism, it had had a hard and often seemingly losing battle to fight for the purity of its apostolic discipline, and was at that very time struggling against intruded Bishops. It seems to me that there is

an Erastian flavor, as foreign to English Puritanism as it is to Scotland or Geneva, in the reference to 'Governors of Churches,' which in the context must mean Civil Authorities, and not Ecclesiastical. The Most Serene Royal Majesty, to whom he refers, must I think be looked for among the Princes of the Empire, where Calvinistic Doctrine was to be found in conjunction with a semi-Erastian Ecclesiastical Discipline. The Editor dedicates the *Consensus Orthodoxus* in Part 3 to the Elector Frederick (IV or just possibly V, certainly not, as Dr. Schaff says, doubtless by a mere oversight, Frederick III) of the Palatinate, whom he calls "Domino suo Clementissimo," as if he were, or had been his subject. Could the reference possibly be to him? It seems to me more natural for the translator to refer to his Prince in such a connection if he were also his correspondent's. But I am not sure that the title is a possible one for him.

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JOHN DICKIE.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Reconstruction of Religion. By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, PH.D., Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1922. 8vo. pp. xviii, 323.

The student of religion will find this book of considerable apologetic value. The author reveals how strong an argument for the truth and necessity of natural religion may be drawn from modern social science. "Science alone," he writes (p. 63), "can never give to social values, in the mind of the individual, that universal and absolute character which they need to possess; or rather it can do so only in proportion as it transforms itself into religion. It is thus that social science instead of becoming a substitute for, and displacing, religion, leads to the perception of its value."

Prof. Ellwood is in earnest for brotherly love and the spirit of co-operation in the family, between classes, in politics, and among nations. He shows how well grounded scientifically are Christ's humanitarian principles. He sets the seal of sociology to the "religion of Jesus," as he calls it. "The mystery is why the world has not accepted His (Christ's) teaching. For His social principles are so plainly the only ones by which men can satisfactorily live together that they might just as well forget the law of gravitation as forget these principles" (p. 177). The book will take its place among the best of its kind, and will be read with profit by all who love mankind and desire to see the Kingdom of God become the reality of this world. The chapters on "The Religious Revolution," "The Social Significance of Christianity," "Our Semi-Pagan Civilization," "Positive Christianity the Religion of Humanity," and "The Opportunity of the Church," are particularly strong.

The Christian reader will have many disappointments as he goes along. After reading the title, "The Reconstruction of Religion," he will be no little surprised to find the author implying rather jauntily in the preface that he knows little and cares less about theology. The reader will wonder what chance for success in the reconstruction of religion the man will have who thus throws away at the beginning the basic materials from which the reconstruction is to be made.

The reader will be disappointed with the author's definition of religion. "Religion is simply morality raised to its highest power, or universalized morality, while morality, in the common acceptance of the term, should be religion brought down to the practical, every-day relations between men" (p. 128). To Prof. Ellwood religion is the glorification of humanity rather than God. On page 183 he writes: "It would be quite as correct then to say that the highest term of religion is "humanity," and that

Christianity is "a religion of humanity." Apparently with his approval he quotes at bottom of page 44 a couple of sentences from Prof. Cooley's *Social Progress*. "The essence of religion is the expansion of the soul into the sense of a greater life; and the way to this is through that social expansion which is of the same nature. One who has developed a spirit of loyalty, service, and sacrifice toward a social group has only to transform this to a larger conception in order to have a religious spirit." The 'larger conception' means society or humanity in general. Thus love of man expanded is religion. The more men you like and treat like a gentleman the more religious you are. We know some jolly good fellows at the club who are deeply religious on this principle. But this is, of course, religion with God left out. It is therefore not religion at all. It is philanthropy, and nothing is to be gained by confounding words. Religion is something more than kindness.

He carries the glorification of man still further. "Social intelligence," he writes (p. 298), "is indispensable for the success of Christian ideals, and, therefore, the social sciences are the natural allies of the church in its work of building a Christian society. They will furnish more material for the effective guidance of public opinion in a Christian direction than even the Bible itself. If the ministry of the church is to undertake the function of social leadership, it should be trained even more in sociology than in theology." The author's admirable "*Enthusiasm for Humanity*" has here carried him to the verge of absurdity. He would have the study of man supersede the study of God; ministers must become men of Man instead of men of God. Then they would indeed be religious men. Much more: they would be Christian men, for "the '*enthusiasm of humanity*' is the centre and core of Christianity" (p. 84).

Of course, this unwise glorification of man has its natural effect in the author's neglect to give God His due. While the author believes in God, his religious attitude is practically deistical. God is far away and has little or nothing to do in the important affairs of man. "It must be, however, the social sciences to which the world must look more and more for guidance and hence to which religion also must look" (p. x). His practical deism is illustrated by his idea of prayer. "All religions, except the very lowest, are characterized by the use of prayer, or by what amounts to the same thing, *introspective meditation*" (p. 154). (Italics ours).

Prof. Ellwood's idea of sin while modern is inadequate. "The Theological conception of sin," (p. 143), "is, that it is rebellion against God. To this statement there can be objection, if we remember that the service of God must consist in the service of humanity. In simplest terms sin is essentially selfishness; it is disloyalty to the claims of humanity, whether that humanity be our fellow beings around us or those in distant lands or future ages. The conception of sin in positive Christianity in other words will be social and humanitarian."

It is reiterated throughout the book that to serve men is the only way

to serve God. For example page 162: "The only possible service of God must consist in the service of men—the fundamental principle, as we have so often reiterated, of the religion of Jesus." To see that this principle of Prof. Ellwood's is not true one need only reflect that the first three and the first part of the fourth commandments have no social implications but are purely individual. Yet to keep those fundamental laws is surely service of God! And in "the religion of Jesus" will be found the words: "The first and the great commandment is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God. . . . The second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

There is confusion of ideas with regard to our modern civilization. In the chapter on "Our Semi-Pagan Civilization," he acutely points out the prevalent evils of modern life and clearly reveals our semi-pagan point of view with power and pleasure as its chief ideals. If his analysis be true, it would seem to argue that the sooner such pagan civilization passes away the better for the world. It is therefore rather inconsistent with this analysis to hear our author warning on page 8 that unless religion keeps step with modern science civilization will vanish. Why not let it go? And even more bewildered are his words on page 159: "The solution which positive Christianity proposes for the religious problems of our time is simple. Let the religious leaders of our day grasp the full social significance of religion, drop their theological disputations, give religion the positive humanitarian trend which civilization demands, etc." But why should religious leaders be so concerned over the demands of a semi-pagan civilization? Its behests had better be ignored and the higher and diviner demands of Christianity be obeyed.

Summit, N. J.

ROCKWELL S. BRANK.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

An Introduction to the History of Christianity, A.D. 590-1314. By F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and Professor of Christian Institutions in Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921. 8vo, pp. ix, 390.

In this *Introduction* Prof. Jackson undertakes, in a series of fourteen chapters rather loosely connected with one another, to set forth the salient features of the history of medieval Christianity during the seven centuries embraced between the reign of Gregory the Great (590-604 A.D.) and the destruction of the Knights Templar (1314), an event that may appropriately be regarded as the close of the period in which the papacy stood at the height of its medieval power and splendor.

The essays here grouped together—for such is really the nature of this *Introduction*—offer the reader rather a series of discussions pertaining to special phases of medieval Christianity, than a systematic and proportionate treatment of the subject as a whole, such as most of our

manuals of church history aim to give. The increased freedom of method thus secured has given the author abundant opportunity to enrich and enliven his narrative with historical judgments and reflections that could not so advantageously have been introduced as *obiter dicta* in a treatise more closely following a logical or chronological arrangement of materials. On the other hand, the chapters as they stand have at times a bewildering mass of heterogeneous data, and a reader using this *Introduction* to get his first acquaintance with the facts will occasionally be dismayed as well as puzzled by the heaping together of disparate elements, gathered, in some instances—for the author frequently harks back to the Ante-Nicene Age—from a period extending over a thousand years. The beginner's difficulties will be increased by the fact that there is no table of contents; that there are no marginal captions and only occasional subdivisions of chapters; that the Index is quite inadequate, omitting many of the names that are mentioned in the text and that might conveniently be made the point of departure by one wishing to use the treatise as a reference-book; and that some of the chapter-headings are so general—necessarily so—that they have little specific value as guides for the understanding of their contents, such as, for example, "The Pillars of the Medieval Church," "The Church and the Empire," "The Church Empire of the West," "England." That the different sections of the volume will prove to many to be of unequal interest and value, is quite natural, and the fact may be due to the subjective conditions of the reader's mind as much as to the varying excellencies of the work itself; but it must be said that in many places the author presupposes altogether too much knowledge of the Middle Ages to make his discussion satisfactory to any except the student of special attainments in this field, while in other portions he goes into needless details of a technical character, or amplifies matters that might well be taken for granted in a treatise of this kind.

But after all, these are mainly considerations of proportion and form, and whatever one may be disposed to say of such minor faults, the work as a whole must be regarded as admirable alike for its scholarly excellencies and for the skilful handling of the essential features of the narrative. Certainly the author has amply succeeded in realizing his modestly expressed purpose of giving "such an introduction to the history of the Middle Ages" as to make his readers "desire more knowledge of this important epoch in the development of mankind."

A conspicuous trait of Prof. Jackson's work is his fairness in dealing with controverted issues, as shown by his readiness, in the light of the latest researches, to revise many of the traditional estimates of medieval personalities and events. This is particularly true of his discussion of the so-called "Dark Ages"; the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals; the merits and defects of monasticism; the epoch-making pontificates of Gregory the Great, Nicholas I, Leo IX, Gregory VII, Alexander III, and Boniface VIII; the Crusaders; the intellectual life of the Middle Ages; and especially the disciplinary system of the Middle Ages. Few, if any,

will be the readers who will not feel indebted to the author for his discriminating judgments concerning the men and issues and institutions that helped to make medieval Christianity the imposing and instructive phenomenon it was. Some, no doubt, will regret that the theological activity of the period was not more adequately set forth—some of the doctrinal controversies are disposed of in a brief paragraph, while others, like that pertaining to the views of Gottschalk on predestination, are not even mentioned; and those who may be specially interested in the everyday religious life of the people will wish that such characteristic expressions of the medieval piety as the worship of images and relics, the making of pilgrimages, the ministries of the departed and the living saints, the elaborations of the ritual, the charms of the contemplative life, and the like, might have been made more prominent. But on the external side of the history, the narrative will often be found to be unexpectedly full and informing. The institutional life of the Church; her polity and her politics; her hierarchy; her schools and convents; her cathedrals and abbeys; her missionary and Crusading activity; her disciplinary and administrative work; her rivalry with, and her triumph over, the Empire—these are the phases of the story that are most adequately presented. The author is not wanting in sympathy for what the Catholic would regard as the best elements of the Christian life of the period; but at the same time he makes little effort to kindle the imagination of his readers or to add any emotional quality to their appreciation of the things dearest to the heart of the medieval Christian.

At the close of each chapter there is a list of sources and secondary authorities dealing with the subject discussed. Special pains have been taken to include the best available works in English, whether original or translated; and more than enough have been given to serve as guides for a further study of the period. But in view of the scholarly character of this *Introduction*, it is rather strange to see so few references to the works of German specialists—in not a few instances the best monographs on the subjects.

At the close of the volume there is a useful four-page list of "Important Popes," arranged in chronological order, with brief indications of their historical significance.

The style of the book is well adapted to the purpose of the author. Occasionally one meets with skillfully phrased comparisons and contrasts which reveal the accurate learning and the sound judgment of the historical expert, as well as the delicate touch of the literary artist. Unfortunately, there are also evidences of careless writing and proofreading, as in the following cases: "Just when the relations between Papacy were most strained" (p. 38); "For the Pontificate of Nicholas I the main authorities is" (p. 85); "forbid" for "forbade" (p. 138); "The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and its principalities . . . was" (p. 154); "The crusade begun in 1218 differed from the earlier ones on the principal attack being delivered against Egypt" (p. 162); "Christendom . . . began to recede not only in the territory which it occupied in its

details" (sc. "but" after "occupied"; p. 165); "Nothing, however, is so illustrative of the learning of the Middle Ages than the career of Abélard" (p. 179); "a rival, whom he burned to contend and vanquish" (p. 179); "threatened the citizens not only with the loss of happiness in heaven but with money on earth" (p. 250); "Its peculiar influence on France has been due to the fact that it was not merely as a residence of the kings or as a commercial mart that Paris became important, but because it had become," etc. (p. 284); "Avignon, whither Clement V repaired in 1308 and was destined long to be the home of the Papacy, was," etc. (p. 295); "No church gave birth to such a series of men eminent in more fields than that of the English in the eighth and ninth centuries" (p. 300); "The grievances were that the Popes Italian," (sc. "were" before "Italian"; p. 315); "the principle that the people must be taxed with their consent of their representatives" (p. 316).

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A Short History of Christian Theophagy. By PRESERVED SMITH, PH.D.
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1922. 8vo, pp. 223. Price
\$2.00.

Under this somewhat forbidding title, the volume before us presents a brief history of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. But one does not need to read many pages to understand why the term "theophagy" was deemed specially appropriate. For the author has a thesis to defend, which, to use his own words, is—

that the dogma of the sacrifice of the mass, repudiated by nearly all the Reformers, and the dogma of the Real Presence, repudiated by some of them, were in reality far more ancient than medieval scholasticism; that they were, in fact, the teachings of the primitive church, and that, pushing our inquiry ever further back, they had been derived by her from a pre-Christian, and from a very remote, antiquity. The idea of the god sacrificed to himself, that his flesh might be eaten by worshippers thus assured of partaking of his divinity, arose at the dawn of religion, was revived by the mystic cults of the Greeks, and from them was borrowed by Paul and implanted, along with the myth of the dying and rising Savior God, deep in the soil of the early church (p. 7).

Our author, then, belongs to that group of historians who in recent years have been bringing the mystery religions of the ancient Hellenistic world, and especially the question of the influence of these on early Christian thought and life, to the fore in theological discussions. He is quite convinced that the eucharist of the early Church was "borrowed by the Christians from the older mystery religions" (p. 43); that "The account of the Last Supper is but an etiological cult story, analogous to the Greek myths or to the Hebrew fable of the Passover in Exodus xii, designed to authorize a custom otherwise established in the earliest community" (*ibid.*); "that the specific accounts of the passion and resurrection found in the Gospels emanated from Paul" (p. 49); "That

the German Wrede has put us under a great debt by at last writing a biography of the Tarsian, showing both how it was possible psychologically for Paul to evolve these myths and possible historically for him to foist them on the Christian church" (p. 51); that Paul "fabled that Christ had instituted the Supper" (p. 76); that "Transubstantiation does not indicate a coarser conception of the real presence than that held by primitive Christians, but a finer one" (p. 78); that "When Paul, on the analogy of the mystery religions, evolved from his inner consciousness the myth of a Savior who should die, be eaten, and rise again, he felt that the only explanation of the mysteries necessary was the story of Jesus, part of which he had heard from others, part of which came to him by direct revelation [and, of course, was quite untrustworthy]" (p. 78); that, in short, the Supper instituted by our Lord is only another form of that theophagy which "goes back to the time when man was just emerging from the animal" and "when the grandsons of the ape were accumulating their theological ideas" (p. 23f.).

The "evidence" for these assertions is such as the student of Christian origins has been familiar with for some time. It is presented by the author, almost entirely at second hand, chiefly in his first two chapters, entitled, respectively, "*Praeparatio Evangelica*" and "*Paul and His Symmystae*." The footnotes furnish an impressive array of names of specialists belonging to the modern school of comparative religions, and of theologians who have been utilizing these data for the reconstruction of historic Christianity,—Murray, Dietrich, Frazer, Cumont, Brückner, Reitzenstein, Reinach, Wrede, Heitmüller, Lake, Kennedy, and the like; but the author's method of utilizing this literature reveals no very thorough mastery of the issues in controversy. These alleged resemblances between Christian and pagan ideas, rites, and institutions, will, of course, impress some in one way, and others in another. For our own part, we cannot but feel that the correspondences are often far-fetched and fanciful. Nor is it at all strange that specifically in this matter of sacramental eating and drinking there should be similarities of the kind that are made so much of by some of these investigators. Eating and drinking are such familiar and vital processes that religions that have, or pretend to have, any real influence on life have naturally found it expedient to give these acts a symbolic significance in their ritualistic observances. But to prove that Paul, and, following him, the whole early Church, borrowed from pagan cults alike the doctrine and the administration of the Holy Supper, is a rather formidable undertaking; and neither Dr. Smith nor those of his authorities with whom we have familiarized ourselves seem to have established this alleged dependence. It is not enough to say that this or that detail of a heathen rite may "remind one" of a bit of superstitious practice that may have grown up in the medieval Church in connection with the idolatry of the mass; that wine was often used in pagan cults as a symbol of blood; that as "the worshippers of Bacchus were called Bacchi and Bacchae," so "the worshippers of Jesus 'put on Christ'" (p. 36); that as in Japan a sacred meal of rice

"was preceded by the administration of a purgative or emetic, the idea being to preserve the sacred food from contact with profane nourishment," so the "Catholics take the eucharist fasting"; or that conceptions inseparable from the very idea of a Supreme Being with whom one can enter into personal relationship should color the language of religious devotion. Then, too, the dates of these alleged similarities in the religious observances are treated in rather arbitrary fashion, and the difficulties involved in these chronological considerations are either ignored or quite too lightly set aside. For some of these analogies the reader is carried, within the limits of a few pages, now to the distant Homeric era, now to the classic age of Hellas, now to the post-Pauline period of the culminating Mithraic influences, and now to contemporary heathenism in Australia or Africa. In some instances—this is especially true of the phenomenon of Gnostic syncretism in the second century—it is more likely that the Christian practice affected pagan usage, than that the reverse was the case. Certainly the Pauline literature as a whole hardly makes the impression that its author was as much interested in ritualistic ceremonies as he was in principles of truth and morality, or that he regarded his doctrine of the cross—of "a dying and rising Savior God"—as a specially attractive message to the carnal men of his day.

The remaining chapters of the book bear the titles: (III) Transubstantiation; (IV) Consubstantiation; (V) Luther; (VI) Carlstadt; (VII) Zwingli and Oecolampadius; (VIII) Schwenckfeld; (X) Bucer; (X) Melanchthon; (XI) Calvin; (XII) The British Reformers; (XIII) The Last Phase. In this chronological order the author sketches the early medieval and the subsequent development of Christian thought concerning the Lord's Supper. Most of this work is done with precision and fairness, and rests, unlike that of the first chapters, on a study of the sources themselves. Particularly full and instructive, as might have been expected from this distinguished authority on Luther, is the presentation of the variations in this Reformer's eucharistic views, and of the controversies in which he engaged on this subject with Carlstadt, with Schwenckfeld, with the Zwinglians, and with some of the mediating Lutherans. The Swiss Reformers, with their symbolic interpretation of the words of the institution of the Supper, appeal most to our author, but his judgment as to the merits of the debate as a whole may be inferred from this characteristic reflection on the Marburg Colloquy: "Here it becomes more clear than ever—not indeed to those present, but to us—that the reason for these interminable beatings about the bush lay in the fact that both parties started from a false premise, namely that reason and Scripture could be reconciled" (p. 159).

As for Calvin, it must be acknowledged that he receives less justice, and more ridicule, than he deserves. No doubt, some of his phrases reveal an unstable equilibrium between the Zwinglian and Lutheran extremes; but Dr. Smith seems to have needless difficulties in trying to follow the Reformer's obvious and valid distinction, fundamental in his whole

doctrine of the Supper, between the real, yet spiritual, and specially efficacious presence of Christ in the sacrament, and a merely corporeal presence. Hence the following misrepresentation of Calvin's teaching—a caricature that reflects more on the historian's impartiality and accuracy, than on the great Genevan's theological acumen: "In all this, is evident not the greater consistency and rationality of Calvin's theory, but the greater cleverness of his prestidigitation. The body is needed as a pledge of salvation. Very well, it is there; if you are elect, eat it. But suppose a mouse or a sinner gobbles up the body? Impossible; for it is not there. Presto, it is gone, only to return in a flash the moment Calvin's own jaws close on the wafer" (p. 196).

The brief closing chapter calls attention to the fact that present-day discussions of the Lord's Supper simply reproduce the views of the past, all the way from transubstantiation to that pure rationalism which in these last years has proved to its own satisfaction the dependence of Paul and Paulinism on the mystery religions of his time, and which the author now commends to us on the score of its having put an end to "outworn survivals from a primeval state" (p. 218).

Enough has been said to make it plain that this *History* must be used with caution. It presents a mass of data that cannot fail to stimulate interest in the delicate and difficult theological problem with which they deal. But the deductions drawn from these facts seem to need many a revision in detail, and a thorough reconstruction so far as the first two chapters and the main thesis are concerned—the alleged derivation of the eucharist from the pagan mystery religions.

In conclusion, mention is made, and ought to be made, of the extensive (seven-page) bibliography. The list is specially rich in reference to the literature in support of the main contention of the treatise. One misses, on the other hand, such standard monographs as those of Ebrard, Kahn, Dieckhoff, Rückert, and Schmid, and one cannot but feel that here, too, the author's preferences and prejudices have made it hard for him to be fair.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Zur Geschichte der Christlichen Heilsgewissheit von Augustin bis zur Hochscholastik. Von GUSTAF LJUNGGREN, Lizentiat der Theologie in Uppsala. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1920. Pages 8 and 328. Price (paper) \$1.00.

This scholarly study traces the Christian idea of the assurance of salvation from Augustine down to and including the Scholastic theologians of the Franciscan and Dominican schools, and it is the author's intention to continue his research on to Luther. It has been a laborious task, covering several years. Almost the entire first half of the book is devoted to Augustine. Every theological avenue into which this vast subject branches is assiduously pursued, and we have Augustine's views on faith, hope, love, personality, sin, predestination, perseverance, Christ, grace, church, sacraments, truth, moralism, mysticism, intellectualism,

righteousness, peace, conscience, perfectionism, humility, etc. Specialists in Augustine will doubtless find Dr. Ljunggren's portrayal of Augustine substantially Augustinian.

The investigation makes plain that, according to Augustine, assurance of salvation is no achievement of the human personality, but results from an inner experience of the love of God in Christ (pp. 125, 137). It is grounded not in us but in God (pp. 94-95, 150). His view is guarded on the one hand from the self-righteousness of moralism, and on the other from the pantheizing tendencies of mysticism. Augustine never loses himself in a subjectivistic, unhistorical mysticism (p. 114). This assurance has both its objective and subjective factors (p. 99). Great stress is laid upon the fact of the Christian conscience, which is called the *sedes Dei*, and is a specifically religious organ realizing the presence of God, and not merely an ethical function of the soul (pp. 86, 101-105). The good, that is, the Christian conscience is the sign of the presence of God in the soul. "He who has a good conscience is tranquil, and tranquillity is the very sabbath of the heart" (pp. 112, 120, note 1). Righteousness is of course necessary: "nullus beatus nisi justus" (pp. 80-81). Mercy and righteousness are ever united, and our joy is not over ourselves but over God's work in us (pp. 89, 131). Assurance (*certitudo*) is never complete in this life, and a perfect security is impossible. Yet there is no blessedness without assurance (pp. 92-93. Cf. pp. 77, 79). There is no perfection here, and a feeling of imperfection is always a part of a progressive sanctification (pp. 82, 134-135). Nor is this grace of assurance mediated mechanically through the sacraments, but is a personal relation of trust to God (p. 154). While careful to absolve Augustine from any Pelagian tendency, still the author thinks that both moralism and mysticism lurk in the background, so that Augustine is scarcely able to reach a thoroughly evangelical conception of assurance (pp. 69, 145).

The above glance is barely sufficient to indicate something of the wealth of material which the author has drawn from the writings of Augustine. His citations, too, are very apt, and establish his point in each instance. These quotations alone provide a mental stimulus of high homiletic value. Let the modern minister cultivate more zealously the companionship of St. Augustine. Few Christian scholars of any age have had a richer and profounder spiritual vision, and fewer still have possessed his remarkable power of expression. There is no dull pulpit, no poverty of incisive thought where this writer leads the way. Think of the depths of such priceless utterances as the following: "Faith is believing what you do not yet see: the reward of this faith is seeing what you believe" (p. 7). "By this law of works God says, 'Do what I command': by the law of faith we say to God, 'Grant what Thou commandest'" (p. 8). "Only faith prays." "Love, then do what you want" (pp. 10, 11). "If one should lapse from faith, he necessarily lapses from love; for he cannot love what he does not believe" (p. 32). "Hope cannot exist without love. Hence neither is love without hope, nor

hope without love, nor both without faith" (p. 34). "What He did is indeed more than what He promised. What did He do? He died for thee. What did He promise? That thou shouldst live with Him" (p. 62). "He prays for us as our priest, He prays in us as our head, He is prayed to by us as our God. . . . What is more sure than our felicity when He prays for us who gives what He prays for? For Christ is God and man: He prays as man, as God He gives that for which He prays" (p. 63). "He began to be in us when He called us" (p. 85). "We are with Christ in heaven through hope, He is with us on earth through love" (p. 88). A man is truly happy "not if he has what he loves, but if he loves what ought to be loved" (p. 99). "Among all the tribulations of the human soul there is no greater tribulation than the self-consciousness of sin" (pp. 101-102). "Love, and He draws nigh; love, and He abides" (p. 107). "When you would flee from Him, flee to Him. Flee to Him in confession, not from Him in hiding" (p. 110). "Lord, if without Thee nothing, in Thee everything. . . . He can do much and everything without us, we nothing without Him" (p. 137, note 1). "The law was given that grace might be sought after, grace was given that the law might be fulfilled" (p. 141). "You have a majesty to whom you may pray, you have a humanity which prays for you" (p. 58). In such fertile passages the writings of Augustine abound, and the present study has gathered up many of them.

After Augustine Pope Gregory the Great is studied. With him fear is such a dominant factor that no one can know whether he is elect (pp. 157-159). "In the history of the assurance of salvation Gregory is before all the apostle of fear and uncertainty" (p. 160). Then come Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Hugo, who are more moderate than Gregory, but far removed from Augustine. Bernhard's piety is experiential. Humility is one of the signs of grace. There is also the witness of the Holy Spirit and a good conscience. Bernhard approaches Luther (pp. 165-173).

Over one hundred pages (174-279) are given to the older Franciscan School, notably Alexander Halesius and Bonaventura. Moralism and mysticism develop. Mediaeval thought is semi-pelagian (p. 232). Assurance depends on personal merit, and even then we are not sure.

The fourth and last section of the book takes up the Aristotelian Dominican Scholastics, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. With the former mere hope is meritorious, and conscience is the organ of hope. Yet a real assurance is impossible (pp. 283-286). In Aquinas predestination is conditioned by foreknowledge of human merit, grace is enclosed in sacraments of which the priest is the dispenser. The confessional is emphasized, and assurance become a matter of ritual dictated by a rigid ecclesiasticism. The book closes with a good summary of the results reached (pp. 324-326).

A number of typist's errors will be found, especially in the setting up of the Latin quotations. Two of these mistakes are corrected at the end of the Preface, following the table of contents. A brief but care-

fully chosen bibliography concludes this painstaking study of one of the paramount themes in Christian theology.

Hillsboro, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

Pascal. VON D. KARL BORNHAUSEN, Professor in Marburg [jetzt Professor in Breslau]. Basel, 1920. Druck und Verlag von Friedrich Reinhardt. Pages xi, 286. Price, paper, Frs. 7.50 (Schweizer Währung).

The subject of this book (dedicated to the Theological Faculty of the University of Heidelberg) is just "Pascal." Even the title-page gives no further description. Dr. Bornhausen, however, does state, on the closing page of his preface, that his aim has been to exhibit the remarkable religious spirit of Pascal as shown in his literary activity. Pascal's life is reviewed up to the death of his father in 1651, then his struggles between the world and the new birth, 1651-1655, and finally "the new life," 1655-1662. We see the age in which Pascal lived, his youth and "first" conversion, his early scientific and religious views, his relations with Port Royal and Jansenism, his "second" conversion, his ardent avowal of Jansenism and final rejection of it, his associations with Descartes, De Méré, Arnauld, Nicole, De Saci, Domat, and his correspondence with Mlle. De Roannez. In numerous places the whole text of Pascal's essay or letter is given.

Pascal entered Port Royal, but, Dr. Bornhausen observes, he was never a real confidant of it, his critical spirit setting him in a much wider circle (p. 154). Yet he was and remained a son of the Church, even venerating the miraculous power of relics (pp. 217-219, 222. Cf. p. 233, note 4). He represents a certain union of humanistic and Christian culture (pp. 259-260), and in his position that Pope and Church had condemned the truth (referring to the condemnation of Jansenism) he approaches the free spirit of the Reformation (pp. 273-274. Cf. p. 147). His *Provincial Letters* Dr. Bornhausen calls the master-work of French literature of that time, and says, Pascal plays a leading though mediating rôle in the social and moral life of the France of 1650 (p. 6). "In Pascal France still possessed a younger prophet who went back to the fundamental principles of primitive Christendom" (pp. 147-148). He never became a theologian, merely an attentive reader and critic of theological controversies (p. 215). Some of Pascal's statements might appear to divorce reason and emotion, as when he speaks of the irrationality of religion and of Christian faith, but Dr. Bornhausen does not think Pascal can be accused of any dualism between head and heart (pp. 249-251. Cf. p. 87, note 1, and p. 211).

Remembering that Pascal lived only a little over thirty-nine years, his career was a singularly busy and attractive one. Despite his broken health and ascetic tendencies, his achievements in mathematics, science, philosophy, and religion will keep fresh the world's memory of him. His *Provincial Letters* and *Thoughts* will be readable literature for every age, and his prayers, his profound culture, and his gentle bearing under

all circumstances, place him in the first rank of Christian scholars. Dr. Bornhausen writes of this great man out of a thorough knowledge of him and a sane appreciation of the religious conditions of the day in which he lived. So much has been written on Pascal, but we think Dr. Bornhausen's study has served to bring him down to date, and in fact present him in a slightly different angle. We seem to walk in a gallery in which the old pictures of this great man have been touched up, dusted, changed about, and better lights thrown upon them. And this without any strained effort to make Pascal other than the wonderful man that he was.

Hillsboro, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

Monastic Life in the Middle Ages. By A. CARDINAL GASQUET. London: Bell & Co. 1922.

This is a volume of essays which have appeared at various times in different reviews and as addresses before various societies. The earliest was first published in the *Dublin Review* in 1883. The last is a paper printed in Rome in 1919. In the preface Cardinal Gasquet states that the collection was made at the request of many who had been interested in the various portions and desired to have them brought together.

The title for the volume gives only a very general idea of the contents. Certain articles deal with exactly this subject, as for example, "Abbot Wallingford," "The Making of St. Alban's Shrine," "An Abbot's Household Account Book," "How our Fathers were taught in Catholic Days," "Books and Book-making in early Chronicles and Accounts," "A Day with the Abbot of St. Augustine's Canterbury, in the Sixteenth Century," and "The English Premonstratensians." But in these the times are very often later than what we ordinarily call the "Middle Ages." Indeed the author's interest seems to lie in that period just preceding the Reformation and one feels in reading the articles that the author's glance is towards the Reformation. In some cases direct reference is made to the charges which Protestant historians have brought against ecclesiastical and social conditions prior to the Reformation. Furthermore, the scene of almost all of the chapters is laid in England. We have, in short, a picturesque account of English religious life at the eve of the Reformation, and running back of it.

Cardinal Gasquet is a Benedictine monk who has spent a great part of his life in researches of this kind, and the book makes its claim to notice on the basis of the original sources with which the author has worked. Most of the articles were written to offset some historical judgment which had been passed on some Roman Catholic by such men as Froude, for example, whose estimate of Abbot Wallingford is criticised by Gasquet.

The outstanding items in these essays are, first, the description of the catechetical tract "Dives et Pauper," a document which, Cardinal Gasquet says, would certainly be attributed to Lollard influence were it not for the thoroughly Roman atmosphere which pervades it. By this, he means that "Dives et Pauper" emphasizes the place of morality and the

underlying obligations of religion and sets forth a "Protestant" view of ceremonial. The implication is that there was plenty of such instruction before the Reformation, and that the Church was not sunk in idolatry and superstition.

The chapter on Adrian IV and the "bull" which gave Ireland to England presents the interesting theory that what was either erroneously, but more haply maliciously called the bull of donation from Adrian IV to Henry II in 1155 was really the somewhat altered substance of a letter denying the right of conquest in Ireland to Louis VII of France, in 1159.

Polydore Vergil's history of the times of Henry VII, which is such a valuable source for that period gains new interest from the "rough draft" manuscript edition which Cardinal Gasquet discovered in the library of the Dukes of Urbino, which was written out by Veterani, their famous librarian, at the dictation of Vergil, before the death of Cardinal Woolsey, and then altered afterwards. The famous estimate of Woolsey which has come into history from this source, was an addendum to the original.

In 1895 Gasquet wrote an Introduction to a reprint of Montalembert's *Monks of the West*, which appears in this book as "A Sketch of Monastic Constitutional History." In this introduction the probable influence of the monastic rule upon European Constitutional development is stressed. The particular connections are not shown. The argument, such as it is, may be reproduced by a few lines from the article itself. "It is undeniable that the monastic order is a great fact in the history of European civilization" (p. 198). "In view of this broad fact, it is impossible to doubt that the monastic system must possess some strange power, some special gift of influencing bodies of men" (p. 198). "(The monk's) power for good lay not in his words chiefly, but in the example of his monastic life. This is the secret of the conversion of European peoples" (p. 199)." This example was that of a social life which had as its end not the individual monk, but the order, the social framework of the individual. This first and persuasive object lesson in Christian social civilization was, thinks Cardinal Gasquet, a principal force in moulding European constitutional government. And among these monastic influences, that of St. Benedict was preeminent.

The last paper, confessedly an addition, deals with the relations of England and the Holy See during the period 1792-1806. It is a selection from the correspondence of Sir John Coxe Hippisley, a semi-official resident in Rome, and Mgr. Erskine, a Papal Envoy to the Court of George III. The visit of this prelate was ostensibly to his Scotch relatives, but he prolonged it to stay in London and handle various communications between the Papal Secretary of State and the British Foreign Office in the interest of keeping the Pope neutral and friendly to Britain.

Lockport, N. Y.

STEWART M. ROBINSON.

Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity. By LEWIS BAYLES PATON, Nettleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, Hartford Theological Seminary. The Macmillan Company. Pp. 307.

A book with "spiritism" as part of its title is today sure of a reading public favorably inclined toward it, and presumably, also, sure of a fairly ready sale. While lay interest in spiritism, psychic research and abnormal psychology is perhaps not as keen as during the war, there remains a wide audience for any speaker on these themes. Reading the title of this book hurriedly, one is apt to get the impression that it will be found to be a collection and analysis of the phenomena of spiritism in antiquity. Students of psychic research, however, who open the book with any such pleasant anticipation, are doomed to disappointment. Looking at the title more carefully, one sees that the theme is not merely spiritism, but the cult of the dead in antiquity; and before turning many pages one discovers further (as might well have been guessed) that the author's interest is not in the phenomena of spiritism but in the theology of ghost worship and its supposed evolution into higher forms of faith. Dr. Paton is a theologian, and his book is almost exclusively a theological study of the cult of the dead (*alias* ancestor worship) and its influence on religion.

Spiritism and ancestor worship, while of course intimately related to each other, are in reality two distinct subjects; they require quite different methods and interests, and perhaps quite different talents on the part of those who would study them. The cult of the dead is a recognized branch of the very modern science of comparative religion. The extreme evolutionary position, which conceives religion as a natural growth of human speculations, has long ago credited animism and ancestor worship together with being the moving first causes of Judaism and Christianity no less than Shintoism and spiritism proper. It is the old Spencerian crudity of men's fears and ignorances producing men's faiths and ideals. The cult of the dead, in this extreme form, might well be retitled *the cult of the dead faith*; for those who expound it are little curious about the cult itself, its origins and phenomena, but greatly concerned with it as a means whereby they hope to desuper-naturalize Christianity.

Spiritism, on the other hand, (unless one confine that term to the small and modern group of mystics who are endeavoring, none too successfully, to manufacture a religion), is not merely a belief in or theory about disembodied spirits and persisting consciousness after death, but it is a definite belief in an intercommunication between the living and the dead. In itself it is of no more religious a quality (though always connected with religion and therefore repeatedly condemned in the O. T.), than would be a belief that Earth-men and Mars-men may and do exchange messages. Spiritism has to do exclusively with what we may call psychic phenomena; its method is wholly empirical; and in all probability it will in the future bear the same relationship to the science of the

sub-conscious that astrology bears to astronomy. In dealing with spiritism in antiquity one expects from scholarship an exhaustive collection and analysis of the records of the past. Students of psychic phenomena have been waiting for a generation and more, hopefully expectant of a thorough and scholarly treatment of all the material which archaeology, Neo-Platonism and the Mysteries, no less than classical literature, offer. That some scholar will one day do for antiquity what the Society for Psychic Research has done for the closing years of the 19th century is a foregone conclusion. Dr. Paton, however, has by no means done this. He is apparently not at all concerned with the phenomena of spiritism, but with ancestor worship and its theoretical contributions to religion. One may be even more definite and say that his book seems to be written wholly from the point of view of the comparative religionist, with the unannounced purpose of sketching the evolution of Christianity from primitive cults of the dead.

That animism and ancestor worship are at the roots of most if not all natural religions, few students would care to deny. But that revealed religion and natural religions spring from the same sources is a presupposition without the slightest warrant in fact; yet that presupposition gives color to the whole book.

There are three premises here: (1) all religion is an evolutionary process; (2) spiritistic or psychic phenomena existed in primitive times; (3) these phenomena have been an active factor in the evolution of religion. Very little space is given to the recording of phenomena, or even to their classification. The author's interest, one must repeat, is wholly theological, and the aim of the book seems to be merely an attempt to show that spiritualism is an evolution from spiritism.

There is nothing original in such an argument. "The cult of the dead in Israel," derivable from earlier and cruder Babylonian cults, and issuing in the religion of Jesus, has been expounded many times in recent years. If Dr. Paton's argument may claim originality it is rather in the disguise with which it is offered—as a study in spiritism. Very early in the book one comes upon asides, bracketed references to the Old Testament, footnotes comparing the cult of the dead in other religions to supposed "parallels" in the Bible. One is led, as it were, gently, through Chinese ancestor worship and mediumship to the "sons of the prophets," through Indo-European ancestral cults, Egyptian spirit worship, Sumerian and Babylonian myths, to "early Hebrew conceptions of the dead"; and thence by a more open road to a study of the development of Israel's religion.

The conservative reader will find little to his taste in Dr. Paton's book. The lay-reader, seeking for information on spiritism in antiquity, will be rather awed by the amount of scholarship embalmed within such narrow compass; but he will reach the inevitable conclusion that the scholarship itself embalms little of real value to the student of spiritism. It is like a target well riddled about the edges, but with the white center untouched.

Delaware City, Delaware.

ROBERT CLAIBORNE PITZER.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Dictionary of Bible Proper Names. Compiled by CYRUS ALVIN POTTS.
The Abingdon Press. Crown 8vo., pp. 279.

The sub-title of this book reads as follows: "Every proper name in the Old and New Testaments arranged in alphabetical order; syllabified and accented; vowel sounds diacritically marked; definitions given in Latin and English." There are two principal criticisms which must be made, both of which are suggested by the word "every" in the sub-title.

The first criticism is that the compiler is guilty of exaggeration. This appears from the following statement of the preface: "It may be affirmed and easily proven, that scriptural names were not arbitrarily chosen but selected with the idea of defining the relation of the bearer to God and for the purpose of expressing some important general truth." If the word "some" or even "many" had been inserted before the word "scriptural" in the above sentence, it would not be open to question. As it stands it is positively untrue and is especially to be deplored because it greatly misrepresents an important and precious truth. For there are significant names in the Bible. No one denies this. There are some that are expressly declared to be such, chief among which is the name that is above every name: "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins." On the other hand the names Joseph and Mary illustrate the difficulty Mr. Potts must overcome in the attempt to establish his thesis. Joseph (meaning "may he add") is at once recognized as a significant name. It is the name given by Rachel to her first born son, when the Lord took away her reproach and led her to hope for further increase. Whether the birth of this later Joseph reflects in any sense the circumstances attending the birth of the son of Rachel, i.e. whether as applied to him it was significant in the original sense, we cannot say. It may be accounted for in several different ways. On the other hand the name Mary (Miriam) is of uncertain etymology and there is no reason for regarding it as significant in any stricter sense than that of general appropriateness. And even that much is not certain. If it means "comely" (literally, "fat,") we would regard it as appropriate for we are accustomed to think of Mary as beautiful. If it means "obstinacy, rebellion" it would seem to be singularly inappropriate to one who called herself "the handmaid of the Lord." If it means "bitterness" it would be both appropriate and the reverse, according to our application of it to Mary's life of peculiar joy and unique sorrow. If it means "mistress," the name would seem to be Aramaic, which is of course possible. We have no way of determining its true meaning with certainty.

There are many other names regarding which the candid student will feel constrained to admit that the strict etymological significance (this is the only one open to us in many instances, and it is often very uncertain) probably or certainly did not figure prominently if at all. Thus in the Old Testament we find a number of 'animal names': Deborah (*bee*), Dorcas (*gazelle*), Rachel (*ewe*), etc. In these names there is indeed a certain appropriateness which accounts for their use. The

sweetness of the honey bee, the grace and beauty of the gazelle, the fruitfulness and gentleness of the ewe lamb,—the names are both picturesque and parabolic. But it may be questioned whether in most instances the significance of such a name was prominent in the mind of the one who gave it or of the one who bore it, much more prominent than in the case of similar names today. The homiletic value of such names is certainly problematical. And when Mr. Potts tells us that Deborah (*bee*) is used "in the sense of orderly motion," we feel that he has failed even to grasp the primary signification of the name. The attempt to find a significant meaning has often led to forced interpretation and absurdity.

The second criticism which must be made of this *Dictionary* is that it is unscholarly. It is hardly too much to say that there is no more difficult problem for the trained philologist than the study of proper names. There are very many names, even among those which like the name of Mary are in current use, the original significance of which is either doubtful or utterly unknown. There are names of which we can not even say with certainty what language they come from. Yet we are surprised to find that although this work is declared to be "the result of extended research" and to contain "definitions selected from accredited authorities," there is not a single name but is given at least one meaning, not a single one the meaning of which is said to be uncertain or unknown. This, to anyone at all conversant with the great amount of work which has been done on Biblical and other ancient proper names in recent years, speaks volumes for the unscholarly nature of the work. Thus "Mary" is defined as follows: "*Amaritudo*—Bitterness; myrrh of the sea:—name of six Christian women, Matt. 1:16." Neither of the definitions is probable,—the second is extremely improbable,—and the reader is left in ignorance of the fact that some at least of the "accredited authorities" whom the compiler of this work might have been expected to consult do not even attempt to give an interpretation of the name. It cannot of course be expected that a little "glossary" should go into lengthy discussions of names whose meaning is uncertain. But certainly one who ventures to make the following extreme statement regarding the Biblical proper names: "To Bible students who do their own thinking, who delve beneath the surface and follow truth wherever it may lead, there is nothing more helpful than a familiarity with the literal meaning of proper names in the Bible. We can no more fathom the profound depths of the Scriptures without a knowledge of the literal meaning of these names than we can solve mathematical problems without a knowledge of numerical values. The value of the full understanding of the original significance of the proper names in the Bible is beyond any possible computation and measurement, and the literal meaning of these names is the keynote of this understanding" might be expected to exercise the greatest possible care to avoid misleading his readers by furnishing them with etymologies which are open to question.

Mr. Potts seems to be laboring under the unfortunate misapprehension

that all the Old Testament names are to be treated as Hebrew or Aramaic. The name Sennacherib, for example, is defined thus: "*Hostis vastitas*—Devastation by an enemy; bush of destruction:—an Assyrian king, 2 Kings 18:13." Confining ourselves to the second definition, we observe that it is one which was widely current up to about fifty years ago. It is a Hebrew etymology (*san* from *seneh*, the word for "bush" in Exod. 3; *cherib* from a well-known root) and a forced and unnatural one at that. But as long as Assyrian was a lost language there was some excuse for it. There is no excuse for it now. Thousands of Assyrian inscriptions have been published and deciphered; and Assyrian proper names have been made a matter of special study by a number of able scholars. It has been known for a generation or more that Sennacherib means "O Sin (the Moon-god), multiply brethren," or, "Sin has multiplied brethren," and that it is a name analogous to "Joseph." The "definitions" of Esarhaddon, Tiglath-pileser, Amraphel, etc. show the same deplorable ignorance of the results of the work of two generations of scholars in the field of Assyrian research. In like manner "Pharaoh" ("*Liber esse*—To be free; sun-king:—general name of Egyptian kings, Gen. 12:15") shows that Mr. Potts is equally ignorant of the labors of the Egyptologists in general and of the controversy which has raged over the question of the bearing of the use of this word in the Pentateuch upon the date and credibility of that document.

Mr. Potts not only gives us a definition or meaning of every proper name in the Bible. He frequently gives us more than one, yet without doing anything to help the reader to decide which of them is the more or the most probable, or even indicating that the meanings may be mutually exclusive. He defines "Babel" thus: "*Confusio*—Confusion; mingling; chaos; the gate of God:—a city in the plain of Shinar [BABYLON], Gen. 10:10." The readers for whom this book has been prepared can hardly be expected to know that the first three meanings (they apparently are but slight variations of the same idea) are all based upon the old and widely accepted view which found expression in the AV margin that in Gen. 11:9 we have an exact etymology of the name Babel; while the fourth gives the meaning of the name favored by Assyriological research. These two meanings are mutually exclusive. They cannot both be right. And they should not both be given without indicating this in some way. Briefly stated the facts are these. According to the cuneiform inscriptions Babel means "gate of God" (*bab ili*). There can be no question as to this. That the Babel of the cuneiform inscriptions is to be identified with the Babel of Gen. 11 cannot be demonstrated, but seems to be quite generally accepted. It is certainly possible. If this supposition be correct the following explanation will accord with all the facts. Gen. 11 speaks of a signal judgment upon a city called Babel. The city gate, as the most public place, was in the ancient Orient the place of judgment. We may, therefore, render vs. 9 as follows: "Therefore is the name of it called Babel (*bab ili*—gate of God) because the Lord did there confound (*balal*) the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the

face of all the earth." It seems plain that we have here a pun upon the similarity in sound between the words *Babel* and *balal* due to the association of ideas between the place (*bab*) where the judgment was pronounced by God (*ili. Heb. el*) and the nature of the judgment (*balal*, to confound) which was there pronounced. There are other examples of such puns in the Old Testament, the name Joseph for example. The old view that *Babel* meant "confusion" was always a doubtful one from the standpoint of etymology; and we may be glad that modern Assyriology has supplied us with a better one, an interpretation which is in full accord with the Old Testament narrative. But it is most unfortunate that Mr. Potts should give both meanings as if there were no choice between them and leave his readers to use either or both according to personal preference. One who attaches the significance to Bible names that he does should guard against such misuse. For it is difficult to see how anyone could help making egregious blunders in the use of this book unless he carefully tested each meaning offered him before making use of it.

It is deplorable that one who judging from the preface holds a high and reverent view of the Scriptures and might therefore be classed as a conservative, should prepare a book for the use of Bible students which is so hopelessly "medieval" in its scholarship as to lend color to the claim of the Critics that the Conservatives are ignorant and behind the times, have made no use of the results of modern research, and do not therefore deserve to be classed as scholars. Those who love the Bible and treasure it as the Word of God are for this very reason under the solemn obligation to see to it that their defense and interpretation are worthy of their estimate of it, lest their labor redound to its shame and not to its glory.

Princeton.

Oswald T. Allis.

Hebrew Life and Times. By HAROLD B. HUNTING. The Abingdon Press.
8vo., pp. 188. 1921.

This book is one of the "Abingdon Religious Education Texts" of which David G. Downey is the General Editor, and it belongs specifically to the "Week-Day School Series" edited by George Herbert Betts.

The aim of the writer is stated to be to reconstruct "the story of the Hebrew people as an account of Hebrew shepherds, farmers, and such like: what oppressions they endured; how they were delivered; and above all what ideals of righteousness and truth and mercy they cherished, and how they came to think and feel about God." The viewpoint is "critical." The dictionary of the Bible which is recommended to the reader is the one-volume *Hastings*; and Mr. Hunting writes with that confidence in the "assured results" which is characteristic of his school. Thus he tells us regarding the words "A Psalm of David" which are used so frequently in the titles of the Psalms, "These words, in the original Hebrew, mean 'dedicated to David'" (p. 141). The Christian Church has believed for centuries that the "of" (expressed in Hebrew by the *lamedh auctoris*) denotes authorship. It took over this belief

from the Jewish Church which held it on the authority of the "original Hebrew." All this is waved aside and ignored, as completely as if a "Davidic tradition" regarding the Psalms had never been. Yet the Higher Critic accuses the Conservative of dogmatism!

Princeton.

Oswald T. Allis.

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

The Religion and Theology of Paul. By W. MORGAN, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics in Queen's Theological College, Kingston, Canada. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1917. 8vo. pp. viii, 270.

The author of this work felt that a full and systematic treatment of the Pauline theology from the standpoint of the newer knowledge, was still a desideratum, and wrote the present volume to supply this lack. He treats successively of the Redeemer, His work in redemption, and the new life in salvation. The whole is preceded by a sketch of Paul's world-view. The apostle's outlook is said to be "at bottom that of Jewish Apocalyptic." As such it is characterized by a certain pessimism and by the transference of religious interest from the present to the future. The apostle departs from the Jewish scheme, however, when "anterior to the redemption of the last days of which alone Apocalyptic knows (he) introduces another redemption, which, indeed, is the decisive one." Moreover some of his characteristic categories of thought carry us outside of the circle of Apocalyptic and may, in certain instances, be traced to Hellenistic influence.

The writer points out that in Paul the living Christ overshadows the historical Jesus. It would almost seem as if the apostle cut loose from the historical basis of the Gospels; but appearances deceive. At the same time it is true that he has a very lofty conception of Jesus Christ. He regards him as the messianic Judge and Saviour and as a proper object of worship. He looks upon him as divine and yet subordinate to God, thus carefully guarding monotheism. He finds in Christ God's intermediary in both creation and redemption. In the incarnation Christ assumed human flesh, and though "as regards his inner being" he remained "divine and sinless," yet this flesh was "sinful flesh" (pp. 66, 67). It was only the assumption of sinful flesh that enabled him to condemn sin in the flesh.

Redemption according to Paul is, as the author sees it, threefold. First of all, it is deliverance from the dominion of the evil spirits. For us, he says, this is mythology, but in the apostle's day the dread of evil spirits was very real, and deliverance from them was a real redemption. Secondly, it is deliverance from the Law. Through His vicarious death Christ met the claims of the law and released us from its bondage. The law, we are told, does not come in consideration here as an abstract principle of justice, but as a historical institution. The death of Christ

was not necessary to make forgiveness possible, but simply to square the account of the old historical institution, and thus to prepare the way for the economy of grace in which no atonement is necessary (p. 89). Finally, it is redemption from the tyranny of sin. This, too, is effected by the death of Christ, by which He buys men out of the power of sin or inflicts on sin a mortal wound. The author regards Paul's way of looking at this as "realistic, one might say, mythological." In the doctrine of redemption everything turns on Christ's death and resurrection, a view that is in part due to the spiritual insight of the apostle, and in part to Hellenistic influences (p. 107).

The writer points out that Paul developed his doctrine of salvation through faith in opposition to the Judaizers. Faith establishes a personal and moral relation, and leads to a mystical union. Believers are in Christ. Here we touch upon Paul's mysticism. In explanation of this the author refers to the mysticism of the Mystery cults and of the Hermetic writings, to which as he sees it, Paul was largely indebted. He is quite willing to grant, however, that the apostle transformed it in large measure (p. 143). Paul also makes justification contingent on faith, but not in the sense that God imputes to believers the righteousness of Christ. His doctrine of justification is simply that God forgives sin, and that forgiveness cannot be earned, but only appropriated in faith. The author regards the doctrine of justification by faith with its corollate, the doctrine of redemption from the law, as distinctly Paul's own creation.

After discussing the apostle's conception of the moral renewal of believers, the spiritual gifts that were manifest among the early Christians, and the ethical requirements of the Christian life, he calls attention to Paul's view of the Church and of the Sacraments. Fundamentally, to Paul, the Church "is not the institution of salvation, but the sum of the saved" (p. 199). He does not describe it as "the Kingdom," but as "the body of Christ" (p. 202). The apostle evidently does not believe that the name of Jesus was used superstitiously as a spell in baptism, nor that the Spirit was communicated through this material means. He regards baptism primarily as a rite of regeneration: believers are buried with Christ in baptism and arise with him in newness of life. Yet it does not appear that he looks upon baptism as the effective agent in the production of this experience. The author sees no reason to doubt the Pauline tradition respecting the Lord's Supper, which is in substantial agreement with that of Mark; and finds that the apostle regards the Supper as a memorial of Christ's sacrificial death. There is no foundation, says he, for the present tendency "to read into Paul the crudest sacramentalism." The sacraments were not for him "the Christian mysteries, through which the Christian salvation is mediated."

The last three chapters of the work are devoted to the Consummation, Philosophy of History, and Paul and Jesus.

The book of Dr. Morgan is a well written and stimulating work. It is evidently based on a thorough study of the Epistles of Paul and the

related literature, and contains the judicious expression of a well-balanced mind. Extremes are carefully avoided. In tracing genetically the origin of the great Pauline ideas the author does not lose sight of the Old Testament. While he allows for the influence of Apocalyptic, he carefully avoids the extreme position of Schweitzer. And though he traces to Hellenism the Christ-cult, the name Kyrios as applied to Christ, the conception of Christ as Mediator of creation and redemption, the doctrine of a death and resurrection with Christ, and the idea of an indwelling God, he is very conservative in his statements and even claims that "Paul borrowed nothing that he did not transform" (p. 267).

But even so the book contains several statements that may well be challenged. For instance, it is confidently asserted that the book of Daniel was written during the Maccabean struggle (p. 10); that Paul expected the parousia during his lifetime (p. 14); that "flesh" in Paul is "the material living substance of the human body," (p. 16), in which Paul finds the spring and principle of sin (p. 17); that the worship of the historical Jesus could not have arisen on the soil of a strict monotheism (i.e. among the Jews) (p. 47); that the title Kyrios, as applied to Christ, was borrowed from the cult-gods of Hellenism (p. 49); that Paul safeguarded monotheism by insisting on Christ's subordination to the Father and never calling Him God (pp. 53, 54); that Christ assumed sinful flesh (pp. 66, 67); that Paul's belief in demons really belongs to the region of mythology (p. 72); that the apostle's words never imply that God could not forgive sin until a full propitiation had been provided, (p. 88); that "the hopeless inadequacy of the apostle's forensic and mythological categories is largely responsible for the embarrassed character of his argument in Rom. 6," (p. 105); that "Paul never speaks of God as imputing to the believer the righteousness of Christ" (p. 149) etc.

In some instances Dr. Morgan shows himself too ready to discredit the explicit statements of Scripture. Little weight is attached to the book of Acts (p. 51); and the "rabbinical proof of the Law's merely provisional character, drawn from the fact that in its promulgation it was posterior to the promise of grace given to Abraham" (Gal. 3:15), is brushed aside as unimportant (p. 82). He finds that in some parts of Rom. 9-11 the sovereignty of God is maintained at the expense of His moral attributes, but warns against taking them too seriously, for "side by side with them we find others, which show that the Apostle has been carried by his logic and his polemic farther than his conscience dares follow" (pp. 248, 249).

The greatest objection, however, to the work is that the author, notwithstanding his careful discrimination and his generally conservative conclusions, allows himself to be controlled by the religious-historical method to such a degree that he leaves little room for the operation of the divine factor. The attempt to explain the origin of the teachings of Paul in a perfectly natural manner results in crowding out the supernatural. The author is perfectly frank in admitting this, when he says: "An historical treatment of the Pauline constructions does not

prejudice the question of their validity. But one thing it does; it puts us in a position of freedom with regard to them. It is no longer possible to look upon them as truths supernaturally communicated, the proper attitude to which is one of unquestioning submission. It is no longer possible to treat them as the ultimate data of our faith. . . As a theological system Paulinism, notwithstanding its wealth of pregnant thoughts, belongs to a past that cannot be revived. Its Jewish and Hellenistic categories are not ours, cannot really be appropriated by us" (pp. 268, 269).

Any method that necessarily results in such a conception of the Bible, is of extremely doubtful value, and cannot be the method of those who take their stand squarely on the Bible as God's supernatural revelation. It endangers not only the supernatural character of that revelation, but also the finality of the Christian religion.

Grand Rapids, Mich.

L. BERKHOF.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Preaching in London, A Diary of Anglo-American Friendship. By JOSEPH FORT NEWTON, LITT.D., D.D. Geo. H. Doran Co. 1922. pp. 140. \$1.50 net.

Dr. Newton is a writer of rare charm. His style has a precision, a warmth, a color, which are delightful. In this volume he appears at his best. The contrast drawn between English and American modes of thought and life is full of interest. "In intellectual average and moral passion there is little difference between English and American preachers, but the emphasis is different. The English preacher seeks to educate and edify his people in the fundamentals of their faith and duty; the American preacher is more intent upon the application of religion to the affairs of the moment . . . It has been said that the distinctive note of the American pulpit is vitality; of the English pulpit, serenity (p. 52). He asserts that "there is more freedom of thought in England than in America. Liberty, in fact, means a different thing in England from what it does with us. In England it signifies the right to think, feel, and act differently from other people; with us it is the right to develop according to a standardized attitude of thought and conduct . . . We think in a kind of lockstep movement . . . An average American knows ten times as many people as an average Englishman, and talks ten times as much. We are gregarious; we gossip; and because everyone knows the affairs of everyone else, we are afraid of one another" (p.55).

Of special interest are the character sketches drawn by the hand of a master. Whether we agree with them or not, we cannot fail to admire the skillful and brilliant treatment of the subject. Lloyd George appears again and again upon the scene. On one occasion when he addressed an audience unsympathetic, if not hostile, in ten minutes he had them "standing and throwing up their hats." "It was pure magic. I felt the force of it. But after it was over and I had time to think it through, I found

that he had said almost nothing. . . . Like Roosevelt, he knows how to dramatise what he does, making himself the hero of the story; and it is so skillfully done that few see that the hero is also the showman" (p. 85). He is declared to be "merely an opportunist, without any principles of policy—except to retain power—feeling his way to get all he can" (p. 110). And finally, "for Mr. Lloyd George personally I have the greatest admiration alike for his character and his genius. . . . Recently he has seemed to return to his true character" (p. 132). Here is a vivid picture of the inconsistencies of a many-sided character, which have often troubled his friends and furnished weapons to his enemies. Of Bernard Shaw he says, "he is physically finicky, almost oldmaidish, not only shy and embarrassed off the platform, but awkward and blushing like a schoolgirl. When you meet him he is quietly modest, full of quick wisdom, generous, but suggesting lavender, and China tea served in dainty old-world cups. The most garrulous man in Europe before the war, he was smitten dumb by the insanity of it . . . Who can describe the fineness, the fatuousness, the futility of him!" (p. 93). Chesterton "is a prophet of normal human nature, his uproarious faith in God is a tonic in days like these. If Dickens was the greatest American ever born in England, Chesterton is the best thing England has given us since Dickens. One loves him for his strength, his sanity, his divine joyousness." Of H. G. Wells he says, "Just now he is all aglow with his discovery of God, 'the happy God of the heart,' to use his words. He looked surprised when I suggested that he had found what the Bible meant by the Holy Spirit. . . . What if this interesting man—whose genius is like a magic mirror reflecting what is in the minds of men before they are aware of it themselves—so long a member of the Sect of Seekers, should join the Fellowship of the Finders" (p. 57). Chesterton's remark is worth quoting here: "The Christ of Wells is tidy; the real Christ is titanic" (p. 79).

This is a striking characterization of Forsyth: "I have read everything that Dr. Forsyth has written about the Cross, and yet I have no idea what he means by it. As was said of Newman, his single sentences are lucid, often luminous . . . but the total result is a fog . . . Just when one expects Dr. Forsyth to extricate his thought, he loses himself in the mystic void of Evangelical emotion" (p. 55). Dr. John Hutton of Glasgow is pronounced "the greatest preacher in Britain" (p. 80). Of Dr. Jowett he writes: "one enjoys his musical voice, his exquisite elocution, his mastery of the art of illustration, and his fastidious style; but the substance of his sermons is incredibly thin . . . His method is to take a single idea—large or small—and turn it over and over, like a gem . . . on the ground that one idea is all that the average audience is equal to . . . His forte is personal religious experience of a mild evangelical type . . . But for the typical man of modern mind . . . Dr. Jowett has no message. However, we must not expect everything from any one servant of God, and the painter is needed as well as the prophet" (p. 95). He heard Sir Oliver Lodge lecture for more than an hour on the structure of the Atom, and he held his audience in breathless interest. "As

a work of art, the lecture was a rare treat. If only the man of the pulpit could deal with the great themes of faith . . . with the same simplicity and lucidity, how different it would be" (p. 136). Mrs. Asquith "is lightning and fragrance all mixed up with a smile, and the lightning never strikes twice in the same place" (p. 137).

Words of high appreciation are spoken of President Wilson. "Whatever his faults at home—his errors of judgment or his limitations of temperament—in his world-vision he saw straight; and he made the only proposal looking forward to a common mind organized in the service of the common good . . . If our people at home had only known the sinister agencies with which he had to contend—how all the militarists of Europe were mobilized against him at Paris—they would see that his achievement, while falling below his ideal, as all mortal achievements do, was nothing short of stupendous" (p. 137). Under date of Nov. 24 1918, he writes, in view of the prevailing spirit of the time, "Two things are as plain as if they were written on the wall. First, the President is defeated before he sails; and second, if the war is won, the peace is lost" (p. 110).

For three and a half years Dr. Newton served as pastor of City Temple Church, and in the light of his experience he declares that the minister of that congregation "needs not only the faith of a saint and the patience of Job, but the skin of a rhinoceros" (p. 40 note). His own ministry there he describes as "a triumph from the beginning" (p. 139).

The review might be extended indefinitely, for every page of the book provokes quotation.

The greatest of all war books is said to be the *Dynast* of Thomas Hardy, which depicts the struggles and sufferings of the Era of Napoleon. We may fitly close with the message of the last sermon of Dr. Newton in the City Temple: "When humanity sees what has been the Eternal Purpose from the beginning, and the far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves; the last word of history will be a grand Amen, a shout of praise, the final note of the great world-song" (p. 138).

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Ten Lessons in Personal Evangelism. By REV. JOSEPH P. HICKS, A.M.
With a foreword by Rev. Mark A. Matthews, D.D., LL.D. George
H. Doran Co. 1922. pp. 89.

The lessons are simple, even elementary, in substance, and the style is rather crude. But many good suggestions are made, and they are supported by copious citation of Scripture. The book may be used with profit in training classes for personal work in leading others to Christ. It is by no means invariably true that "Personal work is not difficult. It is easy" (p. 28). Many will testify from their own experience that it is often hard. What is there well worth doing that is always easy?

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Simple Gospel. By REV. H. S. BREWSTER. Macmillan Co. 1922.
pp. viii, 200.

The Simple Gospel here set forth is not the Gospel of redeeming grace but the Gospel of social progress, drawn from the Sermon on the Mount. The industrial and political conditions of our modern civilization are vigorously, even vehemently, attacked, and much that is said regarding them is shamefully true. A great deal may be said to justify the author's contention that "the most characteristic modern law has as a basic principle the supremacy of property over manhood" (p. 18). He illustrates the point by citing three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: "The Dred Scott decision in favor of chattel slavery, the decision against the Income Tax, and the one against the Federal Child Labor Law" (pp. 17, 18). The world is still far from the democracy of the Kingdom of God.

Jesus' doctrine of non-resistance is literally interpreted and rigorously applied to nations and to men. His teaching is placed in sharp contrast with what is termed the typical American point of view as set forth by President Roosevelt.

The book is decidedly interesting as the work of a man of strong convictions and earnest and devout spirit. Christ is presented as the only hope of the world. One of the chief defects of the volume is that it deals only with the social aspects of the Gospel, and gives little attention to the personal relation of men to Christ. Indeed the care of the individual soul is distinctly deprecated. "It is said that Charles Kingsley, on being asked by a narrow Evangelical if his soul were saved, replied that he had forgotten that he had a soul; he was so lost in a great cause that little cares had disappeared naturally; and that is the condition which Jesus urges upon his followers" (p. 138). To reckon personal salvation among the little cares of life is far removed from the teaching of Jesus.

Another defect is the one-sided representation of the conditions of modern life. There is much that is evil, repugnant to the teaching of our Lord. But the picture is not all dark, and there should be a larger and more generous recognition of the progress that has been made in various directions. It is difficult to follow the author in the assertion that "the history of England, for example, is dominated by religious motives" (109). That religious motives have played a large part in English history, as in modern history generally, is true; that they "dominate" is by no means clear.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The Ministry as a Life Work. By REV. ROBERT LEE WEBB, S.T.M. Corresponding Secretary, The Northern Baptist Education Society. Macmillan Co. 1922. pp. 96.

The book is well written and interesting, reverent in spirit and judicious in counsel. The course of thought is indicated by the titles of the chapters: The Problem of the Ministry; the Discouragement to the Ministry; the Call to the Ministry; the Candidate for the Ministry; The Training for the Ministry; The Opportunity for the Ministry; The

Attractions of the Ministry; the Rewards of the Ministry; The Permanency of the Ministry. Little that is fresh or striking could be expected on such well worn themes, and there is nothing here that has not often been said before. But it is of advantage to the church to have attention called to familiar truths which are highly important but are easily forgotten.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Biederwolf's Evangelistic Sermons. By WILLIAM EDWARD BIEDERWOLF.
Glad Tidings Publishing Co.

The Sermons deal with the great doctrines of The Deity of Christ; The Incarnation of Christ; The Atonement of Christ; The Resurrection of Christ; The Second Coming of Christ; Repentance; Belief; New Birth; Confession; The Unpardonable Sin; Hell, Heaven. The truth is presented with clearness, fervor, and power. The sermons are argumentative in form, and the reasoning is usually sound and convincing. The style is unnecessarily coarse at times, and the preacher seems to go out of his way, in search of expressions which jar or shock the reader. If they were effective in speaking, they are offensive on the printed page.

The volume like every other has its weaknesses. The argument for the Virgin Birth is not convincing at all points. It cannot be said that Jesus could not have been born without sin in the ordinary course of generation. That Jesus entered into human life by the conception of the Spirit in the womb of the Virgin Mary is clearly attested and must be firmly held, but to affirm that this was the only possible way is to go beyond what it is written. It is enough that it was God's chosen way, and therefore the best way. The Letter of Publius Lentulus describing the appearance of Christ is cited side by side with Tacitus, as if it were of equal historical value (p. 56). It is interesting to read that "the death warrant of Jesus was found by the French army written on a brass plate," but we are not told when or where (p. 56).

The premillennial view of the return of Christ is maintained in the usual manner. We read that "if any believe and are saved after He comes, they'll never belong to the Bride of Christ or be a member of this glorious household in the sense that you will if you accept Him now. The one who accepts Him now will be one of the most favored beings in the universe of God" (p. 99). For this no Scripture warrant is given or can be given. The notion of an inner circle of this kind is foreign to all New Testament teaching. There are differences hereafter as here, but they are based upon character and service, and are not chronological but personal. The argument for the premillennial view drawn from the slow progress of the church in the world is not convincing. Why may there not be at any time an outpouring of the Spirit under the present dispensation which shall accomplish the work of centuries in a year? The statement that the premillennial view is held by nearly all missionaries and evangelists, the vast majority of church leaders, and the majority of expositors and commentators, will not of course go unchallenged. It should not be taught that baptism is necessary to sal-

vation (p. 187). The figures given on p. 101 and on p. 103 regarding the proportion of those who come to Christ in middle life do not agree.

It may be said in general that the truth might be more effective if it were presented in a more winning and persuasive manner. The controversial and polemic spirit prevails throughout, and the gentler tones of the Gospel are too seldom heard.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The House God Meant. By GEORGE M. LUCCOCK, Pastor of the College Church, Wooster, Ohio. The Westminster Press. 1922. pp. 205. \$1.25 net.

The thought and sentiment of the book are admirable, and are presented in an attractive style. The teaching regarding the home is thoroughly Scriptural, and the counsel given is therefore sound and sensible. Illustrations are drawn largely from actual experience, and are frequent, illuminating and impressive. No better book could be placed in the hands of those who are about to set out on the great adventure of making for themselves a home.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

Homiletics, or The Theory of Preaching. By JOSEPH GOWAN, author of *Preaching and Preachers*, *The Conscience*, etc. London: Elliot Stock. 1922. pp. xii, 407.

The volume is concerned almost exclusively with what we may call the mechanics of preaching, rules and methods, while the themes and the inspiring motives receive scant attention. Christ and Jesus and the Holy Spirit do not appear in the comprehensive index, covering more than fourteen pages, and are rarely named in the text. The method is treated at length, but the message which is the heart and soul of preaching hardly finds a place. Fourteen pages are given to the Moral and Spiritual Preparation for Preaching, while seventy-three are given to Reading, seventy-seven to Originality and Plagiarism, and one hundred thirty-six, over one third of the volume, to illustrations. Subjects appear to be treated in the reverse order of their importance. The discussion is at times drawn out to wearisome detail, with frequent repetition of thought and superfluity of examples and illustrations. Such important topics as the different kinds of sermons and expository preaching are neglected. Much excellent advice is given, but little that is new or striking.

It is by no means certain, as the author assures us, that "When Moody and Spurgeon are forgotten, Beecher and Bourdaloue will still be read and admired" (p. 19). In the list of books essential to the preacher on pages 27 and 30 the most important of all, the Concordance, is omitted. Judicious counsel is given regarding the use of sermon skeletons and homiletic helps. The book that undertakes to do the minister's work for him should be avoided. Twenty-five pages are taken up with various methods of "collecting materials for future use" (105-129). Just judgment is pronounced upon prevalent forms of church advertising, and

two illustrations are given: "How a man sinned by having his hair cut"; "How to stop a mad bull" (p. 157); Milton is far too lightly esteemed (p. 332).

The author informs us in the preface that most of his book on Preaching and Preachers is reproduced in this book; otherwise we might hope that the earlier volume treated of the substance, as this volume treats of the manner of preaching.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

The House of the Lord's Prayer. By AMOS R. WELLS, LITT.D., LL.D., Philadelphia. The Presbyterian Press. Paper, 12mo. pp. 70. Price 40c postpaid.

In this exposition of the Lord's Prayer the writer forms the mental picture of a house and imagines himself passing from room to room as he reviews the successive clauses of the prayer. He finds the entrance in the phrase "Our Father who art in heaven." He designates as the fireplace the phrase "hallowed be thy name." The windows are pictured by the petition "thy kingdom come," and the remaining petitions of the prayer are designated as the living room, the dining room, the bed-room, and the kitchen and the library.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

When God and Man Meet. By REV. WILLIAM J. YOUNG, D.D., Professor of Missions at Emory University. New York: George H. Doran Company. Cloth, 12mo. pp. 275. Price \$1.50 net.

These are the MacDowell Lectures for 1921, delivered before the Scarritt Bible and Training School, Kansas City. They constitute an earnest endeavor to discuss helpfully one of the most common of Christian exercises, at the same time one of the most mysterious human experiences, namely, the worship of God. The lecturer deals with none of the psychological or metaphysical aspects of the subject. His treatment is simple and popular, with a tendency to be discursive, even prolix. However, the discussion can not fail to remind one of the need of effort in case one would "practice the presence of God," nor can it fail to stimulate one to seek in private and in public to receive the spiritual benefits which accrue from hours of sincere worship.

The search for God is defined as being "the supreme quest of the soul," and the time of worship is therefore set forth in the sub-title of this book as being "*The Supreme Hour of the Supreme Quest of the Soul.*"

The first lecture accordingly deals with "The Quest and the Hour." The second lecture describes "The Mutual Surrender" involved in worship, the "surrender of God to us" and the "surrender of ourselves to God."

Chapter three deals with "The Hindrances to Worship" which are set forth in an expansion of the phrases from Saint John, "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life." The fourth lecture intimates that the habit of worshipping God everywhere and of seeing

Him in all His works of nature and of providence must be cultivated, but that, at the same time, true worship will be stimulated by the observance of "The Appointed Hours and The Appointed Places."

"The Joys of Worship" are set forth in the fifth lecture; and, in the last, the discussion is brought to a practical climax by the consideration of the truth that real worship of God will stimulate one to the service of man, and thus the lecturer treats "The Call to Special Service in the Hours of Worship."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

How to Make the Church Go. By WILLIAM H. LEACH. New York: George H. Doran Company. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 128. Price \$1.50 net.

This is a handbook of methods of work in a modern church. It deals with the executive side of the task of the minister. The author insists that he does not seek to invent new work but to set forth principles which will secure success for the minister as an executive. As the writer indicates in his sub-title, he has prepared "a desk manual for the every day use of the modern minister executive." He approaches the subject from the psychological and practical point of view. He deals with "the forces which move men," such as self-interest, the desire of recognition, love of ceremony, comradeship, the constraining love of Christ, etc. He describes a properly equipped church office. He indicates the proper relations between the minister and his official boards. He discusses the organization of committees. He indicates the necessity of having a definite working program for each year. He shows how to properly conduct a financial campaign and indicates methods of church advertising and of securing the best volunteer help. The treatment is brief but will be of interest to the modern pastor.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Churches Allied for Common Tasks. Report of the Third Quadrrennium of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1916-1920. Board. Crown 8vo. pp. 49.

Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Annual Report for 1921. Paper. Crown 8vo. pp. 264.

These reports edited by Samuel McCrea Cavert contain a complete compendium of all the work which has been accomplished by the Federal Council during the years indicated. They show the significant place which the Council has held in the church life of America.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

That Ye May Believe. By DAVID KEPPEL. New York: Methodist Book Concern. Cloth. 16mo. pp. 86. Price 60 cents net.

In this little booklet the writer gives a brief but reverent glance at the successive chapters of the Fourth Gospel, and points out some testimony which each one bears to the divine person of Christ, and thus shows how, in this respect, the author of the Gospel was accomplishing the purpose which he clearly sets forth in the statement: "These things

are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life through his name."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Jesus and What He Said. By the REV. ARTHUR S. BURROWS. Boston.

The Pilgrim Press. Cloth. Pp. 92. Gilt side title and shelf back.

Price \$2.00 postpaid.

This is not a commentary nor an exposition nor a life of Christ, but, as the sub-title indicates, "a new Bible analysis." It consists solely of an arrangement of Bible texts and references. In the first part of the book on each page in a central column the writer places the texts referring to the life of Jesus and in parallel columns, on one side the references to Old Testament illustrations or predictions, and on the other side illustrative quotations from the writings of the Apostles.

In the second part of the book the writer follows the same method in dealing with the words or teachings of our Lord.

The third part of the book consists of a "Doctrinal and General Index" which refers to all the various subjects outlined in the previous parts of the book. This is a work which indicates great patience, careful research and a desire to help all who love the study of the Bible.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New York, October: LATTA GRISWOLD, The House of Baal; THOMAS P. PROUT, A Little Journey into Practical Psychology; FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, Low Churchmanship; GILBERT PEMBER, Miracle and Law; FLEMING JAMES, Use of God as Saviour. *The Same*, November: THOMAS J. HARDY, A Barren and Dry Land; This Church: An Appeal; A. PARKER CURTISS, The Religion of St. Benedict; WILLIAM C. SEITZ, Are the Saints in Heaven?; Proper Disposal of the Christian Dead. *The Same*, December: J. G. H. BARRY, Giovanni Papini—the Story of Christ; FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, The Creeds and Kant; CECIL ROBERTS, Mgr. Barnes on Anglican Orders; HAMILTON SCHUYLER, Other Sheep not of this Fold; FLEMING JAMES, Four Uses of God by Men of the Bible.

Anglican Theological Review, New York, October: R. M. WENLEY, Friedrich von Hügel; S. A. B. MERCER, Merneptah's Israel and the Exodus; A. HAIRE FOSTER, Pronunciation of Greek in New Testament Times; B. S. EASTON, Critical Note—Matthew 16: 17-19.

Biblical Review, New York, October: MILES H. KRUMBINE, What the Church has a Right to Expect from Youth; ADOLF DEISSMANN, Treasures in Earthen Vessels; GEERHARDUS Vos, The Name "Lord" as used of Jesus in the Gospel; JOHN H. RAVEN, Job's Messianic Hope; ANDREW GILLIES, The Mystic in a Social Age; T. BRUCE BIRCH, Informing and Reforming.

Bibliotheca Sacra, St. Louis, October: W. F. ALBRIGHT, Archaeo-

logical Discovery in the Holy Land; WILLIAM EWING, The Samaritans and their Sacred Law; DAVID L. HOLBROOK, Point of View in the First Chapter of Genesis; G. B. MCCREARY, The Intuitional Apologetic—Faith's Defence from her own Citadel; JAMES L. KELSO, Key Cities of Paul's Missionary Program.

Church Quarterly Review, London, October: ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, The Christian Belief in God; NICHOLAS N. GLUBOKOVSKY, Union, Intercommunion and the Lambeth Conference; R. DEBARY, The Philosophy of Power Redemptive in Christian Worship; F. HAROLD SMITH, Trinities of Non-Christian Religions; G. H. BOX, Judaism and Hellenism; F. T. WOODS, The Catholicism of the Future; C. C. J. WEBB, Mr. Bosanquet on Contemporary Philosophy; A. CALDECOTT, A New Inquiry into the Belief in God and Immortality.

East & West, London, October: F. W. C. KENNEDY, Immigration—a Canadian Problem; E. F. BROWN, Pandita Ramabai; E. H. WHITLEY, Chota Nagpur: a Retrospect and Prospect; R. P. WILDER, Where East Meets West; C. C. WATTS, Coloured Races in South Africa; W. C. B. PURSER, A Mission to the Blind of Burma; A. J. C. ALLEN, Jesuit Missions.

Expositor, London, October: J. M. CREED, Some recent Tendencies in the Criticism of the Gospels; RENDEL HARRIS, Artificial Variants in the Text of the New Testament; EDITH A. ROBERTSON AND J. A. ROBERTSON, The Baptism of Christ; JAMES R. CAMERON, "Some Notes on the Development of Jesus"; J. H. LECKIE, The Ferguson Heresy Case: a page in Scottish Church History; W. A. CRAIGIE, Beginning of St. Mark's Gospel; A. E. BAKER, The Parables and the Johannine Problem. *The Same*, November: G. H. BOX, Jewish Apocalyptic in the Apostolic Age; A. T. ROBERTSON, A New Turn in the Johannine Criticism; B. W. BACON, Wrath "unto the Uttermost"; A. FAWKES, Antonio Fogazzaro; JAMES R. CAMERON, Some Notes on the Development of Jesus. *The Same*, December: HENRY J. CADBURY, The Knowledge Claimed in Luke's Preface; ADOLF DEISSMANN, Letter of Zoilos; EDITH A. ROBERTSON AND J. A. ROBERTSON, Jesus' Preaching in Capernaum; G. H. BOX, Jewish Apocalyptic in the Apostolic Age; HUNTER SMITH, The Universal Christ and the Brotherhood of Man; H. J. FLOWERS, Healing of the Centurion's Servant.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: Notes of Recent Exposition; C. J. CADOUX, The Early Christian Church in Egypt; S. TONKIN, The Psychology of the Twelve. *The Same*, October: Notes on Recent Exposition; A. E. GARVIE, The Nature of Redemption; ARTHUR J. GOSSE, A Communion Meditation; J. G. TASKER, Theology and Religion; W. D. NIVEN, The New Strasbourg; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Wobbermin; A. T. CLAY, The Early Amorite King Humbaba. *The Same*, November: Notes of Recent Exposition; WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, George Adam Smith; J. VERNON BARTLET, The Epistle to the Hebrews Once More; A. E. GARVIE, The Nature of Redemption; A. H. SAYCE, A Hebrew Deluge Story in the Cuneiform.

Homiletic Review, New York, November: WORTH M. TIPPY, A Modern Southern Church Establishment; C. A. BECKWITH, Christ and Christianity Creative; ALEXANDER R. GORDON, The Preacher and the Old Testament; WILLIAM J. MAY, Looking from the Pulpit; JOHN H. WILLETT, For the Benefit of my Creditors; W. M. CLOW, The Gateway to Industrial Peace. *The Same*, December: C. H. RANCK, Recent Fiction Touching Bible Lands and Times; H. F. COPE, Will Children Read the Bible?; A. E. BAILEY, Historic Relationship of Art to Christianity; F. SMITH, The Renunciatory Element in Self-realization in the Non-Synoptic Gospel; F. H. VIZETELLY, Charms of English Speech.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, October: S. RADHAKRISHNAN, The Hindu Dharma; R. KINGSDOWN PEMBERTON, Commensurability of Values; RUPERT C. LODGE, Genesis of the Moral Judgment in Plato; C. F. TAEUSCH, Sanctioning International Peace; O. FRED BOUCKE, Relation of Ethics to Social Service; CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON, Hamlet.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: AUG. BLAUDAU, The "Comma Johanneum" in the Writings of the English Critics of the Eighteenth Century; EDWARD J. KISSANE, Mission of Esdras; F. E. O'HANLON, Identity of the Risen Body; W. H. GRATTON FLOOD, Some New Light on Pope Benedict IX.

Journal of Negro History, Washington, October: HERBERT B. ALEXANDER, Brazilian and the United States Slavery Compared; GEORGE W. BROWN, Origins of Abolition in Santo Domingo; FRED LANDON, Canadian Negroes and the Rebellion of 1837; MILES M. FISHER, Lott Cary, the Colonizing Missionary.

Journal of Religion, Chicago, September: EUGENE W. LYMAN, Rationality of Belief in the Reality of God; KENNETH SAUNDERS, Passing of Paternalism in Missions; HARRY F. WARD, Social Science and Religion; SAMUEL G. INMAN, Religious Approach to the Latin-American Mind; CARL S. PATTON, Did Jesus Call Himself the Son of Man?; A. M. SANFORD, Theological Doctrines and Social Progress. *The Same*, December: A. S. WOODBURNE, Can India's Caste System Survive in Modern Life?; C. W. EMMET, The Modernist Movement in the Church of England; A. EUSTACE HAYDON, From Comparative Religion to History of Religions; ABRAHAM CRONBACH, Psychoanalysis and Religion; C. F. MACLENNAN, Religion and Anthropology; WILLIAM H. LEACH, Weakness of Protestantism in American Cities; GERALD B. SMITH, Spirit of Evangelical Christianity.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, October: J. CHAPMAN, St. Jerome and the Vulgate New Testament; J. H. MICHAEL, Text and Context of St. John 10:29; ST. J. D. SEYMOUR, Irish Versions of the Vision of St. Paul; H. N. BATE, Some Technical Terms of Greek Exegesis; C. H. TURNER, On the Punctuation of St. John 7:37-38; C. H. TURNER, On MS veron. LI (49) of the Works of Maxim(in)us.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: SYDNEY CAVE, Finality of the Christian Religion; COULSON KERNAHAN, John Masefield's Poems;

H. CRAWFORD WALTERS, *The Problem of Buddhism*; FRANK BALLARD, *The Truth concerning Occult Phenomena*, with a reply by Judge Bodkin; A. M. CHIRGWIN, *Birth of a Race*; T. H. S. ESCOTT, James Viscount Bryce.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: PRESERVED SMITH, *Unpublished Letters of the Reformers*; HENRY OFFERMANN, *Luther's German Bible*; J. C. F. RUPP, *Rule of Authority in Religious Thought*; KUND HEIBERG, *Nerayan Vaman Tilak*.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, October: REES E. TULLOSS, *Aims in a College Education*; L. B. WOLF, *The Hindu Saint*; JOHN A. FAULKNER, *Four German Protestant Mystics*; J. KENT RIZER, *Erasmus and Luther*; J. F. SPRINGER, *The Misplacement in Hosea*; HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, *A Hebrew Deluge Story*.

Methodist Quarterly Review, Nashville, October: WILBUR F. TILLETT, *Hand of God in American History*; A. H. GODBEY, *Shylock in the Old Testament*; JAMES F. JENNESS, *Will the Church Secure a New Grip on Vital Truths?*; JOHN C. MONTGOMERY, *Shall We be Pessimists?*; E. W. ALDERSON, *Is there a Galatian Problem?*; S. A. STEEL, *Athens*; DAVID M. KEY, *Omar, The Fugitive Moment, and Americanitis*.

Moslem World, New York, October: SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, *Where the Stones Cry Out*; DWIGHT M. DONALDSON, *Modern Persian and Afghan Thinking*; I. LILIAS TROTTER, *Superstitions in Algeria*; DALTON GALLOWAY, *The Resurrection and the Judgment in the Koran*; R. W. CALDWELL, *Chart of Arabic Literature*; S. A. MORRISON, *A New Approach to the Moslem Student*; HENRY RUSILLON, *Islam in Madagascar*; W. H. T. GAIRDNER, *The Study of Islamics*; J. ROBERTSON BUCHANAN, *Moslem Education in Syria*.

New Church Life, Lancaster, October: W. E. BRICKMAN, *Our Sunday School*; W. L. GLADISH, *Knowing God*; ALFRED ACTON, *Two New Writings by Swedenborg*. *The Same*, November: ERNEST DELTENRE, *The Word of Divine Revelation*; GEORGE DE CHARMS, *Need for New Church Education*; W. H. ALDEN, *Sadhu Sundar Singh*. *The Same*, December: R. J. TILSON, *The Word of the Old Testament*; ALBERT BJÖRCK, *The Word of the Writings*; GUSTAF BAECKSTRÖM, *The Time of Death*.

Open Court, Chicago, September: ROY P. LINGLE, *Petra*; DUDLEY WRIGHT, *Islamic Influences on Jesuit Origins*; SANFORD A. MOSS, *Evolution of Social Qualities*; HERMAN JACOBSOHN, *The Challenge of Asia*; JULIUS J. PRICE, *How the Rabbis Regarded the Commandments*. *The Same*, October: VICTOR S. YARROS, *Social Ideals and Human Nature*; CATHERINE B. ELY, *Whitman and the Radicals*; ROLAND HUGINS, *The new Literature of Approach*; T. SWANN HARDING, *Limitations of the Religious Concept*; WILLIAM WEBER, *Two Answers to the Challenge of Jesus*. *The Same*, November: C. O. WEBB, *Common Ground of Liberalism and Fundamentalism*; J. O. LEATH, *Jesus' Concept of Himself and of His Mission on Earth*; HARDIN T. McCLELLAND, *Romanticism and Government*; WILLIAM WEBER, *Two Answers to the Challenge of Jesus*.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: ELMER L. COBLENZ, A Theology for the Social Gospel; EDWARD C. MOORE, College Studies Preparatory to the Seminary Course; A. W. KRAMPE, Our German Work in the Reformed Church in the United States; HAROLD B. KERCHNER, The Institutional Church and the City Problem; HENRY K. MILLER, Why Become a Foreign Missionary?; D. WEBSTER LOUCKS, Guides and Guards for the Ministry's Maintenance.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: EDWARD B. POLLARD, Science and Salvation; JAMES DUNLOP, A Study in Preaching; J. A. FAULKNER, Were the Early Christians Mystics?; OSCAR L. JOSEPH, Modern India and Rabindranath Tagore; WILLIAM W. EVERETT, Philosophy with no Hope in the World; W. A. JARREL, Imprecatory Psalms.

Southern Journal of Theology, Seminary Hill, October: W. T. CONNER, Eddyism versus Christianity; H. E. DANA, Influence of the Baptists upon the Modern Conception of the Church; W. E. DENHAM, Lectures on Genesis—God's New Plan for Human Redemption; B. A. COMPASS, Relation of Culture to Effective Service; R. T. BRYAN, Some Things Accomplished in China; B. H. CARROLL, Our Articles of Faith—Grace in Regeneration; N. R. DRUMMOND, An Adequate Educational Program.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, October: T. C. JOHNSON, A Prince and a Great Man; T. P. HARRISON, Recent Tendencies in Literature; J. G. VENABLE, God's Call to the Church; FRAZER HOOD, Psychology and its Value to the Preacher; B. R. LACY, An Introduction to Paul's Spoken Messages; P. H. HILL, A Working Program for a Worth-While Church.

Yale Review, New Haven, October: FREDERICK J. TURNER, Sections and Nations; R. C. LEFFINGWELL, War Debts; ZONA GALE, The Novel and the Spirit; EMMA PONAFIDINE, The Famine and the Bolsheviks; HENRY VAN DYKE, The Fringe of Words; FRANCIS E. CLARKE, The Menace of the Sermon; DAVID S. SMITH, Modern Music—a Suggestion; FREDERICK E. PIERCE, The Destructibility of Literary Genius; PAUL L. WHITE, American Manners in 1830; ALEXANDER PETRUNKEVITCH, Wasteful Nature.

Biblische Zeitschrift, Freiburg i. B., xvi: ½: J. GOETTSBERGER, Die Hülle des Moses nach Ex 34 and 2 Kor 3; JOSEPH SLABY, Gn 41, 41-42 und die altägyptischen Denkmäler; P. S. LANDERSDORFER, Eine sumerische Parallele zu Psalm 2; HERMANN DIECKMANN, Das fünfzehnte Jahr des Tiberius; HEINRICH J. VOELS, Der Apostelkatalog bei Markus in der altlateinischen Übersetzung; ALFONS SCHULZ, Das Wunder zu Kana in Lichte des Alten Testaments; ERASMUS O. NAGL, Die Gliederung des ersten Johannesbriefes.

Bilychnis, Roma, Settembre: G. RENSI, Incompresibilità e religione; M. ROSSI, Per il culto nel giorno del Signore; B. VIGNA DEL FERRO, Pensieri di G. Mazzini sull'immortalità dell'anima. *The Same*, Ottobre: A. NAPPI-MODONA, Un frammento della "Didache" in un papiro d'Ossirinco; La vita odierna della Chiesa ortodossa russa; G. E. MEILLE, Per

vedere Iddio. *The Same*, Novembre: A. NEPPI-MODONA, Il "pastore d'Erma" in un recente papiro d'Ossirinco; G. PIOLI, Un riformatore cattolico; G. COSTA, Pipistrelli o pilastri?

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse, Mai-Juin: PIERRE J. MONBRUN, La Lutte "philosophique" en province; E. LEVESQUE, Fénelon et les candidats à l'épiscopat; LOUIS DE LACGER, La règle mitigée de Citeaux au XIIe siècle; F. CAVALLERA, Les pseudépigraphes et l'ancienne littérature chrétienne.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Septiembre-Octubre: FRANCISCO MARÍN-SOLA, La canonización de los Santos y la fe divina; MATÍAS GARCÍA, Fray Diego de Deza, campéon de la doctrina de Santo Tomás; P. LUMBRERAS, El mérito teológico y sus divisiones; VENANCIO D. CARRO, De Teología historica. *The Same*, Noviembre-diciembre: LUIS G. ALONSO-GETINO, Fundó Santo Domingo el Rosario; JACOBUS M. RAMÍREZ, De ipsa philosophia in universam secundum doctrinam aristotelico-thomisticam (con.); JOSÉ M. AGUADO, Obras de Santa Teresa; V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Crónica del movimiento tomista.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Aalten, September: S. GREIJ-DANUS, Onmisbaarheid van God en Zijne Hulp; P. VAN DIJK, Het gekrookte riet en de roonkende vlaswiek. *The Same*, October: J. RIDDERBOS, Jesaja en de zonden van zijn tijd; Verslag der 11de Algemeene Vergadering der Vereeniging van Predikanten. *The Same*, November: Verslag der 11de Algemeene Vergadering der Vereeniging van Predikanten; L. LINDEBOOM, Jezus Christus en die gekruisigd het kenmerk der Apostolische prediking.

Gregorianum, Romae, Septembri: L. J. WALKER, Anglia quaerens fidem ii; G. MATTIUSSI, Determinazioni idealiste; H. LENNERZ, "Salva illorum substantia" i; A. D'ALÈS, Novatien et le doctrine de la Trinité à Rome au milieu du troisième siècle.

Logos, Napoli, Luglio-Dicembre: BORIS JAKOVENKO, Il cammino della conoscenza filosofica; GIUSEPPI RENSI, La volatilizzazione di Dio; C. RANZOLI, Il problema delle azioni a distanza; P. MASSON-OURSEL, Le positivisme mystique de l'Inde; GUIDO D. VALLE, Le antinomie della valutazione; GIUSEPPI EPIFANIO, Il sonno in psichiatria; COSMO GUASTELLI, La teoria di Einstein e il fenomenismo; PAOLI SERINI, Bergson e lo spiritualismo francese del sec. XIX.

Nieuwe Theologische Studien, Gröningen, V: 7/8: J. DE ZWAAN, Christendom en geestelijke stroomingen in den Keizertijd; J. DE ZWAAN, De tweede druk van Boussets Kyrios Christos; A. J. DE SOPPER, Filosofica; H. M. VAN NES, Zendingsarbeid.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Mai-Aout: ADHEMAR D'ALÈS, Marcion: la réforme chrétienne deuxième siècle; JEAN CALÈS, Les trois discours prophétiques sur l'Emmanuel; PROSPER SCHEPENS, L'épitre de Singularite clericorum du psuedo-Cyprien.

Revista de Cultura Religiosa, S. Paulo, I:3: VINCENTE THEMUDO, A Hollanda e a Reforma no Brasil; MIGUEL GEKELER, Philanthropia Christa; ALBERTINO PINHEIRO, Jesus; OTHONIEL MOTTA, O Materialismo e a Literatura.

Revue Benedictine, Paris, Octobre: G. MORIN, Fragments pélagiens inédits du ms. 954 de Vienne; Le texte des cantiques aux Vigiles de Noël, d'après l'usage monastique primitif; A. WILMART, Le vrai pontifical de Prudence de Troyes.

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, Toulouse, Octobre: Constitution Apostolique de S. S. Pie XI; F. CAVALLERA, La Spiritualité des Exercices; L. GOUGAUD, La "Theoria" dans la spiritualité médiévale; J. DE GUIBERT, Dons du saint-esprit et mode d'agir "ultra humain" d'après S. Thomas; A. WILMART, La fausse lettre latine de Macaire; H. BREMOND, École Ignatienne et scole Bérulienne.

Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, Juillet-Aout: S. ROCHEBLAVE, Étude sur Joseph de Maistre; C. BLONDEL, La Psychanalyse; L. P. HORST, L'extrase chez les prophètes d'Israël; A. CAUSSE, Quelques remarques sur la psychologie des prophètes; R. WILL, La liberté chrétienne chez Luther. *The Same*, Septembre-Octobre: P. LOBSTEIN, Une lacune dans la philosophie religieuse du XVIII^e siècle; R. ROCHEBLAVE, Étude sur Joseph de Maistre (con.); A. LECERF, De la nécessité d'une restauration de la dogmatique calviniste; J. D. BENOIT, Le principe de la souveraineté absolue de Dieu peut-il servir de base à une restauration dogmatique?

Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, Louvain, Avril-Juillet: L. VAN DER ESSEN, Alfred Cauchie, l'initiateur, le savant, l'homme; A. PELZER, Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés, en Avignon, en 1326; J. DE GHELLINCK, Un évêque bibliophile au XIV^e siècle, Richard Aungerville de Bury.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Juillet-Septembre: PHILIPPE BRIDEL, De la religion comme principe indispensable à la vie de l'humanité; PHILIPPE DAULTE, Franz Leenhardt; ROBERT WERNER, Partis et conflits d'idées dans l'anglicanisme contemporain; ARNOLD REYMOND, Le pragmatisme religieux; JEAN DE LA HARPE, L'énergie universelle.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Octobre: FRANÇOIS VIAL, Les arguments de M. Einstein; P. MADONNET, La "ruine" des dantologues.

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Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, xlvi:4: JOHANN STUFLER, Ist Johannes von Neapel ein Zeuge für die praemotio physica?; ARTUR LANDGRAF, Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae; URBAN HOLZMEISTER, Die Magdalenenfrage in der kirchlichen Überlieferung, ii.

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IS THE HIGHER CRITICISM SCHOLARLY?

By ROBERT DICK WILSON, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Semitic Philology and Old Testament Criticism in Princeton Theological Seminary. With a Foreword by PHILIP E. HOWARD. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times, 1922. Price 25 cents. London: Marshall Bros., 1923. Price 1 sh.

"The book is a veritable arsenal of ammunition with which to demolish the critical theories."—Howard Agnew Johnston, in *Scientific Christian Thinking for Young People*.

WITHIN THE GATEWAYS OF THE FAR EAST

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922. Crown octavo, pp. 128.

As a member of the Princeton Theological Faculty, as a delegate of the Presbyterian Board of Missions and as a leader in a long series of important conferences, Professor Erdman was afforded unusual opportunities for investigating the forces now contending for mastery in the Orient. However, he never centers the interest of his narrative upon mere personal experiences, but upon the avenues of approach, the great wide gateways, opening before those who are bringing to the nations that Christian Gospel which is held to be the hope of the Far East.

CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. To appear in February. Price about \$1.50.

Being convinced that historic Christianity and the naturalistic liberalism now widely prevalent in the Church are not two varieties of the same religion, but two distinct religions, the author endeavors to present the issue between the two as clearly as possible in order that the reader may be aided in deciding it for himself. The "liberal" and the evangelical way of thinking are contrasted as they concern (1) Doctrine, (2) God and Man, (3) the Bible, (4) Christ, (5) Salvation, (6) the Church.

THE ORIGIN OF PAUL'S RELIGION

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN. The James Sprunt Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia. New York: The Macmillan Company, Second Printing, 1923. Price \$1.75.

"Professor Machen's work commands respect. It is worthy of a high place among the products of American biblical scholarship"—B. W. Bacon, in *The Evening Post* (New York).

"Dr. Machen . . . has written a book which, while obviously the result of careful study, is not too academic to interest the general theological reader."—*The Times* (London).

"This is a book which it would be difficult to overpraise."—*The Church Quarterly Review* (London).

THE RETURN OF CHRIST

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN. New York: George H. Doran Company. Crown 8vo. pp. xiv, 108. Price \$1.00.

As the author states, "the purpose of this book is to deepen conviction and to promote harmony of belief concerning the return of Christ." The doctrine is treated not as "the foundation" but as "the capstone of the Christian faith." The writer "does not attempt to explain mysteries . . . he emphasizes the cardinal truth that the great duty resting upon all those who accept the Lord Jesus Christ . . . is to preach 'this gospel of the kingdom in all the world . . . and then shall the end come.'"—*The Moravian*.

NEW TESTAMENT GREEK FOR BEGINNERS

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Will probably appear in March.

This textbook is intended both for students who are beginning the study of Greek and for those whose acquaintance with the language is so imperfect that they need a renewed course of elementary instruction. The book does not deal with classical Greek, but presents simply the New Testament usage.